A future industrial operation on the Moon. Possible or not? (Artwork by Pat Rawlings)
A NASA-sponsored study has been released which outlines a plan to return to the Moon with people and set-up an outpost at one of the poles to mine water for propellant. This report has drawn both attention and puzzlement within the space community, as the agency continues to make clear that they have no interest in human lunar missions. This disconnect is covered because NASA will not do these activities – instead, the agency will pay commercial companies to develop and implement the plan. The propellant produced at the outpost from lunar polar water will then be sold to NASA for use in future human missions to Mars.
I find both positive and negative aspects in this report. I am gratified that another study recognizes the great leveraging power for spaceflight offered by the development of lunar resources. Most NASA lunar mission studies have invariably incorporated resource utilization only in the form of small-scale demonstrations or flight experiments. In contrast, this effort makes the production of water from the Moon’s polar deposits the principal mission objective – a definite step forward. The architecture also makes significant use of robotic machines on the Moon for most of the mining and processing activities, another positive development. Because of the Moon’s proximity, controlling robots on the lunar surface in near real time permits the early establishment of processing facilities using operators on Earth, rather than on the Moon. In these ways, I find a lot of similarity with this plan and the architecture designed in 2011 by Tony Lavoie and myself.
On the other hand, there are some strange aspects to the report that warrant attention. Early stages of the program call for human crews to be sent on equatorial surface sortie missions prior to the establishment of the polar outpost. Presumably, these missions will test and prove the equipment and vehicles needed for routine lunar surface access later. But sortie missions to equatorial or mid-latitude sites offer no real benefit to the ultimate aim of the architecture: the establishment of propellant production facilities at the pole. There is no good reason for not sending the first human missions directly to the locations where our future activities will happen. There is also no rush to do so – much can be accomplished in advance of human arrival with robotic machines under the control of operators on Earth.
The architecture calls for a series of robotic missions to reconnoiter, prospect and survey potential mining sites prior to human arrival. This approach is an absolute necessity, as much is still unknown about the nature and composition of the polar ice deposits. Apparently, there has been little to no scientific input to this report regarding the consideration of actual prospecting and mining activities, a significant shortcoming. Although the study acknowledges that the unknowns of polar ice mining constitute a “major risk” to the program, that risk can be at least partly mitigated now through the incorporation of results from current research. Known facts are misstated (e.g., water concentrations) and unattributed, a general shortcoming of this effort. It is critical to demonstrate ISRU (in situ resource utilization) with robotic precursors prior to outpost commitment, but the report does not indicate what levels of production constitute success or failure of this milestone. Insufficient detail for the robotic missions likely indicates that these aspects have not been designed or imagined, e.g., the need of power and communications for polar robotic spacecraft requires a significant supporting infrastructure that is not described.
The principal object of the lunar outpost in this plan is the production of water to be converted into cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen for use as rocket propellant. The report envisions this lunar propellant (about 200 metric tons per year at the end of outpost emplacement) as enabling human missions to Mars by reducing the total number of required SLS heavy lift vehicle launches required for such a mission from 12 to 3. But the study does not mention an even more tangible, practical benefit – that the availability of lunar produced propellant not only enables human missions to Mars, it creates routine access to the entirety of cislunar space. We could visit all of the locations of cislunar space (e.g., GEO, L-points) with people and machines to emplace, construct and maintain new satellites of potentially enormous power and capability. A fleet of space-based flight assets in cislunar space, provisioned by the products and propellant produced on the Moon, constitutes a transportation system that can serve nearly all of our space needs for the next century.
The cost analysis of this architecture has drawn much attention. Indeed, more print space is expended on the allegedly low total cost of the project (23 pages) than on the technical aspects of establishing a lunar presence (20 pages). The remainder of the 100-page report deals with risk management and organizational structures. The report claims that by using their approach, the establishment of the polar outpost would cost $40 billion, plus or minus 30%. At first glance, this estimate seems exceedingly low, but it is comparable within about a factor of two to the cost analysis numbers run for the Spudis-Lavoie predominantly robotic architecture (our cost total is $88 billion, of which 30% is reserve). Where do their low cost estimates come from? Primarily from the assumption, widely held in the New Space community, that a COTS-like model of implementation will produce cost savings of factors of eight to ten.
In their model, NASA simply provides the money and industry designs, develops and performs the missions and program. This architecture critically relies on SpaceX’s “Falcon Heavy” for the delivery of propellant to LEO – a vehicle that has yet to materialize, even in structural mock-up form. The Falcon Heavy design consists of three Falcon 9 vehicles, constituting a total of 27 engines, strapped together and using cross-feeds for fuel. In concept, it is similar to the old Soviet N-1 rocket, which used 30 engines; that vehicle was launched four times and never successfully. Even if Falcon Heavy works as advertised, we have no idea what its ultimate cost per flight might be. Its 53 metric ton to LEO payload capacity has no obvious commercial customer; satellite manufacturers design their spacecraft to fit on Atlas or Delta expendables (with a mass limit of about 30 metric tons), so the excess lift capacity either goes to waste or must be sold to co-riders. I frankly find the quoted cost of $90 million per flight of Falcon Heavy unbelievable, especially as the vehicle has not yet flown.
But the new plan willingly accepts this advertised sticker price, largely on the ideological belief in the New Space trope that it can do more in space with less money. The NASA program to deliver cargo to the ISS using commercial launch providers is cited as an example of the benefits of the new business model. In fact, we arguably spend more money now for payload delivered to ISS on the Dragon (about $9,500 per kg) than when Shuttle was operational (cost usually quoted as between $5,000-$10,000 per kg). All equipment, assets and operations remain the property and responsibility of the lunar “development authority,” an entity established by the plan consisting of a consortium of private companies and international agencies to accomplish the mission. So American (and possibly other nations’) taxpayers pay for a lunar outpost, but they don’t own any of it. And when it eventually does come time for a human Mars mission, NASA will pay for the lunar-produced propellant, even though they would have already paid to develop the system that acquires and delivers it.
Which brings me to a final (possibly critical) aspect of this plan. One reason I favor the federal government leading a return to the Moon is that it establishes our national, collective rights to use the Moon and cislunar space for a wide variety of purposes, including all of our economic, scientific and security needs. In possible future disputes with the space efforts of other nation states (such as China), it is not clear that this “development authority” will possess the stature or the assets to prevail. Nations can and do go head-to-head, but when nations go against corporations (for- or not-for profit), corporations seldom come out on top.
The development of the Moon and cislunar space is critical to national strategic needs – it is not some carnival sideshow that we should relegate to a second-tier space program. While I applaud this effort as a contribution to the technical literature of lunar return, I have serious doubts that the plan as presented will work. New Space has a long history of talking big and promising bigger, but their follow-through and delivery has been more run of the mill. Undertaking a major, innovative space program is beyond their capabilities now and may remain so for the foreseeable future.
Still, setting aside concerns over this plan’s feasibility, the glaring issue of our weakened national space posture remains. The traditional role of government is to represent us collectively and to protect our national interests. A lunar development authority would possess neither those ethics nor the means to do anything about them. We are not the only ones interested in the Moon and cislunar space, and it is still a dangerous world. The federal government, of which NASA is a part, should take steps to assure national rights of access and activity in cislunar space and the Moon. It should be noted that in the section of the report listing the “pros” and “cons” of a development authority, these critical national priorities are not even considered.
“-enabling human missions to Mars by reducing the total number of required SLS heavy lift vehicle launches required for such a mission from 12 to 3.”
Mars is a P.R. hook, a distraction, and a farce. It is one of the half dozen devices NewSpace relies on to bamboozle the public and obfuscate issues in any serious discussion. Liquid Hydrogen and oxygen derived from lunar ice is NOT the salient feature in this scenario. Considering the volatiles likely to be trapped in lunar ice deposits, methane is the more likely propellent as it is much easier to store and handle. As for interplanetary travel using chemical propulsion- that is a myth. Only nuclear energy can push the massive cosmic ray shields necessary for long duration human deep space missions. Which is fine because the Moon is the only place to acquire the water-as-shielding, assemble, test, and launch such nuclear missions. LEO is the worst place to do it.
“-construct and maintain new satellites of potentially enormous power and capability.”
In my view these future “satellites” will be manned GEO space stations assembled in lunar orbit from wet workshops. With radiation shields filled with lunar water, they will transit back across cislunar space to replace the present satellite junkyard and capture the over hundred billion dollar a year revenues of that industry. Mate nuclear propulsion systems (not in GEO) to these assembled stations in lunar orbit and they become spaceships. True space stations and spaceships must provide artificial Earth gravity and a near-sea-level radiation environment for long duration multi-year missions. LEO is a dead end and a complete waste of time and money. The only reason it continues to be pursued is the NewSpace business plan which is mostly about….tourists.
“-the ideological belief in the New Space trope that it can do more in space with less money.”
That ideology blew up with the last hobby rocket. The ideology that was always the utilitarian and represented the wisest path was put forth by Gerard K. O’Neill in the 1970’s. The inevitable collapse of the Ayn-Rand-in-Space fantasy NewSpace movement will hopefully restore O’Neill’s vision.
I would add that my assertion methane is the cislunar fuel of choice is based on conventional propulsion as the immediate technology to be exploited.
Liquid hydrogen has some disadvantages that make methane a better choice for many missions but in regards to Earth launch vehicles there is NO SUBSTITUTE for the Super Heavy Lift Vehicle with hydrogen upper stages.
In my view microwave beam propulsion as proposed by NASA researcher Kevin Parkin is the next big thing and this system will likely use liquid hydrogen as a mono-propellent. The probably-over-one-thousand Isp of such a system will likely be what makes any cislunar infrastructure practical and efficient.
“Undertaking a major, innovative space program is beyond their capabilities now and may remain so for the foreseeable future.”
This is where the term “Orwellian” best describes the NewSpace public relations campaign. One simple example comes to mind; Robert Heinlein is often quoted by NewSpace groups as saying, “reach Low Earth Orbit and you are halfway to anywhere in the solar system.”
http://www.projectrho.com/public_html/rocket/surfaceorbit.php
In fact it is not clear exactly what he said as it is often quoted as “reach Earth orbit.” The difference between LEO and escape velocity is really the difference between two very different places. Calling 200 miles up “space” and “space exploration” has not really been valid since 1968 when Apollo 8 left LEO far behind.
LEO is not really space. Illustrate in simple terms and educate the public with this fact and suddenly most of the NewSpace business plan takes on the character of an infomercial.
In fact GEO at 22,236 miles up is the real boundary where space begins. The space station to nowhere would not go in endless circles there- it would be a true space station. The reason the ISS is not up there is that dirty little secret NASA and NewSpace either does not like to talk about or trivializes: radiation. The ice on the Moon as space radiation shielding is the critical enabling resource for any permanent human presence Beyond Earth Orbit.
