NASA’s Space Launch System — A boondoggle?
An endlessly repeated media trope is that NASA’s new launch vehicle program, the Space Launch System (SLS), is some kind of entitlement boondoggle, a gigantic “make-work” project for the agency – a derision summed up through the use of the derogatory phrase, “jobs program.” Mocked as a “rocket to nowhere,” the current SLS program takes a substantial fraction of the agency’s exploration budget, about $2 billion out of the $8.5 billion per year designated for human spaceflight. It is designed to launch massive payloads (initially, about 70 metric tons to low Earth orbit, later up to 120 metric tons) into space, allowing the use of pre-fueled departure stages to send payloads beyond LEO into deep space. In contrast to some misleading promotional slight of hand, the SLS will not “take astronauts to Mars” but it could launch ready-to-assemble pieces for a human Mars mission into space (it would take between 8 and 12 launches of an augmented SLS to get a fully fueled manned Mars vehicle into space and prepared for departure to Mars).
Why does the SLS draw such invective? It is claimed by space advocates that commercial launch can do the same job as SLS at a fraction of the cost. Less often spoken directly, but clearly part of this meme, is that the part of the money NASA currently spends on SLS should instead be given to “New Space” private companies to develop and produce heavy lift launch services at lower cost (predominantly, but not exclusively, to SpaceX for their “Falcon Heavy” launch vehicle), thereby freeing up money that NASA could spend on hardware such as habitats, landers and other peripheral equipment needed for future human deep space missions.
How much of this story is true? Why are we building a rocket whose mission and destination are uncertain? Would it be better to use “privately developed” heavy lift launch vehicles (HLV) for human deep space missions? And why is a heavy lift vehicle desirable anyway? Could we not do the same thing using smaller launch vehicles and space-based propellant depots?
Human missions to deep space destinations require large amounts of mass in LEO because we need to protect and preserve the lives of the crew, take all consumables and fuel for the journey, and carry the equipment and supporting machines needed to carry out the mission objectives. The main benefit of using an HLV is that fewer individual launches are needed to get the same amount of mass into space – with fewer launches of larger payloads, a lower launch cost per unit mass is realized. A few larger pieces are more easily assembled in space than are a multitude of smaller ones. The cost buy down is mitigated somewhat by the assumption of more risk, as the loss of a single HLV will more greatly impact the mission campaign than the loss of a single smaller vehicle. But the benefits of fewer launches overall and less complex on-orbit operations are usually judged to outweigh these drawbacks.
There are also historical reasons for the use of an HLV. The agency’s experience with the Apollo program created the mindset among many mission designers that very heavy lift launch vehicles enable deep space missions. Even the Space Shuttle was sized to Saturn V proportions; although its gross liftoff weight (2000 metric tons) was comparable to Apollo-Saturn (2950 metric tons), it had much lower payload capacity because of the requirement for the 100-ton orbiter to return and be reused. With modifications, the Shuttle stack was able to use launch infrastructure created for the HLV Saturn V. Likewise, the existing Shuttle support systems and infrastructure are now being modified for the forthcoming SLS program.
Complaints against the SLS come from several streams of thought. It is argued that building the SLS is merely a program to make a rocket, but one having no place to go. In fact, this arrangement was exactly the course recommended by the 2009 Augustine committee, who contended that the agency should become “destination agnostic” and focus on a “Flexible Path,” in which systems would be developed first and destinations chosen afterwards. President Obama seemingly embraced that recommendation in 2010 by terminating the Moon as a destination for the American human space program. We were going to visit an asteroid instead (sometime), but finding no suitable targets for human missions, the “Asteroid Redirect Mission” concept was embraced. SLS can certainly support that mission, for what it is worth (which is not much).
Another criticism of SLS is that NASA should not be spending its budget making rockets – especially a new launch vehicle system – and instead should purchase launch services from the “private” sector. Certainly NASA does this already for robotic missions and satellites, so why not let commercially available launch vehicles serve the human program as well?