Dipping water out of the gravity well of Earth and dipping it out of the gravity well of the Moon tells the whole story: Page 23, Figure 10
http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucfbiac/Lunar_resources_review_preprint_accepted_manuscript.pdf
Bypassing the dead end of Low Earth Orbit and going direct to the Moon dumps the NewSpace business plan in the trashcan- where it belongs. When NewSpace starts proposing they “take over” any Moon project it is probably because people are wising up to their scam and they need a new one. Time to say goodbye to NewSpace.
One way to see the straits we are in, and also to address NewSpace, and reports such as the Mars via the Moon study, is to ask three questions. First, what might the missions to Mars cost via “OldSpace”? Second, is there any likely chance those budgets might show up somehow?
If the answer is very high, and it usually is, and very unlikely, and it’s usually more like delusions as to getting those future budgets, then the third question comes along naturally. The third question is “what might new approaches offer, including new acquisition approaches, and partnerships”?
Though people may think “NewSpace” only about a launcher (especially SpaceX’s Falcon 9 as a poster child of sorts), we actually have many more real data points – we have seen “commercial” paradigms in SpaceHab, EELV’s (Atlas and Delta), the Antares launcher, and operational cargo spacecraft (Dragon, Cygnus). We are seeing it too in CST-100 and Dragon for “crew” (both Dragon’s will eventually be just one platform, cargo and crew). We have seen “commercial” satellites and commercial satellite operations for decades.
In many of these instances very large cost advances have occurred relative to “OldSpace” doing the same. Development and operations have all done well in programs like SpaceHab, less so in EELV, and especially well with ISS cargo. ISS crew is heading toward very good numbers on cost, again relative to “OldSpace”.
As a poster child for “OldSpace”, take Orion, which will have cost $16 Billion by the time it’s development ALONE completes in 2021. If delayed a year, the burn rate is 1 Billion every extra year. This does not bode well for Mars modules, which also are complex spacecraft for cargo and crew, habitation modules in space and on the Mars surface, rovers, landers, etc.
If any of the numbers for Mars modules from stages to in-space modules to surface modules repeats the “OldSpace” (Orion-like) numbers, no budgets ever will add up to Mars missions. Take a zero off here, or make an item 4 times cheaper there, and things like costs versus budgets can look different, better, very fast. That’s what some “NewSpace” data would say is possible, just gathering the best data points.
Now, how to get lightening to strike twice and more – that’s the challenge some are accepting in trying to understand the better data points. It’s not a bad challenge, as compared to taking the challenge to go get that NASA budget justified that would support the “OldSpace” cost paradigm.
It would be curious to see which challenge of these everyone here would pick? (Who’s a glutton for punishment which way?) Recognizing of course that the mix of old and new will likely be the real path if we ever get there.
“Though people may think “NewSpace” only about a launcher (especially SpaceX’s Falcon 9 as a poster child of sorts), we actually have many more real data points-”
Throwing the B.S. flag on that one. The hobby rocket IS the poster child the child and the other “data points” are things like the Glory satellite fiasco and the Virgin Galactic fatalities. NewSpace is a scam and needs to end.
There is no cheap.
“I frankly find the quoted cost of $90 million per flight of Falcon Heavy unbelievable, especially as the vehicle has not yet flown.”
Space X is currently charging NASA approximately $133 billion for a single Falcon 9 launch to the ISS. So that’s already more than $90 million per flight:-). The tax payers still had to pay Space X 80% of the cost for its failed Falcon 9 flight to the ISS!
Since the Falcon Heavy would consist of three Falcon 9 boosters, it seems extremely unlikely that Falcon Heavy cost are going to be significantly less than $400 million per launch. The Falcon Heavy would still give Space X a huge cost advantage over the ULA’s Delta IV heavy– but it still wouldn’t be as cheap per tonne of payload as an SLS launch.
For a four launch per year scenario, the SLS shouldn’t cost more than $600 million per launch (NASA suggest $500 million) to deploy 95 tonnes of payload to LEO. Higher launch rates would, of course, reduce cost even more as would later versions of the SLS capable of deploying 130 tonnes to orbit.
Marcel
That’s incorrect on a couple of points, the 133 and the use of the 90.
The $133 million NASA pays now for ISS cargo flights is for the Falcon 9 launcher AND Dragon. This is a common mistake, or myth, to forget the Dragon spacecraft, and compare the contracted amounts of a launcher and a spacecraft to some other vehicle with just the launcher.
The estimated cost to NASA of just the Falcon 9 launcher is about 10% above commercial rate, being bundled (with Dragon), procured efficiently, and being a block. I believe you’ll find in the report that the same assumption of bundling and a block meant using a 10% premium for NASA on the Falcon Heavies advertised commercial price, to be consistent. More importantly, a “tanker stage” when required is booked separately as a distinct cost, much as Dragon is a distinct cost from the launcher.
Actually, using the Dragon makes it a lot worse since the Dragon can only deliver less than 3.4 tonnes of cargo to the ISS at $133 million.
That’s more than $39 million per tonne: 2.3 times the cost of the Space Shuttle ($400 million to launch 24 tonnes of payload) and more than 6 times costlier than the SLS ($600 million to launch 96 tonnes).
Marcel
Why do you include the cost of a brand new dragon each flight ( the customer, NASA wanted new capsule each flight) when quoting the Falcon 9 but you do not include any extra costs for the cargo carrier ( orion) at 1.1 billion each to the costs of the SLS? Add the costs of the cargo carrier like you did with falcon.
The hobby rocket just blew up trying to go 200 miles up.
The SLS is designed to fly a quarter million miles to the Moon. Blather all you want about cost but you are essentially comparing a Cessna 150 to a 747.
Actually….that is not even a good analogy because Cessna’s are a pretty good design while the funky falcon has so many shortcomings it is difficult to cite which is the worst.
Orion’s not a cargo carrier, its a crew capsule. But its part of the Ares I legacy that I believe should have never been funded (That money should have been used to develop a reusable lunar landing vehicle!).
But Congress wanted a back up human rated launch vehicle in case their were problems with the development of Commercial Crew vehicles– plus they didn’t want to waste the money already invested in the Orion.
But the Orion capsule has become extremely costly to develop and the US is not even developing the Orion Service Module (the Europeans are).
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated that the cost of the launch of the Orion plus the Ares I at about $300 million per flight for a two flight per year scenario.
NASA claims that the test of the Orion capsule aboard the Delta IV heavy (EFT-1) cost $370 million.
The Orion capsule should be reusable. But since Obama decided to outsource the Service Module to the Europeans, I supposed that their ATV derived system, could cost as much as $300 million per flight. But I doubt if there will be more than one MPCV launch per year after 2021.
I predict that the Orion program will play no part in future Mars missions and will be decommissioned well before the end of the 2020s– as an obsolete component for both crewed Lunar and Mars missions.
Fortunately, most SLS flights in the 2020s will probably be cargo missions, requiring heavy lift launches for lunar cargo landers deploying habitats modules, solar power plants, excavation vehicles, mobile water extraction vehicles, mobile water and cryostorage tanks, etc. in addition to cargo flights to deploy Deep Space Habitats and orbiting propellant depots.
And, hopefully, all SLS flights will be cargo missions in the 2030’s when its time to go to Mars.
Marcel
Orion with it’s powerful LAS is ideal for transporting survivable packages of fissionable material to the Moon. Hopefully there will be no “orbital propellent depots” or Mars missions as nuclear pulse propulsion will require none and if you have such a fleet of spaceships then Mars becomes a poor destination compared to the ocean moons of the gas giants.
By the $133 billion per flight of the Falcon 9 to the ISS, I assume you mean $133 million. The price for the Falcon Heavy is listed as $125 million per flight.
But for the Falcon 9 price to the ISS, about half is taken up by Dragon capsule. The Falcon 9 itself without the Dragon has been quoted as $56 million. Now remember this includes both the 1st and 2nd stages, of course. So when you consider for the Falcon Heavy the two side stages will not have an upper stage, a $125 million price for it is a reasonable extrapolation for the cost.
Bob Clark
$133 Billion per launch? That is a very serious misplacement of decimal points since the entire contract is only $396 Million for something like 12 launches. I don’t have all of the numbers in front of me, but I’m pretty sure the entire COTS program doesn’t even add up to $133 Billion.
I think the $90 million per Falcon Heavy number is a bit optimistic. Robert Clark’s comment of $125 million makes more sense to me. But long-range plans may be assuming some amount of success by SpaceX on cost-savings through reusability of rocket stages…something that I know you New Space haters are still in denial about. I say that, but I wonder if reusability would be possible for lunar launches or even human launches at all for that matter.
Billgamesh’s remark about “hobby rocket” is just plain out to lunch. That “hobby rocket” to which he refers so smugly just finished driving the venerable Delta rocket out of business. The sooner Old Space starts upgrading their development and industrial processes to the 21 Century instead of relying on name-calling PR, Cold War military surplus engines, and GSA contracting, the sooner we’ll have truly competitive and routine access to space.
“$133 Billion per launch? That is a very serious misplacement of decimal points since the entire contract is only $396 Million for something like 12 launches. I don’t have all of the numbers in front of me, but I’m pretty sure the entire COTS program doesn’t even add up to $133 Billion.”
SpaceX CRS contract is to deliver 20 Metric Tons to the ISS (in 12 flights) for $1.6 Billion dollars (4 times the figure you quote). That is a cost of $80,000/kg.
The CR contract for the ISS was for 1.6 billion for 12 launches from SpaceX and return cargo with dragon and the 1.9 billion for Orbital for 8 launches and the cargo carrier burned up on reentry.
“-some amount of success by SpaceX on cost-savings through reusability of rocket stages…”
Not yet. The only reusable rocket engines to date were used on the shuttle and soon to be reused as expendables on the SLS. There will be no cost savings reusing that cluster of crummy little kerosene burners- it is cheaper to drop them in the ocean- it is a scam. Try again.
“That “hobby rocket” to which he refers so smugly just finished driving the venerable Delta rocket out of business.”
The hobby rocket just blew up- something the Delta has not done in it’s entire launch history. Since this puts the future of the funky falcon faux heavy on hold the Delta will be launching spy satellites for years to come. So says the Air Force the foreign born founder of SpaceX sued.
Stop making stuff up. Calling me a NewSpace hater is the only thing you got right. NewSpace is the worst thing that has ever happened to the U.S. space program.
I agree that there are some major flaws. The primary one that slaps me in the face is the the incompatibility of the the two main assumptions of an international US led effort and a COTS model. Politically Congress would not go for a combination of the two. Either a US led effort where US developed items IP is the property of the US or a US only COTS development where only US companies do the development and keep the IP where spending and IP remain in the US.