No existing commercial launch vehicle (nor any anticipated in the near future) has the launch capacity of the SLS. The largest extant commercial LV is the Delta-IV Heavy, which can put a bit less than 30 metric tons into LEO, less than half the capacity of the core SLS. Critics of SLS claim that the advent of SpaceX’s “Falcon Heavy” vehicle will render SLS unnecessary, but that launch vehicle was announced in 2011 and we have yet to see even a structural test article of it. It is stated that this vehicle will be able to put about 53 metric tons into LEO, significantly less than the 70 ton payload of the SLS core. The acceptance of this lower performance by its advocates is predicated on a proclaimed vastly lower cost, but as no Falcon Heavy has yet to fly, we have no idea of what its cost would be. Moreover, there are good reasons to question the technical viability of the Falcon Heavy. Released design details show that it consists of 3 Falcon 9 rockets, strapped together and burning simultaneously. Such a configuration would consist of 27 engines, all of which must burn for the same duration and thrust level. The Soviet Union once had a launch vehicle (the N-1) that had 30 rocket engines; it flew four times, each flight ending in a catastrophic fireball, largely as a result destabilizations following an engine-out condition.
The problem lies not with the rocket that we are building – it lies with the mission that we do not have. SLS did not cause the destinations for human spaceflight to go away – that was a considered and deliberate decision by the current administration. In response, the Congress (who had twice voted their overwhelming support for the goals of lunar return, in two different authorization bills) mandated the construction of SLS, largely because NASA was dragging its feet on doing anything about it. Congress was concerned that an important national resource – the industrial and technical infrastructure (including its human resources) to build and fly HLV rockets – was being lost through neglect and attrition. They asked the agency to come up with a specific design for an HLV system but received no cooperation. So, they consulted external technical experts to derive the specifications of a general purpose HLV and mandated this design in the authorization. Its purpose was to make sure that the vehicle would be built and to assure that our national capability in this area would not be lost.
Congress reasoned that the SLS could be used for any deep space mission a future administration might consider. The reinstatement of the lunar surface as a prime candidate for future missions is clear from the language of the 2010 NASA Authorization, which specified the technical details for SLS, and at the same time, listed a variety of destinations for America’s human spaceflight program. In the preamble to that bill, cislunar space is listed as a destination in 4 of the 7 provisions of that section, while the presence of humans on the lunar surface is mentioned in 3 of those sections. These declarations were ignored by the agency.
A final ridiculous criticism of the SLS program is that it is simply a “jobs program” for NASA. Well, of course it is! Federal programs create jobs for the people who bring them to fruition. The unstated implication of the “jobs program” epithet is that it is useless “make-work,” like a work crew digging a ditch and then re-filling it, all simply to collect a paycheck. But “jobs programs” are now a fundamental part of our national existence (Try Googling the phrase “jobs programs” and see how many hits you get). However, some federal “jobs” aren’t make-work, but instead create or maintain national capabilities that are determined to be important or vital to the security and prosperity of the nation. We supported an elaborate industrial and technical defense establishment for the 50 years following World War II not to “make jobs” but because we believed that such capabilities were critical to the national interest. The SLS program was created because it was feared that once lost, the ability to make and operate a heavy lift launch system might vanish forever. There are always repercussions when you create a power vacuum.
No one but NASA (Saturn, Shuttle) and the Soviets (Energia) have successfully operated an HLV System. Such a system is needed for deep space human missions – at least until we can transition to a space-based transportation system provisioned by lunar resources, rather than one which requires that everything be brought up from the deep gravity well of Earth. The SLS is not perfect – it certainly isn’t the system I would have chosen to build (Shuttle side-mount could have been flying now for a fraction of what we have spent to date on SLS). But it exists and it will provide a capability that we can use to go back to the Moon and to the planets beyond.