The costs are plausible but as you stated there are no mention of programmatic margins. Plus trying to get humans to the surface in 5 years after start is the wrong focus as you also mention. Getting the infrastructure tested and resources explored is the first step Humans arrival on the base is for a higher and expanded level of maintenance and operations. You and I have conversed back before in 2011/2012 about use of the COTS model and its costs impacts to NASA. Actually what the model shows is that the actual costs are deferred into the price of the water/prop delivered enabling a much lower initial yearly NASA budget. It also enables more incentive for innovation getting the corporations out from under a more strict NSA control. I have updated the COTS model I did based on your work and a spreadsheet of it was posted recently in the Mission to the Moon forum section of NSF.
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=37591.msg1400005#msg1400005
It also does not contain the cost growth margins additions for NASA budgeting.
An additional note about the the spreadsheet cost model is that it is still a work in progress and that a more spread out initial development of the first 2 years into a 8 year time-frame allows for the major upfront costs for technology developments for depot and ISRU technologies to be funded by NASA at a constant $600M per year budget. Meaning that this slower pace development would start landing hardware on the Moon after 10 years from Congress funding.
This NASA study I find as you do curious in that it left out your 2011 study as a reference since it re-performs most of your work.
Considering that the ESA also wants to move to a private-public partnership in developing launchers, it is conceivable that Congress would allow international partners in a private-public return to the Moon. When you also take into account that Bolden has said NASA might be involved in a return to the Moon as part of a partnership with Europe this becomes even more likely. Then on top of that you have the fact that the new head of the ESA Jan Woerner has spoken of developing a lunar colony.
Bob Clark
oldAtlas_Eguy,
Many thanks for the link to your spreadsheet. I will give it some detailed study.
“In fact, we arguably spend more money now for payload delivered to ISS on the Dragon (about $9,500 per kg) than when Shuttle was operational (cost usually quoted as between $5,000-$10,000 per kg). ”
Sort of a nit, but SpaceX CRS contract pays them $1.6 Billion to deliver 20 Metric Tons to the ISS (in 12 flights). That is $80,000/kg.
The $9,500/kg figure came from the assumption that each Dragon mission would carry 6,000 kg/launch and each launch would cost $57,000,000. When the time came to actually sign a contract they agreed to an average of only 1,666 kg/flight and the average cost per flight became $133,000,000.
You could expect the same sort of thing when the time came to sign a real contract for orbital deliveries by the (mythical) Falcon Heavy. The cost per kg delivered would go up by a factor of 8.4.
(Since I cannot reply to your baseless attack against me as a person below, I reply here instead)
I don’t claim anything about SpaceX. It is they themselves who use these numbers ($40bn investment for <$0.36bn/year). Given their own assumptions and calculations, their conclusion is absurd. If they don't do it for the money, to make space flight cheaper, and I'm fine with other motives, but then they shouldn't try to argue that they do it for the money, because it fails so hard and humiliates all proponents of that loosing idea.
This has certainly gotten to be a “lively” forum.
The point being made below was that the SpaceX figures being used by yourself and the study participants are highly questionable.
You can make all the statements about ” fails so hard and humiliates all proponents of that loosing idea” as you wish.
The real point is that if you did have a booster with the claimed hypothetical performance of the Falcon Heavy and used it to launch the mass of a Mars mission to orbit you would get a single Mars mission – an expensive “one off”.
Use it to support the development of a Lunar Industrial Capability and you get (for the same effort);
(1) An open ended series of Mars Missions.
(2) The development of Cis-Lunar Space.
(3) Missions anywhere else in the Solar System.
If you like the “one off” that is your privilege.
I will stick with the “loosing idea”.
It is the same device used by NewSpace for years; fill up the page with increasingly confusing dollar figures hoping anyone who looks at the page will be impressed with all the voodoo economic mumbo jumbo and not bother to try and make any sense of it. So sick of SpaceX cybermarketing and sleazy infomercial tactics.
You are giving NO VALUE to the cargo returned. Which is flawed thinking. How much does it cost to bring a pound of cargo home?
Puh-leez Donald, give it a rest.
The only thing of value to return from space is people. And since the supposedly human-rated free market miracle just blew up…..
As I stated, SpaceX (pre-contract) said their cost would be $9,500/kg by assuming each Dragon mission would carry 6,000 kg/launch and each launch would cost $57,000,000.
Then when the time came to actually sign a contract they agreed to an average of only 1,666 kg/flight and the average cost per flight became $133,000,000. An increase in cost by a factor of 8.4.
That was a discussion (by SpaceX) of up mass cost. Value of returned cargo did not even enter into the discussion as per the way SpaceX set the terms of the discussion.
The Shuttle, for instance, had far more down mass capability than does the Cargo Dragon. Yet in all the debates on the subject I have witnessed, I have never heard you or any other SpaceX fan talk about giving Shuttle credit for it’s down mass capability.
Well done Joe.
Call the shuttle what is was- a Saturn V class launch system- and the NewSpace fans get upset. They have always liked to compare the falcon with the shuttle as if they were somehow in the same class. That is their standard Orwellian sophistry in play- the falcon is a hobby rocket compared to the shuttle and that is why I refer to it as such.
When I first read about this idea, I wondered if the authors of it had read the Cislunar Next plan and simply copied the parts they liked.
What I take from this is that it would be best for NASA to bypass the middleman of “commercial space” and take it on themselves. To hell with he-that-I-will-not-name imaginary plan for asteroids and Mars. Perhaps something for the next president to consider?
I find the price estimate for Falcon Heavy amusing as well. ULA’s Vulcan has a more realistic price for it’s capability (they say around $100 million or so).
As I understand it, Falcon Heavy’s capacity to GEO is not much better than Delta IV’s capacity, due to it’s lack of a LH2/LOX stage.
“-Falcon Heavy’s capacity to GEO is not much better than Delta IV’s capacity, due to it’s lack of a LH2/LOX stage.”
The as yet unrealized miracle of “propellent crossfeed” also has alot to do with that as yet unrealized payload capacity. In my view their existence was predicated on making space routine and dirt cheap and thus proving OldSpace thieves and NASA a jobs program. Now they are raising their prices, their subsidies are being exposed and mocked, and they just discredited the cheaper-is-better approach by blowing up.
The SLS is a Moon rocket and the falcon in whatever form is a hobby rocket. The deluded SpaceX fans have been screaming for years the SLS would never be built but now it looks like it just might turn out the other way around and the NewSpace flagship company might go under. The best course for NASA is to abandon LEO and Mars and concentrate on the Moon.
The most obvious feature of the situation being the collective lack of guts to make the tough call and do what is right.
I assume you meant the Delta IV Heavy as a comparison to the Falcon Heavy, as it is 3 cored as the FH is.
According to Wikipedia the Falcon Heavy can get 21,000 kg to Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO) while the Delta IV Heavy can get 14,000 kg:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_Heavy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_IV_Heavy
Bob Clark
If the yet-to-fly Faux Heavy can get that much it should be compared to the yet-to-fly SLS and not the proven and yet-to-blow-up Delta IV.
Faux Heavy- 21,000 Kg to GEO.
SLS block 1- 25,000 Kg to Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI)
SLS block 1b- 40,600 Kg to TLI
SLS block 2- 52,000 Kg to TLI
It was more like something I heard via the scuttlebutt.
I can’t recall where or from whom I heard the figure from.
I’m more excited about the development of Vulcan and ACES.
From what ULA is saying, Vulcan can outperform the Delta IV.
And I think it comes close to beating what Falcon Heavy is claimed to be able to do.
The SLS is currently the only Super Heavy Lift Vehicle being built for Beyond Earth Orbit missions. Despite the two faced double agents in the NASA hierarchy working for Musk it WILL fly and be the most capable launch vehicle on Earth.
Nothing else comes close.
As well as limiting the production of cores at Michoud and giving away one of the launch pads, the present administration is now faced with justifying billions wasted on the amazing exploding falcon and a deteriorating space station which will have a Boeing taxi ready just in time to be decommissioned.
All the while sticking with Mars as the “horizon goal.” Mars has too much gravity to land on easily, not enough to keep humans healthy, not enough solar energy to sustain a human presence, and no reason to really go there at such incredible cost. And in reality there is no way to go anywhere Beyond Earth and Lunar Orbit (BELO) without a nuclear propelled and massively shielded spaceship which can only be shielded with water from the Moon, assembled, tested, and launched from lunar orbit outside the Earth’s magnetosphere.
LEO is a non-nuclear dead end and Mars is too far away for chemical propulsion. The best destination was always the Moon and the best ride is the SLS and the best reason to go the ice deposits at the poles- yet billions continue to be poured into the space station to nowhere and not one but two taxis- and yes, we continue to pay for rides from the Russians.
With about a quarter century of lifespan left my only hope of ever seeing human beings leave Earth again is the next administration abandoning LEO and Mars and making the Moon the “horizon goal.” This would entail cutting off the corporate welfare to the worthless NewSpace companies and expanding the tooling and workforce at Michoud very soon.
The “Vulcan”? It is not a Moon rocket any more than the funky falcon faux heavy is.
“The traditional role of government is to represent us collectively and to protect our national interests. A lunar development authority would possess neither those ethics nor the means to do anything about them.”
Perfectly stated. I would add they not only do not possess those means but in the most important sense they CANNOT possess those means. The means in this case being nuclear devices.
Nuclear pulse propulsion, or more bluntly- the hydrogen bomb, has been the only efficient space propulsion system for going on half a century. This fact is almost entirely unknown to the public. It is the most inconvenient truth of all concerning space exploration. While beam propulsion or other schemes may enable solar energy to be exploited in cislunar space any human travel into the outer solar system for the foreseeable future requires converted nuclear weapons. Since these devices cannot be detonated in the magnetosphere this leaves the Moon as the only stepping stone, as the single available gateway, to the solar system.
In terms of the U.S. national interests the most critical need of the human race in the near future is energy. The ethical considerations concerning global poverty being the prime conflict generator and destabilizing threat to the U.S. are well known. The only way to meet the unavoidable need for ever more power without continuing to affect the ecosystem we depend on for survival is by beaming this energy down from outer space. It follows in a chicken or egg first fashion that until a massive space solar energy infrastructure is in operation the only way to lift the several million tons of lunar-manufactured space solar power components from the Moon is with hydrogen bombs.
Such a nuclear Moon public works project is far beyond the means of any mega-corporation, let alone starry-eyed “entrepreneurs.”
There are some real positives in this report as you have noted. At the core, the concept is good. But I wonder if the authors sought enough outside input before finalizing on their architecture. I too found the initial equatorial destination to be puzzling as well as the question of why no do telerobotic missions to at least attempt ice harvesting operations prior to crew return. Also, the 6 or so years from funding to lunar crew return seems short to me and then to have a much longer time before a permanent base is established? Why not use the full-sized landers to be tested and proved by landing all that the permanent base would need before the crew arrives on the then-human-rated landers. For the current public-private programs it is cargo first and the crew using those systems. Anyhow.