“The SLS is not perfect – it certainly isn’t the system I would have chosen to build (Shuttle side-mount could have been flying now for a fraction of what we have spent to date on SLS). But it exists and it will provide a capability that we can use to go back to the Moon and to the planets beyond.”
Could not agree with that statement more.
It is interesting that the SLS Block I has virtually the same payload capacity that the Shuttle side-mount configuration would have had. This was the payload range that John Shannon pitched to the Augustine Commission for the dual launch lunar return architecture (the Commission ignored – not invalidated simply ignored – the presentation. Apparently it did not fit in with the conclusion they had already decided to reach).
Hopefully the SLS Block I will eventually be used for this purpose.
My main concerns about the SLS are still that it is (1) not reusable and thus will be unable to support high mass space operations with frequent launches, and (2) its development is using up all of the money that is desperately needed for in-space craft and cis-lunar infrastructure development. When someday the SLS is declared ready to use, how long will we then have to wait until the spacecraft that it could launch are approved, designed, constructed, and tested. Based on other programs, that would be at least 7 years or more.
I strongly support building HLV rockets, but this is 2016, not 1966. Why not build a reusable HLV?
Yes, I know we were told 30 years ago that it would take 30 billion dollars to develop one. By about 2020, I expect to see a private one in operation and it will not cost 30 billion.
its development is using up all of the money that is desperately needed for in-space craft and cis-lunar infrastructure development.
Actually, it isn’t. Spending on SLS comes to less than one-quarter of the human spaceflight budget (see text of article, above).
Why not build a reusable HLV?
By the time one is perfected, it won’t be necessary. We need it now to get the big pieces of lunar surface infrastructure into space. After we begin to use lunar resources, we won’t need a reusable HLV.
By about 2020, I expect to see a private one in operation
I don’t. But if I’m wrong, what difference does it make? We’ll then have two HLVs to choose from.
It is also a mistake to assume that a surface to orbit launcher will be less expensive to use because it is reusable.
SpaceX’s Shotwell (in separate statements) has said two things that (taken together) are very illustrative:
(1) The payload mass penalty for landing the Falcon 9 first stage is 30%.
(2) The cost savings for reusing the Falcon 9 first stage is 30% (assuming no required refurbishment).
Independent analysis puts the mass penalty at more in the 35-40% range and it is difficult to imagine reusing a Kerosene/Oxygen engine.with no refurbishment.
But granting SpaceX its own numbers that would still make the reuse of the Falcon 9 first stage a wash.
If the mass penalty is higher and some refurbishment is required is required reuse of the Falcon 9 first stage could (counter intuitively) be more expensive.
NASA operated a partially reusable heavy lift vehicle (the Space Shuttle) for more than 30 years. Space X and the ULA also plan to operated partially reusable systems in the future.
But its still not clear that there were any clear savings over expendable vehicles. NASA believes that expendable RS-25 engines will actually be cheaper than the refurbishing of RS-25 engines during the space shuttle program. And Orbital ATK is longer no even considering reusing its SRBs for its private launch system, believing that it is cheaper to serial mass produce them than to reused them.
During the Shuttle era, fixed cost (the cost of operating a flight system even if there are no launches) represented at least 75% of the cost for the Space Shuttle program.
Basically– its high launch demand– that has the most substantial influence on reducing the cost of a launch system.
Marcel
Forgive me if I’ve misunderstood, but it seems from this comment that NASA has conclusively proven that “reusability” can’t be done.
From my perspective and given recent decades’ history, NASA’s conclusively proven that NASA can’t do it.
If this were a discussion about any other complex system sold as a product, well, we wouldn’t be having the discussion. A car, modern oceangoing cargo freighter, computer — these are reusable.
Sure, you can push a car engine so hard that it can only be used once without serious refurbishing at serious cost. This is called drag racing. There’s a time and a place for these “ooh, ahh” moments, but when folks drive to work, when UPS delivers a package, the focus is not on the vehicle but the result. We want reusability in most things except firecrackers.