However, I would differ on your assessment of the Falcon Heavy. The analogy to the N1 doesn’t stand on all fours. As you noted, the FH is largely three F9s. The F9s have a fair amount of flight experience. I don’t think that there was an equivalent step for the N1. Also, because the FH is based upon the F9s, one could argue that the FH has been more than mocked up. For example, here is a picture with, to a large degree, the equivalent of a Falcon Heavy not at mock-up level but with nearly the equivalent components:
http://www.spaceflightinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/tankland2v2.jpg
It is true that the FH needs to fly, but it is not a complete unknown. There is a lot of flight experience that is relevant to it. We need to be reasonable. If ULA were developing the equivalent capability I would be supportive of that too because what we need for BLEO is significantly better capability than the EELV-class launchers.
As for the price, yes, we don’t know the final price and yes, I too would question the $90 million price cited. I’d rather go with the $135 million price (for the top-end FH) for which they were listed and could have been contractually purchased for. So, the moment the first FH successfully flies, the decision makers should take a hard look at the then price and consider contractually locking SpaceX into a block buy.
The question about which customers need the capability of the FH misses the point that, again, because it is based upon the F9s the FH production line is the largely the same as the F9 production line meaning that you done need a lot of FH customers to keep the price of the FHs down. Rather, the large F9 manifest and the competitiveness gives reason to believe that the FH will have a good foundation upon which to operate. These all are relevant factors when considering the likely capability and cost of the FH.
I agree that it would serve us well to have a national program to achieve a good legal outcome to ensure our interests. On the other hand, the comparative cost savings for at least COTS is well established. So, couldn’t we have an approach which achieves both? I’m thinking of a Lunar COTS approach so that America gets lower cost access to the lunar surface followed by the establishment of a national and perhaps a separate international base.
“The analogy to the N1 doesn’t stand on all fours.”
27, not four. It profoundly violates the KISS principle and was never a good idea.
–But the new plan willingly accepts this advertised sticker price, largely on the ideological belief in the New Space trope that it can do more in space with less money. The NASA program to deliver cargo to the ISS using commercial launch providers is cited as an example of the benefits of the new business model. In fact, we arguably spend more money now for payload delivered to ISS on the Dragon (about $9,500 per kg) than when Shuttle was operational (cost usually quoted as between $5,000-$10,000 per kg). All equipment, assets and operations remain the property and responsibility of the lunar “development authority,” an entity established by the plan consisting of a consortium of private companies and international agencies to accomplish the mission. So American (and possibly other nations’) taxpayers pay for a lunar outpost, but they don’t own any of it. And when it eventually does come time for a human Mars mission, NASA will pay for the lunar-produced propellant, even though they would have already paid to develop the system that acquires and delivers it.–
I like your plan much more than
this one. In terms of shuttle, we spent 3 billion per year on Shuttle program.
Or on the budget for years, it was about 3 billion for Shuttle and 3 billion for ISS.
Presently, we have 3 billion for ISS and 3 billion for SLS.
Not sure how much we giving Russia for ISS activity, but it’s safe bet that per year we give more money to Russia than we spend on US commercial cargo and crew program.
Of course we get more launch capability from Russia- but then again Russia is suppose to be major partner rather merely some kind of beneficiary of ISS.
But whole idea of subsidizing lunar mining is wrong, and it’s not going to cost less than 88 billion.
What going to do is take forever- so something like 2 to 3 billion for couple decades and still not get any real lunar mining occurring. And sprinkled in to such “low” yearly cost will be related “loans” which will be tens of billions. Or will predictable dump more than 100 billion into this, waste decades and not get real lunar water mining- and eventually Congress will cancel it [assuming they are stupid enough to start it]. And NASA will suffer as result, just as NASA is suffering from SLS- or exploration of space will not occur as a result. Which not to say much real exploration of space is occurring at the present.
And I believe NASA should explore the Moon- less than 40 billion and less than 10 year- and of course *continue* to use private launch companies [just as New Horizon to Pluto did not use NASA made launch vehicle].
But if Government pays for Exploration, then Government need to control and be responsible for the exploration.
If NASA had something better to explore than the Moon, the US government rather than explore the Moon could offer a series of lunar exploration relate prizes, which could total all together, say 5 billion. So say 2 billion dollar prize to mine 1 ton of lunar water, could one of the prizes.
The problem is we are spending 20 billion per year for NASA to explore Space, and it seems NASA should explore the Moon and then explore Mars [or if we actually wanted to end NASA, then alternative could be prizes, but we should not end NASA].
–Which brings me to a final (possibly critical) aspect of this plan. One reason I favor the federal government leading a return to the Moon is that it establishes our national, collective rights to use the Moon and cislunar space for a wide variety of purposes, including all of our economic, scientific and security needs. In possible future disputes with the space efforts of other nation states (such as China), it is not clear that this “development authority” will possess the stature or the assets to prevail. Nations can and do go head-to-head, but when nations go against corporations (for- or not-for profit), corporations seldom come out on top.–
I think this same applies if NASA explores the Moon, rather than establishes some kind of prototype mining. Or have NASA find the minable water, rather than mines the minable lunar water.
This way it costs less- it could reasonably cost less than 40 billion and it could take less than 10 years to finish such exploration. And more important than this, NASA could get this funded, and therefore could actually start exploring the moon- rather than all this delay. Or we should started
such a lunar exploration program before 2000, and be finished and be exploring Mars right now.
So first explore the Moon, then explore Mars. And start with depot in LEO, and start with robotic
lunar exploration, and finish by 2025 with manned landing on lunar polar regions- maybe crew to both poles, or whatever is indicated by the robotic exploration.
And so after lunar exploration which could finished by 2025, NASA starts Mars exploration- to find resources related to future Mars settlements.
And if Congress want to waste tax dollar related to subsidizing lunar water mining, it can consider this after NASA has explored the Moon and while NASA is doing it’s Mars Exploration program.
There is nothing stopping Congress from adding 5 to 10 billion per year having something to do with the moon. But if they do this *at least* they will make there decision based upon previously completed lunar exploration results.
“And start with depot in LEO,-”
The depot was never more than a way to hoodwink the uninformed into believing a hobby rocket could accomplish the same mission as a Super Heavy Lift Vehicle. Much like saying enough kayaks can do the same job as a container ship.
Taking some lego blocks and a couple gallons of gas at a time into the dead end of LEO is a joke. The only “depot” ever likely to go into service is a lunar launched very large cislunar fuel tank with it’s own Zero Boil-Off system (ZBO) that never transfers propellent but instead just mates with an engine module. You won’t find any in LEO.
Paul –
I tend to agree with you on the more positive aspects of the Miller report, so I won’t repeat those. I’ll focus on three areas where I think we disagree. Sorry this is so long.
1. On your issue with using the COTS/CRS public-private partnership model…I think you do protesteth (!) too much. Where do their low cost estimates come from? Primarily from the assumption,(emphasis mine) widely held in the New Space community, that a COTS-like model of implementation will produce cost savings of factors of eight to ten. As the report points out, we have an actual history with with the right public-private partnership (PPP) used to produce space vehicles. The Congressionally-chartered study by Price Waterhouse in the early 90s showed that the privately-financed and built Spacehab was produced for one-eighth the cost compared to NASA doing it – really. NASA’s own study of the COTS program, where all but one participant (I think it was Blue Origin) submitted their cost data in confidence to NASA, indicated about the same order of savings of that PPP model (they gave a range of savings, but the 8-9x factor is usually used). And the two EELV launch vehicles, were, initially, produced faster and cheaper using their own PPP model. (EELV ran into a problem later, when the humongous telecom market they were designed to meet never showed up, causing the government to step in).
I’ve been in NASA 40 years; 9 of those as a Senior Executive, and I had management positions in both the Space Shuttle and Space Station program offices. We in NASA must get over our need to control everything totally in-house, no matter the cost, schedule, etc. impacts; because doing it our way for everything is making us more and more irrelevant to the future. Change is necessary in how we go about seeing that the nation – not “NASA” per se – and Earth, progress in space. In short, it’s not about us in NASA; the issue is about progress (or, as is the case now, not progressing). So, when it is appropriate, and done in the right way, PPPs are the way to go for developing things like launch vehicles, delivery systems, and anything else that is envisioned ultimately to be operational and used repeatedly. The PPP model is not a theory any more; it’s a real tool in the toolbox for the society to get things done in space quicker, cheaper, and more sustainably, with longer ‘legs’, than if you left it totally up to government engineers like me to do it our old way.
The Miller report emphasizes PPPs for major capabilities and operations for the simple reason that we have to – as in MUST – change what we do, and how we do it; or we’re going to continue to not get anywhere. As the report correctly points out, NASA’s buying power is reduced on average, between one and two percent, per year, over time; and is most likely to continue this trend. Rather than whine about needing budget increases that are not likely to come barring an alien invasion, it tries to paint a way to moving us forward that fits within that slowly declining budget profile the nation has decided for us. And I think they’ve done a decent job of painting one reasonable scenario (given the risks that you also point out, such as the unknowns with respect to water ice, etc.)
2. Your issues with the Falcon Heavy are somewhat weak, in my view.
To say that
This architecture critically relies on SpaceX’s “Falcon Heavy” for the delivery of propellant to LEO – a vehicle that has yet to materialize, even in structural mock-up form…….
while literally true, is a bit too cynical. After all, Falcon Heavy is closer to realization — and at likely lower risk and cost – than either SLS, Vulcan, or Ariane 6 for that matter. If you’re discounting Falcon Heavy, then you’d have to discount the production of any new launch vehicle, ever. The Falcon core stages on which it is based will have higher manufacturing rates, higher testing rates, and higher flight rates than methinks all the other upcoming rockets put together – and it will almost certainly launch sooner, and at lower cost, including operational cost, which is most important.
Even if Falcon Heavy works as advertised, we have no idea what its ultimate cost per flight might be. Its 53 metric ton to LEO payload capacity has no obvious commercial customer; satellite manufacturers design their spacecraft to fit on Atlas or Delta expendables (with a mass limit of about 30 metric tons), so the excess lift capacity either goes to waste or must be sold to co-riders.
As far as customers, a quick check of the manifest shows that Falcon Heavy has at least one DOD and two different paying commercial customers, already. And a major likely customer – the large national security payloads – haven’t weighed in yet. You’re just wrong that it doesn’t have any customer base before it even flies.
As to the cost of Falcon Heavy, simply stating I frankly find the quoted cost of $90 million per flight of Falcon Heavy unbelievable, especially as the vehicle has not yet flown.
is also a bit too cynical. SpaceX is the only launch provider on Earth that openly publishes its minimum prices; and everyone knows that special requirements, such as the extra hoopla et al that the government (especially military) customers require for their own payloads, is an add-on to that price. Yet, for example, the total price to, say NASA, for a Falcon 9 and Dragon launch and return, is less than any other launch provider’s basic launch price alone, as far as we can tell (sometimes by hundreds of percent. Really).
the new plan willingly accepts this advertised sticker price, largely on the ideological belief in the New Space trope that it can do more in space with less money.