Mr. Bezos was quoted as following a path of “high performance design operated at moderate level performance.” I didn’t get the quote exactly right, but that is the gist of it. Build a really good system, but then back off a bit from the red line. Your engines will last longer. Mr. Musk seems further ahead on this path. Mr. Bruno may be as well. Reusability is on the way, and, I think personally, sooner rather than later.
Thanks, guys. Marcel, I always enjoy reading your comments, and Paul, your articles.
On a not completely unrelated subject, orbital depots for refueling (reusing) spacecraft, Paul, I think you have posed one of the most interesting space questions of the early 21st century:
Fuel depots can be placed anywhere, which is the point. But where does the fuel come from?
In terms of really substantial tonnage of fuel delivered, will it be, earliest and mostly, from Earth? Or will the (proposed by some) pilot plants on the Moon quickly turn into production plants delivering meaningful amounts of fuel?
Thanks,
John
Fuel depots can be placed anywhere, which is the point. But where does the fuel come from?
In early stages of development, it will have to be launched from Earth. But the reason that we utilize depots in the first place is that we need a place to store our lunar propellant product prior to use. So ultimately, depots are simply a part of a propellant distribution system based in cislunar space.
“Forgive me if I’ve misunderstood, but it seems from this comment that NASA has conclusively proven that “reusability” can’t be done.”
No the point of my comment was that (in particular for Earth Surface to LEO Transport) reusability is not necessarily less expensive.
It depends on the specific design. I used SpaceX attempt to make the first stage of the Falcon 9 reusable as an example using SpaceX own statements as information.
Sorry if that was confusing.
NASA could easily convert the SLS EUS (Exploration Upper Stage) into a propellant depot that could either be directly deployed to its destination by the SLS or could self deploy itself to its final destination (There lots of advantages to having a mobile propellant depot, IMO).
An EUS derived depot would be able to store about 125 tonnes of propellant.
Since it would be a lot safer, cheaper, and more convenient to transport water to a space depot than propellant, I believe that propellant depots should manufacture and liquefy their propellant from water using solar or nuclear energy.
So I’d also make the EUS derived propellant depot capable of also storing about 200 tonnes of water.
This would allow private companies to initially transport water from Earth to propellant depots located an EML1, for instance. But once lunar water is being exported to propellant manufacturing depots at EML1, Earth water launches might be restricted to propellant depots located at LEO.
However, lunar water exported to depots at LEO might still be competitive with water being launched to from Earth.
Marcel
In regards to Soviet N-1, they should do necessary ground tests of engines and systems for SLS, unlike N-1 where much of this was neglected. I heard only time they exercised all 30 engines together was the actual flights. Reading in James Harford “Korolev” the Soviet space program was not given sufficient resources. Hmm, I sure hope SLS doesn’t fall into same fate but maybe that’s why it is being dragged out all these years.
I think what will doom SLS is the infrequent flights, probably a lot of young people may not be that thrilled to get in on this program as they may feel they will be old people by time of first or second flight. Unlike SpaceX is moving at a pretty rapid pace (but wait, it ain’t all that great. I talked to someone that worked there, left for another job to allow time for themselves outside the big building at Hawthorne). Also with infrequent flights is political climate changes more rapidly.
Latest news is SpaceX is going to Mars, though it seems there’s more needed besides a spiffy Dragon-2 and a Falcon Heavy.
Then we have Billgamesh raising doubts about the New Space crowd which got him banned on other forums. Yes, I made a remark questioning Elon’s intentions and was flamed pretty bad by the fan boys. Everybody only says good things about him, anything less… geez can’t someone express doubts? I think that is essence of panel and forum discussions. Thanks to Paul Spudis for permitting Billgamesh to post, that 1972 paper on pressure fed engine for recoverable booster is interesting.
Billgamesh raised some interesting points such as what it really takes to depart earth space. Correct if I’m wrong but to go to Mars need high ISP engines (LH2/LOX) where other fuels just don’t have the “kick” (hobby rockets are fine for LEO). If this be the case then Falcon rockets with lesser ISP not going to be sufficient (but wait, maybe they are planning LH2/LOX but like all private companies they never say their actual plans).
Been beaten into the ground on this site, but the low flight rates set for the SLS are an artificial construct of the current executive branch (which has scaled the ground support to limit the launch rate – even including giving away a launch pad).
What one administration can intentionally break another (if it wants to) can fix.
Excellent point Joe. Two launches per year would probably make the system economically sustainable but I’d prefer about four launches per year for the SLS.
But I know that Billgamesh would prefer a much higher launch rate for the SLS:-)
Marcel
Actually the still functional equipment at Michoud (replaced by “more advanced” – but less capable facilities) could have supported 8 launches/year.
The two launch pads (one given exclusively to SpaceX, when Blue Origin wanted to share it) could also have supported 8 launches/year.
Amazing the way that worked out isn’t it.
“Then we have Billgamesh raising doubts about the New Space crowd-”
I have no doubts at all what NewSpace is all about and that it is the single worst thing that has ever happened to space exploration- worse than both shuttle disasters. All the polite dancing around the supposed critics do makes me want to throw up.
I find myself more and more just shutting down and being unable to comment when I contemplate the damage that has been done by the SpaceX sycophants. Which is fine because nobody lets me comment much anymore.
It just seems hopeless trying to undo the years of propaganda that have flooded the internet and the widespread popular belief in this absurd farce called the flexible path.
Will you please define a “hobby rocket”? And tell me which hobby rocket producer.. estes etc has hobby rockets flying to LEO.
“Hobby rocket” (from Billgamesh) probably the best I can describe is a rocket that uses other fuels besides LH2. Good for Estes model rockets or putting things into earth orbit. I’ve not done the calculations myself (hey, how many long winded forum posters really know the Rocket Eqn?) but from what Billgamesh implies is in order to go beyond (lunar, interplanetary, etc) need high ISP that only LH2 can provide. Only the big kids have worked with LH2, it is beyond capabilities of the hobbyists (for now).
To take it further, to me this suggests New Space with all the non-LH2 fueled rockets will provide excellent access to LEO (and with little more boost to GEO) but that’s as far as they will get. I was also thinking how wonderful it would be to have a fully reusable SSTO but that means violating the Rocket Eqn also equivalent to repealing the laws of momentum.
Blue Origin (a NewSpace company) has developed the BE-3 engine. It is LH2/LOX.
They have not launched an orbital rocket, but I believe they have plans to do so eventually.
That is correct.
Additionally the BE-3 has the potential to be the engine for reusable Cis-Lunar Space transports.
Blue Origin says it has been designed with that in mind.
“-but from what Billgamesh implies is in order to go beyond (lunar, interplanetary, etc) need high ISP that only LH2 can provide.”
I have implied nothing: I have been allowed to completely explain it over and over again for several years here thanks to Dr. Spudis.
It works likes this:
We live at the bottom of gravity well that dictates design, similar to Feynman’s quote- “For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”
This means that no matter how many sci-fi movies portray SSTO and no matter how many NewSpace infomercials scream cheap, “there is no free lunch.” By the way, the other famous Heinlein quote about Earth orbit being “halfway to anywhere” was revised to “Low Earth Orbit” as a NewSpace marketing ploy – He never said LEO and may just as easily have meant GEO.
LEO is not really space and is a dead end.
To achieve escape velocity (not so much orbital velocity) hydrogen upper stages are almost a necessity. To go anywhere Beyond Earth and Lunar Orbit (BELO) with humans requires massive shielding and chemical propulsion will not work. Only nuclear energy can push such mass (until some kind of beam propulsion infrastructure exists). That said, the only practical form of nuclear propulsion is “pulse” or, to put it bluntly, bombs.