SpaceX’s disruption of the marketplace with its drastically reduced prices is not ‘ideological’ or ‘trope’. It’s very real. You’ve seen what it’s single-handedly done to ULA’s plans. The most recent hearings in the French parliament on Arianespace mentioned SpaceX, according to Peter B. de Selding in Space News, even more than they talked about Ariane 6. Even the Chinese have publicly complained about SpaceX underpricing them in the market. These guys are for real. (While there are some extremists that blindly plug ‘newspace’ with sometimes impossible capabilities, I’m also not in favor of adopting the other cynical extreme; ie, that there’s nothing really new going on here with things like SpaceX, that it’s all “ideology” or “trope”. Both are wrong).
3. I personally think your implication – if I’m reading you right – that a truly national presence is important to be established – by which you seem to mean government owned and operated – may be legally off base; or, maybe more correctly, somewhat irrelevant. The Outer Space Treaty makes governments responsible for both their government and non-government actors; and uses the word supervise to get its point across. If US-based companies – or a consortium led by a US company – is running something in cis-lunar, that US government is still responsible, if my understanding is correct. In short, whether it be the USG, or a US company, doing something, may be irrelevant to the Chinese, Russians, etc., both legally and otherwise.
Cheers,
Dave Huntsman
Dave,
1. In regard to SpaceX cost performance, I do not accept that they are cheaper because we do not have fully open, audited data with which to compare efforts. SpaceX got over $800 million from DoD and NASA in the early 2000s to develop Falcon 1. DoD needed the capability to quickly and inexpensively launch small sats for responsive space. After enduring several launch failures and (finally) a successful launch, SpaceX cancelled the Falcon 1 program. They claimed that they would launch small payloads piggyback on the Falcon 9. Fine, but what about responsive space? The SpaceX shell game gets government to pay for their development and then leaves them holding the bag as Musk’s attentions wander elsewhere.
2. The idea that Falcon Heavy is real and SLS is not is absolutely ridiculous. SLS is basically the Shuttle stack, minus the orbiter. It has 30 years of flight heritage. Falcon has been flying only for the last few years and never in a clustered configuration. If you want to believe their hype and BS, fine. Some of us are not so gullible.
3. Do you honestly believe that in a property dispute with China (say, over mining rights for a particularly choice piece of polar real estate), that the American government would go to the mat (i.e., declare war) for the rights of the Lunar Development Authority? Fine — I have a bridge to sell you.
“I’ve been in NASA 40 years; 9 of those as a Senior Executive, and I had management positions in both the Space Shuttle and Space Station program offices. We in NASA must get over our need to control everything totally in-house, no matter the cost, schedule, etc. impacts; because doing it our way for everything is making us more and more irrelevant to the future.”
Sounds like he was in NASA and now works for someone else. He may want to “get over our need to control everything” but I doubt he speaks for the rest of NASA that is “relevant.”
Sounds familiar; another one ready to “hand it over to Musk.”
No thanks.
Excellent points Dr. Spudis!
The US will have little leverage as far as lunar affairs are concerned– unless we’re on the lunar surface.
Ouyang Ziyuan (Ouyang), a senior consultant at China’s lunar exploration program (2010):
“If China doesn’t explore the moon, we will have no say in international lunar exploration and can’t safeguard our proper rights and interests”
Marcel
My understanding of the plan is that the Lunar Authority would be financed by NASA and other national space agencies. It would seem in that case that the partners would have every incentive to push back at any Chinese attempt at claim jumping. On the other hand, there is no reason a NASA research station could not be co-located with the fuel refinery, providing the kind of federal government presence you suggest is imperative.
“-the partners would have every incentive to push back at any Chinese attempt at claim jumping.”
Such language is completely disingenuous. Force majeure voids any such “incentives.” The only thing that counts is fear of retaliation; consequences. Since the global economy joins China and the U.S. at the hip for decades to come we are not likely to start shooting at each other over some ice fields on the Moon. What will decide the matter is possession- who get’s there first and has human beings guarding the claim.
That means a Moon base- probably several. The best way to build one is to probably blow a crater and cover it in some way to provide a radiation sanctuary.
In my view Moon bases may not be the way to go at first. Robot landers can harvest and convert the ice on site into propellent and water and ferry it back up to lunar orbit and fill wet workshop radiation shields to provide true fully shielded space stations (with tether or torus generated Earth gravity). Such stations would allow for multi-year tours with no debilitation or overexposure to radiation.
On the $800M for SpaceX in the early 2000’s to develop Falcon 1 – do you have a source? I think you have two numbers confused.
It think you may be confusing the Air Force’s (DARPA’s) “Falcon Project” program from back then (and “responsive” space stuff and all that in assorted buckets and projects) with SpaceX’s specific “Falcon 1” – which are not the same thing.
The sourced costs of only $90M for SpaceX to develop Falcon 1 is at the back of the “Commercial Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems” from 2011 (see page 40).
It [sic] think you may be confusing the Air Force’s (DARPA’s) “Falcon Project” program from back then (and “responsive” space stuff and all that in assorted buckets and projects) with SpaceX’s specific “Falcon 1″ – which are not the same thing.
How do you think the development costs for the Merlin engine and the Falcon 1 vehicle were covered? SpaceX got both money and aid in kind (e.g., Kwajalein Space Center facilities) from the federal government to develop it. Then when it finally became operational, they discontinued its production. Try that in the real business world and you’ll get taken to court.
Mr. Huntsman,
A couple of points if I might.
In your point # 2 you say:
“SpaceX is the only launch provider on Earth that openly publishes its minimum prices; and everyone knows that special requirements, such as the extra hoopla et al that the government (especially military) customers require for their own payloads, is an add-on to that price.”
Maybe everybody know it yet until SpaceX signed it’s CRS contract, they were saying that they would deliver 6,000 kg to the ISS for $57,000,000/flight. Then when the contract was signed that (without explanation) became an average of 1,667 kg for $133,000,000/flight (a factor of 8.4 times more expensive).
Frankly stating that “everyone knows” that there are other factors that will drive the cost up by almost an order of magnitude reminds me of the old joke:
A guy answers an add to buy a used car for $800. When he arrives to get the car the seller tells him the actual price will be $6,500 and when the buyer asks why replies – “Well you want an engine and wheels, don’t you.”
The study seems to accept the $90 M/launch Falcon Heavy price as the full mission cost and to accept the 53 Ton payload as being total payload (fuel, whatever) with no holdbacks for (among other things) rendezvous/docking maneuver propellant. And that assumes the rest of the Falcon Heavy promises are true.
If having bought SpaceX “bill of goods” once and not being willing to do it again makes someone cynical count me as being cynical. I would call it learning from experience.
It’s important to distinguish launcher from spacecraft (and payload) while also adjusting for the location placement in orbit when comparing any launch providers $ per kg. Your confusing these all in MANY ways, yielding your INCORRECT numbers.
So say we wish to compare the Shuttle and Falcon 9 to the ISS. First, you would gather up what NASA pays. For the Falcon 9 you would have $133M for an ISS location with useable payload (only the delivered NASA “internal” (the the spacecraft) goods of about 3,300kg. The 3,300 is what goes inside the luggage; do not count the luggage itself (the Dragon). That’s apx. $40,000/kg. Again, what does NASA pay and have to set aside in a yearly budget, versus what does it get.
For comparison, say the Shuttle as the immediate comparison, there was the operational Shuttle budget and the capital (or “upgrades” budget) which were necessary costs of owning a Space Shuttle. A MPLM or other module was the “luggage” into which would go the “useable” NASA cargo to deliver. The MPLM to ISS at 400nm, 51.6 circ. was in the 10,000kg range at best, being generous (more likely just 7,500kg useable), not the more frequently advertised Shuttle payload range of 24,000kg, which is the payload to the lower 200nm, 28.5 circ.
Using JUST the Shuttle operational budget, a Shuttle launch would have cost NASA about $500M at the end of the program. So the cost per kg of cargo to the ISS, of the same type as SpaceX or Orbital delivers, would have cost NASA $50,000/kg with Shuttle. Now this is a starting point on Shuttle’s really “apples to apples” cost compared to a value like the SpaceX contract for the same, as owning the Shuttle also meant an upgrades budget again as large as the operational budget. So the real $/kg for the Shuttle for the cargo to ISS would be closer to $100,000/kg. Using the “delivered” MPLM payload (just like Dragon) the value climbs to $133,000/kg for Shuttle.
The Shuttle too had “fixed costs”, whereas the behavior of the ISS cargo contracts is more “by the yard”, allowing flexibility. That is, no one could launch the Shuttle just once a year (as had been proposed) and budget just the $500M (or $1,000, etc). You had to budget nearly 80% of the Shuttle’s operational and capital costs any year – just to fly once.
So, in a true “apples to apples” – $40,000/kg to ISS (SpaceX) is much less than $100,000 to $133,000/kg (Shuttle) to ISS – adjusting for (1) the exact same goods, not counting the “luggage” (MPLM or Dragon), (2) to the exact same place (ISS, 400nm, 51.6 circ.). In addition, the commercial contracts have “flexibility” and can allow NASA to “buy by the yard”. (The later being where SLS and Orion came from).
“So say we wish to compare the Shuttle and Falcon 9 to the ISS. First, you would gather up what NASA pays. For the Falcon 9 you would have $133M for an ISS location with useable payload (only the delivered NASA “internal” (the the spacecraft) goods of about 3,300kg. The 3,300 is what goes inside the luggage; do not count the luggage itself (the Dragon). That’s apx. $40,000/kg. Again, what does NASA pay and have to set aside in a yearly budget, versus what does it get.”
That is a very complicated analysis where one is not required.
SpaceX CRS contract calls for the delivery of 20 Metric Tons Cargo to the ISS for $1.6 B. That is $80,000/kg – twice the $40,000/kg your “analysis” asserts.
“Using JUST the Shuttle operational budget, a Shuttle launch would have cost NASA about $500M at the end of the program. So the cost per kg of cargo to the ISS, of the same type as SpaceX or Orbital delivers, would have cost NASA $50,000/kg with Shuttle. Now this is a starting point on Shuttle’s really “apples to apples” ”
You were off to a good start there, but then you added this:
“Now this is a starting point on Shuttle’s really “apples to apples” cost compared to a value like the SpaceX contract for the same, as owning the Shuttle also meant an upgrades budget again as large as the operational budget.”
If you are going to add costs for hardware development to the Shuttle operations budget, then you need to add the cost of:
– Falcon 1 Development.