This means that inside the Earth’s magnetosphere only chemical propulsion is practical due to fallout eventually being sucked into the atmosphere. This works out fine because just outside the magnetosphere is the Moon and that is where we have to go for the water-as-radiation-shielding anyway.
To keep this as short as possible, only progressively more powerful iterations of a Super Heavy Lift Vehicle used in a state sponsored public works project to develop a cislunar infrastructure has any chance of success. NewSpace is a scam that ends in the dead end of LEO.
And that makes their flagship companies inferior lift launch vehicle a hobby rocket.
>I have implied nothing
>We live at the bottom of gravity well that dictates design
One of these days I need to learn the rocket equation and run the numbers myself. It seems with us at 1 g, escape velocity be greater than 25K mph, fuel being X amount of mass, chemicals when mixed explode providing Y amount of energy, livable container being Z amount of mass,… LH2 fuel is pretty much only way to go.
>Heinlein quote about Earth orbit being “halfway to anywhere”
This is a catchy phrase but does it make sense? We have lots of things in earth orbit but taking it to the next level has been much more difficult (there’s something many of us are missing). I’m thinking Heinlein’s quote is great for story telling but bankrupt like “it takes money to make money” (if you know what that means then you already know this expression and can make money, if you don’t then can only repeat the quote).
Paul,
I think you may be constructing a bit of a strawman when you say that rather than funding SLS, we’d rather see NASA funding SpaceX to build an HLV. While admittedly there are many in that camp, most of the objectors to SLS you’ve linked to just want NASA To buy commercial flights from whichever mix of currently flying commercial providers provides the best deal, and using depots to minimize the mission risk from multiple launches. As someone who has been a strong advocate for using lunar-derived resources to lower the cost of Mars missions, I’m sort of surprised to see you acting as though launching most of our propellant for a Mars mission from Earth is a good idea.
I’m a big fan of your work, but have to disagree with you here.
~Jon
I’m sort of surprised to see you acting as though launching most of our propellant for a Mars mission from Earth is a good idea.
Where in this post have I advocated that?
Paul,
A couple of places, including this line from the opening paragraph:
“It is designed to launch massive payloads (initially, about 70 metric tons to low Earth orbit, later up to 120 metric tons) into space, allowing the use of pre-fueled departure stages to send payloads beyond LEO into deep space.”
It just seems that as an advocate for lunar resources, I would think you’d be a more natural fit for the “lunar exploration/ISRU + depots + commercial launch” camp than the camp supporting SLS. Especially since many SLS supporters see it as as an alternative to supporting depots and the kind of lunar infrastructure that you and I would like to see happen.
~Jon
“It is designed to launch massive payloads (initially, about 70 metric tons to low Earth orbit, later up to 120 metric tons) into space, allowing the use of pre-fueled departure stages to send payloads beyond LEO into deep space.”
I am saying that it is possible to do this — that’s not advocacy. Likewise, my earlier quote comes from the design of the Mars Reference Mission; I not only do not advocate that, I repudiate it.
Just to make it perfectly clear to you, I have not changed my opinion on the need to get propellant for a Mars mission from lunar polar ice. My support of an SLS system is to use it to send cargo (habitats, infrastructure) to the lunar surface.
Paul,
Fair enough. Thank you for the clarification. The article had me confused.
Honestly though, I still think that something like Xeus + distributed launch would be better for getting cargo to the lunar surface than SLS/EUS, but I’m not going to argue. While I disagree with you on if it’s the best way to do lunar surface landing missions, SLS/EUS for landing infrastructure is at least somewhat logically defensible for an ISRU advocate (compared to using it to launch fully-fueled Mars stages to LEO).
Thanks!
~Jon
You write (above) “it would take between 8 and 12 launches of an augmented SLS to get a fully fueled manned Mars vehicle into space and prepared for departure to Mars).” If it is “fully fueled” and one presumes launched from Earth on SLS rockets, then you just said that the propellant for the mission to Mars comes from Earth, right?
See my comment to Jon above about this.