– The COTS program
– Any Falcon 9 improvements financed by the Commercial Crew Program
to the operational costs of the SpaceX CRS contract as well, but you do not there fore your raising the shuttle costs to $100M/kg or more is not (in your words) “a true “apples to apples””
I worked in shuttle cargo integration for a while and there were detailed analysis of the costs of MPLM payload (even taking out the mass of any packing material) on a standard utilization flight. The figure was around $70,000/kg.
So a real even handed analysis of SpaceX CRS vs. Shuttle performance would be:
– SpaceX CRS – $80,000/kg
– Shuttle – $70,000/kg.
SpaceX is 14% more expensive than Shuttle.
Thanks for those comments supporting public-private partnerships for BEO spaceflight. While NASA speaks of this for flights to LEO this still is not pushed for BEO spaceflight by NASA.
One especially important place where I would like to see this pushed is in regards to a manned lunar lander. NASA still talks as if the only possible lunar lander has to look like the 45 metric ton, $10 billion Altair.
NASA does have the CATALYST program but this is only for small robotic landers. Yet the Centaur-derived lander of Masten Space Sytems awarded a grant by the CATALYST program could be developed to a manned lander for ca. $50 million, according to Dave Masten, less than two orders of magnitude cheaper than the Altair. And NASA’s own Morpheus robotic lander could be scaled-up to carry crew for a similar low cost.
Bob Clark
$10 billion to develop a lunar lander capable landing more than 10 metric tonnes on the lunar surface would be cheap. Plus you want lunar landing vehicles that can take full advantage of the SLS large fairing diameter– especially if you want to deploy spacious habitat modules to the lunar surface. You could even deploy habitat modules derived from urber lite repurposed SLS propellant tanks which would allow substantial amounts of interior space for astronauts or for growing food.
Marcel
It’s not cheap if NASA says it’s too much and they can’t afford it. Remember when Bolden specifically cited this cost for a lander as a reason why NASA couldn’t return to the Moon?
In contrast, a two orders of magnitude cut in cost to < $100 million is cheap and doable.
Bob Clark
Transporting humans down into the gravity well of the Moon is never going to be “cheap.” Forget it. How soon we forget what a truly amazing vehicle the lunar lander was. Coming back to Earth is much easier. A capsule has the Earths atmosphere to slow it down and nearly fool-proof parachutes that slow it down further so it can splashdown on this world largely covered in oceans. Like an escape tower, it is almost impossible to improve upon. The polar opposite is landing on an airless rocky body in space- there is no free ride and any kind of a crash is likely to combine propellents explosively in a fiery fatal finale. Kind of like the proposed toxic dragon landing evolution. Forget that also- yet another fantastical distraction to wow deluded sycophants.
What is “doable” is a robot because it would actually be expected to crash sooner or later (“semi-expendable”). The difference between something meant to carry humans exploding and something that does not is the difference NASA is considering right now with the Falcon 9. As I commented, robot landers can ferry water into lunar orbit to space stations and spaceships under construction without having to worry about human-rating for the time being. Let’s GO!
$10 billion over a six or seven year development period is only $1.4 to $1.7 billion a year. That’s certainly affordable for NASA’s $8 billion a year human spaceflight related budget.
Developing a reusable single stage vehicle should be substantially cheaper since Bolden was probably referring to a two stage Altar-like vehicle. A large single stage vehicle could also be used as an orbital transfer vehicle between LEO, the Earth-Moon Lagrange points and Low Lunar Orbit.
Of course, practically– any new spending in the near future is unaffordable– if NASA’s still running a big LEO program ($3 billion a year ISS program). So Congress will either have to raise the NASA budget by a couple of billion or finally end NASA’s 40 year mission to LEO:-)
Marcel
With a Falcon Heavy for $90 million, 200 ton fuel on the Moon is not worth more than 0.36 billion since one can launch it from Earth for that sum. So, the initial investment would be more than 100 times yearly gross sales. I certainly hope the technical calculation beats their economic one.
Only if you believe that $90 million price quote.
Of course, but they do! And still they still want to extract 200 tons fuel per year from the Moon for $40bn. They give a new scale to the saying “Crossing the river for water”. Some day launch costs will come down, one way or another. Fuel production on the Moon will probably have to either be used on the Moon, or be done in a very large scale.
I contend that one shouldn’t analyze the proposal to build a fuel-producing lunar outpost solely on the basis of cost payback per kg fuel delivered. In my mind, the real objective of doing something like this (which I also advocate) is to create a foothold off-planet and a permanent, space-based transportation system. That’s what you are really buying, not 500 tons of propellant.
Hi Paul,
Please forgive me if I seem to be butting, but you are not going to convince this guy of anything.
He is just inventing talking points to praise the greater glory of SpaceX.
I agree the value of getting commercial lunar water mining is not the price of the rocket fuel.
It’s about gaining access to the lunar surface.
So that’s why I think it worth the public spending 40 billion to explore the Moon in order to determine if and where there is minable lunar water.
Or for next 5 decades after exploring the Moon, it’s possible that less than 40 billion dollars of lunar water is mined.
Or if assume lunar water worth 1/2 million per ton, less than 80,000 tons could be mined within 5 decades.
It could be more than 1 million tonnes mined in less than 50 years, but it’s not predictable.
But were 50,000 tons of lunar water mined before 2060, that would change everything. Or you can’t mine 10,000 ton of lunar water without transforming the Moon into a place which one has access to.
You making an unaffordable 1 trillion dollar lunar base into affordable 100 billion lunar base.
Or making lunar rocket fuel is all about reducing the cost of all things one could do on the Moon.
But I think NASA should focus on exploring the Moon.
I think NASA exploring the Moon to determine if and where there is minable water, is more important than everything else NASA is doing.
Whereas subsidizing lunar water mining not important
to NASA. Having commercial lunar water mining would be very important to NASA. Buying lunar rocket fuel might be important- it depends on the price.
For US government subsidizing lunar rocket fuel, in my opinion is far more important than subsidize “alternative energy”. Just on basis of “alternative energy” lunar water mining is a more viable path in terms of the future. And then other factor is choosing to subsidize lunar water mining instead of “green energy” is less tax dollars wasted in total.
Or it would very difficult for politician to waste much money on lunar water mining- compared to the trillions they already wasted on green energy.
But likewise in terms of subsidization, lunar water mining not very exciting for politicians- the graft takes more work
The $40 billion is not the yearly cost obviously!
Bob Clark
No, $40bn is initial investment, as I wrote. $0.36 billion per year is the worth of their project, given zero operational costs. That’s <1% of initial investment. Financial logic bids that such a project requires about 20% yearly pay off to be worth the very high risk. It is much much cheaper to launch that fuel from Earth.
Based on SpaceX performance vs. promises in the CRS Contract that $90 M to deliver 53 Tons will become more like $210 M to deliver 15 Tons so the initial investment would be more like 12 times the yearly sales.
Even that Falcon Heavy performance is questionable, since the study seemed to assume that the supposed 53 Ton payload could all be assumed to be delivered fuel (no mass for tankage, docking and fuel transfer, maneuvering propellant, etc.)
I assume you are just being ironic. The Falcon 9 v1.1 expendable version already has a 16 metric ton capacity to LEO for only $56 million.
Bob Clark
Space X is charging the tax payers $133 million per Falcon 9 flight. Since the tax payers have already given Elon hundreds of millions of dollars to man rate his Falcon 9 vehicle, the over charges for the cargo missions sort of add insult to injury!
Marcel
Marcel, the $133 million includes the price of the Dragon capsule. For just delivering propellant by the Falcon Heavy, you would not include that cost. A more relevant cost estimate, if you want to compare to the Falcon 9, would be to look at the cost charged to satellite customers for F9 launches. That’s $56 million for a maximum of 16 metric tons to LEO for the expendable Falcon 9.
Note this itself is not terribly far from the $125 million for the 53 metric tons of the Falcon Heavy, for three expendable F9 launches would give 48 metric tons at $168 million.
Bob Clark
Robert,
You guys keep trying to say that the increase to $133 M is for the Dragon vehicle.
But unless you are planning to simply launch propellant into orbit and leave it there. your notional Falcon Heavy fuel truck will also:
(1) Have to have the capability to rendezvous/dock with you propellant depot (the current Dragon only has to berth – much simper than docking).
(2) Transfer two different types of cryogenic propellant to the depot (the Dragon does not to do any of that).
The cost of that vehicle (actually much more complicated than the Cargo Dragon will have to be added to the $90 M price tag. The weight of all that hardware will have to subtracted from the 53 Metric Tons of claimed Falcon Heavy capacity, as will the mass of maneuvering fuel to perform the rendezvous/docking.
The same goes for the comment: “The Falcon 9 v1.1 expendable version already has a 16 metric ton capacity to LEO for only $56 million.”
That is the gross lift capacity of the vehicle and for ISS mission the total mass of the cargo Dragon must be subtracted.
SpaceX (on their web page) only claims 13.228 lbs. of cargo. But when the time came to actually sign a contract they agreed to an average of only 1,666 kg/flight.
You can keep trying to play that shell game all you want. Nobody that has any idea what they are talking about is going to buy it.
“- one shouldn’t analyze the proposal to build a fuel-producing lunar outpost solely on the basis of cost payback per kg fuel delivered.”
The inevitable NewSpace scream cheap card is to babble about money being the only thing that matters. Only cheap counts…….but cheap just blew up.
And still they whine that launch costs must come down sooner or later while playing the other card in their stacked deck; the NASA budget must never go up. It is a scam designed to promote an inferior lift hobby rocket and milk a government space station to nowhere for every penny that can be had.
The SpaceX fans have been programmed for years to dismiss any Moon return. Here they have to talk about the mythical faux heavy as a Moon rocket if they hope to get any free advertising worked into the thread. They are just moving on to a new market. Which is why NewSpace must fall apart sooner or later; milking the government cash cow while claiming to be a free market miracle can only go on for so long before the public finally figures out they are being robbed.
As a member of the study team, all I could use in the study were past and present historical facts:
1) Launch Costs
1a)the space shuttle program from 1972 to cancellation in 2013 cost $251B based on the STS line item in the NASA authorization bills (several years had to be estimated because of continuing resolutions). This cost does not reflect the civil service costs for the first 19 years which would add another 20% based on the zero base review for the new accounting of CS in the STS budget line in 1992. There were 135 flights and the maximum payload was 24,400 kilograms. Thus, this simple analysis results in $76,125/kg. Other studies can dispute this “accounting practice” but this is the total cost to the tax payers. I was shocked and dismayed with this accounting, but it has changed my perspective of NASA launch costs.
1b) Based on SpaceX launch site, the “price” for the Falcon 9 is $61.2M for 13,120kg =$4,654 and the Falcon Heavy cost $90M for 53,000 kg =$1698. Rumor has it that cross feed is our so the payload is $42,000 (based on my analysis) = $2143/kg. Because NASA imposes a number of additional services from SpaceX and a 20% increase to cover their Launch Service Program, their costs are higher.
1c) The “prices” for the Delta IV Heavy and Atlas V 515 vary based on single versus bulk buy but are on the average ~$10,000/kg. ULA just announced their Distributed Space Architecture with the Vulcan, ACES, etc. which they say will be approaching SpaceX prices
1d) NASA has not disclosed the SLS costs. The SLS budget is ~$2B/year and based on the 2015 budget requests, the outyear funding is level. By 2017, $12B is the cost of the Block I 70t launch. By 2021 another $8B for the Block II and development will continue to the Mars 130t block in 2034 for a additional cost of $26B. There are no plans for launches but 1 every other year has been stated in the development RFP. Assuming an aggressive launch rate of 1 per year and payload of 100t, the cost is $66,000/kg.
Based on the disclosed NASA HEFT 2 study on the internet, the cost for the 20 year development and asteroid mission was $66,466/kg.
Thus,
Space Shuttle Cost =$76,125/kg (history)
SLS Cost =$66,000/kg (reverse engineered from current budgets and unofficial docs)
SpaceX website Price =$4,654-$1,698 (currently advertised) and a bargain at 2-3x more
ULA Price=$10,000 and going down with Vulcan to compete with SpaceX
Launch costs are a major element of total program costs and commercial practices are “currently” showing approximately an order of magnitude less cost.
2) 53t of propellant was computed by adding the stretched barrel sections of the LOX and RP tanks and the additional mass of fuel transfer and RCS propellant minus the mass of the 2t payload fairing.
3) Nuclear Thermal Propulsion is not economically feasible with a $19B development cost (NASA estimate – HEFT2 study) requiring a $6B test facility for removing all radioactive exhaust particulates. NTR only saves on launch costs because of the engine low T/m, NTR has the same trip times as cryogenics. Yearly program costs would be at least $2B/year. I agree that advanced propulsion has to be developed for routine access to Mars along with active radiation shielding. Very little funding to either of these enabling technologies today.
4) As stated in the report, a 1% concentration of exploitable lunar water ice was assumed for the sizing of the ISRU system. If not found, a fallback is LOX only which accounts for more than 83% of the total propellant required for cryo propulsion.
5) Currently NASA does not an economically feasible Mars exploration program as review committees have stated including Augustine and NASA’s advisory board. The Constellation program assumed the use of the shuttle budget (already dispersed to other uses), the ISS budget, and an additional $6B per year plus up to the budget as shown in NASA’s budget submits to Congress in 2008; however, the actual increases since then haven’t even covered inflation in their flat budget over the past 10 years.
Alan,
Thanks for your comments. In response:
1. Integrating the entire Shuttle program cost to calculate a $76K/kg cost for payload delivery is absolutely ridiculous. Shuttle was a multi-purpose vehicle, with many missions devoted not simply to payload delivery. By analogy to such an accounting analysis, we should include the entire aggregate space launch industry development costs into SpaceX’s total costs, as they use industry practices and rocket technology developed over the last 50 years. Moreover, accepting the $90 million cost for Falcon Heavy (assuming that it works) is an act of faith, not fact. You are entitled to believe your cost estimates and others are entitled to question them.
2. and 3. No comment, as I wrote nothing in my post about either of these two topics
4. In regard to lunar water, my point is that your report did not use existing scientific data to assess the likely concentrations of water at the lunar poles. I have no problem with assuming 1% concentration — but we could have (and did) assume that 20 years ago. We now have more data from a fleet of international missions that should have been incorporated.
5. No argument from me on these points. But they are irrelevant to the question of the cost estimates presented in your report.
This whole conversation is getting so long and convoluted that it is hard to tell, but I will take a shot at the topics “2”.
This seems to be referring to my observation that the study appeared to have taken the SpaceX assertion that the Falcon Heavy could launch 53 Metric Tons to LEO for $90 M and to have additionally assumed that the 53 Tons was all pure payload.
He seems to be saying that the study assumed a sort of Falcon Heavy Plus with “stretched barrel sections of the LOX and RP tanks” . This more capable version of the Falcon Heavy would have the additional capacity to take on the mass penalties for “the additional mass of fuel transfer and RCS propellant minus the mass of the 2t payload fairing” (not to mention the mass of rendezvous/docking hardware etc.) and still arrive at the original SpaceX claimed 53 matric Tons as pure payload delivered.
How very coincidental.
Maybe the “Falcon Heavy Plus” will be 5 cores lashed together with 45 Merlin engines. They can land them back from the morning flight on separate wheeled drones and then push them back together for the red-eye.
How much R&D money was used to develop a government rocket vehicle– before it becomes operational– really doesn’t matter since it’s money already spent that doesn’t have to be paid back to the tax payers. NASA’s not a for profit company. What matters is the vehicle’s recurring cost once it becomes operational and whether its affordable within the annual budget for NASA. Still, it is generally believed that NASA expenditures create more economic wealth for the US economy than it consumes.
There were five Shuttle launches in 2009 with a NASA Space Shuttle budget of nearly $3 billion. That’s about $600 million per launch. Carrying 24 tonnes of payload into orbit in its payload bay, the payload cost would have been $25 million per tonne. Of course, the Shuttle also carried 8 or more people into orbit. Commercial American launch companies are planing to charge a minimum of $25 million per passenger. So shave off $200 million from the $600 million in launch cost aboard the Space Shuttle for the passengers and the cost of the payload carried by the shuttle bay is reduced to $400 million (17 million per tonne).
Your argument that it cost NASA $76 million per tonne would have required a Space Shuttle budget in 2009 of $1.8 billion per launch with a total Shuttle budget in 2009 of 9 billion instead of $3 billion– which would have exceeded NASA’s entire $8.4 billion human spaceflight related budget in 2009– with no money available for the ISS (~2 billion) and the $3.4 billion that was spent that year on the Constellation program.
So when it came to annual budget procurements, the Space Shuttle’s recurring cost were easily affordable within NASA’s $8.4 billion human spaceflight related budget. And the same should be true of the largely Space Shuttle derived Space Launch System.
Space X, by the way, also claims its Falcon 9 cost are $61 million per launch– but its charging NASA $133 million per launch. Maybe I’ll start to believe Elon’s estimates if he returns $72 million to the tax payers for each of his Falcon 9 launches to the ISS:-)
Marcel
“NTR only saves on launch costs because of the engine low T/m, NTR has the same trip times as cryogenics. Yearly program costs would be at least $2B/year. I agree that advanced propulsion has to be developed for routine access to Mars along with active radiation shielding.”
I don’t know who you “agree” with on this but NTR is far more trouble than it is worth- it gives an Isp only twice that of chemical propulsion using a reaction a million times more powerful. Active shielding does not stop galactic cosmic radiation heavy nuclei; only mass and distance can stop that form of cosmic radiation. Both NTR and active shielding are non-starters and, like going to Mars itself, just gimmicks to justify “research” funding.
The ice on the Moon (as cosmic ray shielding) and the Moon itself being outside the Earth’s magnetosphere makes it the only place to acquire the necessary massive shielding and test the only viable form of nuclear propulsion (bombs).
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I’m guessing billgamesh is either a NASA or Boeing employee. Sorry, but I really rankle at the continued references to F9 as a hobby rocket. One failure by an otherwise very successful rocket that has performed excellently as a cargo delivery and satellite launch vehicle is no reason to give it such a derisive moniker. One which, by the way is inches away from becoming reusable, something the overpriced SLS will never be able to do. Badly done Bill, badly done.
Space X is charging NASA $133 million to deploy up to 13 tonnes payload per launch. It would cost Space X $971 million for its Falcon 9 to deploy the 95 tonnes that a single $600 million SLS could launch.
The SLS, including its ground systems, is only costing NASA less than $2 billion a year to develop. Its going to cost NASA more than $3 billion a year to continue the ISS as a– make work program– for future Commercial Crew flights.
Marcel
Keep guessing Joseph and don’t apologize for believing in what you believe. I gave it that moniker from almost day one and as for being “inches away from becoming reusable”…..those inches just turned into hard miles with that “one failure by an otherwise very successful rocket.” The close to 100 in row by ULA and the over 100 in a row by the shuttle make your statement “badly done.”
What was “badly done” was the entire Human Space Flight program after Apollo. Retreating back into LEO was badly done. Spending most of the lift of a Saturn V class launch vehicle on wings and landing gear was badly done. So little payload there was nothing that could be sacrificed for an escape system was badly done. The make-work space station to nowhere when with minor modifications the shuttle could have done 6 month missions was badly done. The billions poured into commercial space that has repeatedly failed the test from the Glory satellite fiasco to the years-behind-schedule toxic dragon was badly done.
Your participation in the SpaceX infomercial portraying the falcon as “resuable” was very badly done. It is just one more scam to distract the public and keep the NASA dollars rolling in for the years to come it will take to prove what anyone with a basic knowledge of space technology understands; reusability is a myth.
I would add that what is reusable is not automatically economical. While NewSpace fans are obsessed with dollar figures and endlessly blather about every “price point” they completely ignore the larger issues that determine success or failure. The shuttle SRB’s were recovered and inspected at a loss but the ability to inspect every steel casing meant there would be no failures after the Challenger disaster- zero failures in over 200 booster firings of these multi-million pound thrust devices. Such detailed thru-flight inspections are a complete impossibility with liquid fuel rocket engines. As for the wear and tear on the fragile structure of the liquid fuel stages themselves……
The airline turnaround and maintenance costs that characterize “reusability” as idealized by NewSpace is pure fantasy. It cannot happen and is just one of many devices used to mislead and deceive the public into thinking SpaceX is America’s only space program.
Again, the best term to describe this NewSpace-NewSpeak is “Orwellian.”
Let’s see where this goes. About time there is discussion on returning to the Moon (I’m bored of reading about Mars which will always be 20 years away), and the time frame means either money allocated to start building stuff now or it gets shelved like other lunar missions. As always Dr. Spudis brings up some insightful issues.
And there’s Billgamesh with comments such as,
“LEO is not really space. Illustrate in simple terms and educate the public with this fact and suddenly most of the NewSpace business plan takes on the character of an infomercial.”
I can see why he got booted from many forums (ruining dreams with facts?) but he does bring up some topics that need to be considered whether we like it or not. Radiation for one.
William Mellberg: Thanks for posting that link to Surveyor article in previous forum (cool pic of you with your dad and Schmitt). I was thinking as Dr. Spudis suggests tele-operated systems on the Moon, I’m thinking if those who design such systems will have to re-learn many practices your dad worked on Surveyor lens.
Getting back to robotics, we have made huge strides in that technology and gives us many tools that were not available during Apollo. And the Moon is only three days away, or a few weeks doing extended transfer like LRO/LCROSS to avoid spending lots of fuel.