It should be noted that with a lunar refueling depot the number of SLS launched go down to three.
But the benefits of fewer launches overall and less complex on-orbit operations are usually judged to outweigh these drawbacks.
Usually judged by whom ? I’d like to see an actual unbiased analysis that properly trades the risks of the full thing. Factoring in actual observed reliability of vehicles that fly often and on varied missions vs vehicles that come out of the hangar once in a blue moon.
ISS was successfully built from 10-15 ton pieces and is continuously resupplied by medium class launchers. It’s a sustainable program and system, and even keeps evolving – see BEAM.
The lesson learned from that is that don’t do any more orbital staging and assembly ? Or perhaps take a long hard look at what the constraints actually were, learn the lessons and do it better.
Yup, even launched on the most innefficient LV in history (shuttle), ISS managed to get built with 20mT chunks. Note said modules lanched launched several times per year…
My grip with the SLS is double. On the one hand, it’s unneccesary. Why? well, it’s not enough to launch a deep space mission on its own, so you have to assemble those and gain pretty much nothing over existing EELVs. But it’s not cost efficient either, so flying it on assembly flights is a costlier than doing it on smaller rockets. If you dont beliieve me, work out the launch cost of 70mT on F9s or Protons (never mind the F9H), and compare with, about a couple billion each year in order to get one flight each two years or so, and all of it a decade from now.
And on the other hand? Well, it’s eating money for payloads. Put half its development budget on buying already-existing rockets, the other half into building payloads, and we would have a Mars mission assembled before the first SLS flies… or at the very least several launches each year to other destinations. And develop orbital refueling already so we can use ACES-like reusability! An EELV upper stage fully refuellled would be a sight to see, and it could put some serious payloads into C3. No need to refuel them on the moon, on a right priced launcher, fuel is not THAT expensive to lift up, and it is a great way of increasing launch rates to distribute fixed costs and end up with a lower launch cost per kg.
And of course there is the black swan that calls itself BFR. How expensive is that going to be to get built and flown? No idea, but I have a hunch SLS will look even more stupid after that is unveiled.
You just restated the assertions already addressed and refuted in the article.
Did you read the article before posting or just cut and paste the standard attack?
Sorry Joe, but I agree with the “assertions already addressed and refuted in the article”. SLS is not advancing much technology. Apart from new avionics and software (I presume), it is flying SSMEs (and dumping them in the ocean) and “out of style” solid rockets… for a ridiculous amount of money. WIth an Orion capsule that is less capable than Dragon. Once SpaceX lands a capsule on Mars, it’s game over. More people will see through the fabricated story of SLS. SLS protects established contractors, even if their usefulness has been overcome by other developments.
WIth an Orion capsule that is less capable than Dragon.
Orion has flown. Dragon has not.
Sorry Luis, but agreeing with something and simply restating it when it has been refuted is not the same as engaging in debate.
As far as the rest of the post goes:
(1) “out of style” is not a technical argument – would fit in more with “reality” television..
(2) “Once SpaceX lands a capsule on Mars” – get back to me when they do.
The rest is all ad homonym insult (you lose style points for not using the ever popular “pigs at the public trough”.)
Technically the dragon is the cargo version and it has flown several times in it’s completed form. The Orion has not flown in the fully configured for humans version and neither has the CREW dragon, which is a different bird altogether.
When is each crew capsule scheduled to fly fully configured uncrewed and crewed?
When is each crew capsule scheduled to fly fully configured uncrewed and crewed?
It will happen when it happens — I no longer believe anything SpaceX says about schedule.
Vlad,
(1) If Luis was talking about the Cargo Dragon, why was he comparing it to Orion as they serve different functions? Nice try at a bait and switch, but no sale.
(2) If you want to talk schedules lets remember that SpaceX originally promised Falcon Heavy would be flying in 2012. Since then it has slipped a year every year. Now scheduled to fly in November but (as noted in the article) has yet to show even a structural test article . So Dr. Spudis comment about “longer believe anything SpaceX says about schedule” should be a point well taken.