“-the agency will pay commercial companies to develop and implement the plan. The propellant produced at the outpost from lunar polar water will then be sold to NASA for use in future human missions to Mars.”
As a troubleshooter I am accustomed to approaching a hidden system fault from every possible angle. This problem is fairly simple as essentially the same one the agency faced after Apollo. Justifying the continuance in perpetuity of a fixed multi-billion dollar budget without assuming any risk of failure to insure that chunk of sweet taxpayer dollars accomplish something; this corrupted the agency. If you are not really trying to succeed at something there is no danger of failure. Thus the retreat into LEO and the do-everything-pay-for-itself-cargo-bay-of-dreams. Unfortunately going cheap usually means ending up with nothing.
“Corruption -the process by which something – is changed from its original use – to one that is regarded as erroneous or debased.”
The origin of the space agency was a destination- the Moon. The error was in not making a permanent base the prize (the verb debase means to reduce (something) in quality or value; degrade). This was understandable because of the logistical obstacles to sustaining a base. One solution would have been a source of water which would have suddenly made all things possible instead of nearly impossible. Sadly, the water was there waiting to be discovered.
In 2008 mini-SAR equipment detected indications of ice deposits but the corruption had festered far too long. Instead of pursuing a cislunar infrastructure, which would have required a repeat of the massive investment and commitment of the Apollo era, the best we seem to be able to do is….paying someone to build a gas station in hopes of repeating the original error on a different rock.
I am not into philosophy but some guy named Santayana said something about those who do not remember the past that I have always tried to remember.
The only market immediately accessible to space industry is in the GEO telecommunications arena and the only way for the United States to triumph there is by way of the ice on the Moon. Human-crewed GEO space stations assembled from wet workshops in lunar orbit and massively shielded with lunar water can improve connectivity on planet Earth by an order of magnitude and capture hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue for further investment in space.
The first step is abandon dead end LEO get-rich-quick mini-sat schemes and Mars fantasies and redirect and expand funding into the Space Launch System.
It seems to me that both you (Paul) and the study participants are in total agreement about what the NEXT step should be, which is to send additional robotic probes to the Moon and confirm once and for all the quantity, quality, and other characteristics (especially accessibility) of lunar ice or other forms of trapped lunar hydrogen. Every other step is meaningless until that NEXT step is taken. So let us ALL focus on this critical NEXT step and put the rest of the report on the shelf for now, alongside all the others made in the past 40 years.
Technical Risk Assessment, Report Page 26 — “The most significant system-level technical risk of the entire ELA is the possibility we will not find abundant enough levels of accessible hydrogen, which is critical to enabling economical production of lunar propellant. While we have proven that there is hydrogen trapped in lunar polar craters, we do not know how deep the water/hydrogen is
buried, or if it is locked up in some form that is uneconomical to release. To mitigate this risk, rovers and prospecting systems need to be developed, tested, demonstrated, and validated. The availability of readily and economically available water, or hydrogen, at the lunar poles needs to be proven before significant investments can be made in all the other ISRU systems and the reusable lunar module that depends on lunar propellant. To the extent national decision-makers value the economical production of propellant at the lunar poles, this objective needs to be a top priority.”
The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) launched in 2009, but was conceived/approved all the way back in 2004 — FIVE YEARS earlier, shortly after the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) was first announced. LRO was originally part of VSE’s Robotic Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP). It morphed into the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program (LPRP) in 2005 when it got bounced around various NASA centers until management was given to NASA Marshall — when YOU and Tony Lavoie got involved.
So “we” (thanks to Paul and Tony) already have fairly detailed plans for the above NEXT step, yet it has been over SIX years since the LRO launch, and FIVE since the effective demise of the VSE. We clearly cannot get the next STEP approved in the 2016 NASA budget (already at the Appropriations stage), which means we need to focus our advocacy energies on getting it added to the 2017 budget request. Even so, based on LRO’s history, it will likely not launch until 2022 — SEVEN years in the future. So before we get lost in day-dreaming of Moon bases and missions to Mars by 2020, let’s take The Matrix’s “red pill”, and start building the needed advocacy coalition to ensure that the NEXT step gets in the 2017 NASA budget request.
Follow-up. Looks like our needed “advocacy coalition” is already one or two years behind schedule. According to the NASA 2016 Budget request released in February 2015, the last vestiges of the old Robotic Lunar Exploration Program were swept away the PREVIOUS year — in the NASA 2015 budget (THIS year). And LRO is targeted for termination. Though apparently NASA’s own Web site does not seem to realize this.
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/lunarquest/main/
NASA 2016 Budget request Page PS-21: Operating Missions — LUNAR RECONNAISSANCE ORBITER (LRO) — “LRO will cease operations by FY 2016. NASA moved LRO to the Discovery Program because the Lunar Quest Program ended.”
Ronnie,
The end of mission for LRO is only a proposal in the administration’s budget request — Congress has not weighed in and as NASA has no FY2017 budget yet, the fate of LRO is unknown at this stage. The project is currently involved in preparing a new proposal for more extended operations. Stay tuned.
On your previous point about the need for surface measurements, there is a mission called Resource Prospector, which is currently scheduled to fly in 2019. It will land a rover to investigate terrain near the lunar south pole. Details on this effort can be found here.
Thanks for the link Dr. Spudis. I think I’ll post the NASA video on the Resource Prospector on my blog this weekend!
Marcel
“To the extent national decision-makers value the economical production of propellant at the lunar poles, this objective needs to be a top priority.”
Characterizing the ice on the Moon as doubtful or a difficult to utilize and not very meaningful resource has been the standard Newspace position until recently. As the SLS gets closer to flying the subject of lunar resources, like cosmic radiation, is becoming impossible to trivialize. New proposals to use the falcon heavy as a Moon rocket are in my view tragicomic and nauseating.
The ice will ideally be in sheets on or just beneath the surface and contain trapped volatiles. Ice in surface sheets makes robotic operations practical, unlike robotic mines.The volatiles will facilitate in situ production of methane (and eventually other critical materials like nitrate fertilizer to grow plants), a propellent much easier to handle and store than hydrogen. This ease of storage and handling compared to hydrogen makes a robot lander that can shuttle back and forth between the ice and lunar orbit far more practical.
Propellent is penultimate but the intrinsic value of water is to sustain a permanent human lunar presence and cosmic ray shielding to facilitate space station and spaceship construction. There are actually other ways to get water off the Moon besides rocket propellent- such as mass drivers and even Jules Verne guns.
“Economical production of propellent for Mars missions” needs to be divorced from any lunar project. Mars is a farce. Anybody unfortunate to ever have to live there would dream of living on Earth. The propellent is for establishing a cislunar infrastructure.
Paul,
This thread is certainly interesting and entertaining! It is
good that someone at NASA at least is paying some attention to this type
of ISRU-based architecture, although i believe that there are many
optimistic assumptions in here that will not pan out should this be
pursued further. The study is short on the technical details,
unfortunately, as that is where the meat of the concept ultimately
resides. Nonetheless, here are my comments.
1. Two basic elements that make this work (Phase 3) are the RLM and
the in-space transfer. On both of these, i question the assumptions.
The mass fraction for the lander is just too optimistic, and i believe
cannot be built. The Isp for the RL10 would need a very large engine
bell for gas expansion, but there is no room on a lander to get it under
there unless there are huge landing legs. this vehicle would be very
large in mass, but no discussion was made on how to get it built in
space. A single stage reusable lander needs even more structural margin
due to fatigue loading, and they don’t mention it. The same comments
hold for the mass fraction and design assumptions for an aero-braking
in-space reusable transfer stage. This is a very difficult problem to
design for reusability while giving grossly optimistic numbers for
performance. Aero-braking will generate a LOT of heat, yet the H2 tank
will want to stay really COLD, and so that challenge will cost mass.
Air density unknowns will result in large error bars on exit velocity
which will be compensated by extra fuel, a factor not taken into
account. On the plus side, i note that Phase 1 and 2 landers use Direct
Trajectory profiles. Good deal, as long as one doesn’t have to
rendezvous with anything first.
2. I see no technical reason for human sorties to the equator. Maybe
the authors assume that politics requires some human presence to keep
such an architecture alive. I don’t believe that any technology
development is needed on key GN&C systems, nor on landing systems enough
to have a specific mission for equatorial human sorties.
3. I question some of the power requirements in the report, especially
regarding the power requirements for ISRU capabilities. Are the rovers
nuclear-powered? If not, you would need to charge them every time you
exited the cold trap, and that may require a traverse of a few
kilometers. A valid operational concept with timelines and power
profiles would show that they are too optimistic. Similarly, in Phase
3, electrolizing that much water is power-intensive. I see they bring a
nuclear reactor. How big is it and what can it do? No details usually
means that they have not thought in detail about the operation.
4. The concept of an International Lunar Authority is interesting,
although in practice i would see this more as an international
government body because of the initial participants being all
governments as opposed to commercial entities. The cost is just too
high to make this a commercial based endeavor (If it was possible, would
not some commercial entities already have developed one?) Much like the
lack of progress on the grand lunar X-Prize, the commercial costs are
too high for a questionable ROI, and even if so, positive ROI is far in
the future on general financial timescales. As well, because the costs
are so high, i believe that initial customers will all be governments.
If so, there is no major benefit for PPP, since the government would
have to pick up all the cost (no price-sharing with other customers).
5. Following the above comment, PPP is not a panacea; it has
applications where it is good, and others were it is not. For launch
vehicles, there are others in the industry that have been building
launch vehicles for a long time so that the basic functionality is
well-known and systems are generally well understood. That is not the
case with reusable landers and in-space reusable transports. If the
government is the sole customer, they (the government(s)) will drive the
requirements. If they drive the requirements, requirements will drive
the costs, much like the COTS ISS cost that has been much debated in
this blog thread. It doesn’t matter what the generic quoted price is,
the true cost will be only known when all the requirements are in, and
if history is any guide, it will be factors higher than the quoted
generic prices.
6. I think the idea of non-government ownership of assets which will be
solely used by government entities is non-viable for the basic
infrastructure blocks. If the government is going to generate the
requirements, operate the hardware, and repair it when it brakes, then
it is hard to imagine why this would be a good deal. These systems will
break down and will need to be fixed. Unless there are other commercial
crew on-site to fix hardware, this doesn’t seem to be a good idea to
me. Note that SpaceHab was at most a 2-week mission and would be
returned every mission for refurbishment. Yes there were some basic
standard contingency procedures, but there are just too many unknowns
for NASA to allow for ownership of a critical element requiring in-situ
and unknown repair capabilities.
In summary, good idea to keep In-Situ human space architectures in the
national discussion (which by inspection would point to the Moon as the
proving ground), but this one to me needs some more polish.