Joe & Vlad,
Just some details.
In April 2011 SpaceX said that the Falcon Heavy would arrive at its launch site before the end of 2012. (20 months out)
As of now, SpaceX says that the Falcon Heavy will arrive at its launch site November of this year. (7 months out)
So in 5 years, roughly 13 months of progress has been made. (or claimed to be made…)
Lets assume that rate of progress stays constant: (just for kicks, oversimplifications are fun!)
5yrs/13mo = x yrs/20mo
x = 7.69 yrs
Therefore expect Falcon Heavy 2 years and 8 months from today.
“Therefore expect Falcon Heavy 2 years and 8 months from today.”
I would make only one change:
“Therefore expect Falcon Heavy no earlier than 2 years and 8 months from today.”
Other than that you have no idea how much I wish I had said that.
So nobody wants to offer a life cycle risk and cost analysis of sustained Mars program over something like a 10(1) or 20 year period, composed of 10-ton, 20-ton or 70-ton launched pieces ?
Factor in international contribution opportunities and trends on worldwide commercial launch market, which regularly lofts hundreds of tons of payloads to orbit every year.
(1) – fine picking between 8 to 10 tons to include some of the most reliable and cost effective operational launchers in the world.
“It is designed to launch massive payloads (initially, about 70 metric tons to low Earth orbit, later up to 120 metric tons) into space”
SLS Block II is designed to launch 130 metric tons into LEO.
Spudis: “I no longer believe anything SpaceX says about schedule.” Hmmm … right now NASA carries 2 (or 3 depending on how you look at things) launch dates for the first and second SLS flights – dates that are always moving to the right.
right now NASA carries 2 (or 3 depending on how you look at things) launch dates for the first and second SLS flights – dates that are always moving to the right.
Everybody’s dates constantly move to the right, including especially SpaceX’s (the “Falcon Heavy” was announced in April, 2011 — where is it?). So how is New Space superior?
BTW, in regard to your “deleted” post — I do not delete posts that I have already approved. You posted a comment last night at 8:37 pm. It was awaiting approval and I did not see it until around 1:00 am. Yet after an apparently unbearable hour and 8 minutes of waiting, you decided to harangue me on your site about me “deleting” your post (which I did not do). As for the “snippiness” of my answer, you still don’t get what I was saying: Jon Goff asked me why I was “acting as though launching most of our propellant for a Mars mission from Earth is a good idea.” I pointed out to him (and to you) that I was not advocating that, but simply pointing out that the use of an HLV enables one to send a fueled transfer stage directly to orbit (e.g., the S-IVB of the Saturn V). To note a possibility is not to advocate a position.
So its O.K. If SLS schedules move to the right – but not Falcon Heavy? As for where Falcon Heavy is – there is a barn full of Falcon 9s in Hawthorne waiting to be strapped together to make a Falcon Heavy and hauled to a launch pad that has yet to be completed. Call SpaceX, Paul. They’ll give you a tour.
“there is a barn full of Falcon 9s in Hawthorne waiting to be strapped together to make a Falcon Heavy …”
I know this will not do any good, but you do not make a new booster by just strapping smaller boosters together; its a lot more complicated than that.
The fact that you do not know that fact (Or is it that you are so flip you just do not care?) is very telling as to how much credence to give anything you say.
Hey Joe. Call SpaceX. Seriously. Ask them what forward- and backward-compatible capabilities they designed into the basic Falcon 9.
Really they let you examine and have analyzed their design specifications or do they simply tell you that they are doing good work?
If it is the former then you can enlighten us as to how they verify (as one example among many) the difference in vibrational effects between a single “barrel” and a triple “barrel” vehicle and produce a single “barrel” design that satisfies both.
If it is the latter that would make you credulous. It would not make you credible.
One of the skepticism of Falcon Heavy is that it has not flown yet. But the same can be said of SLS for nearly the same basic reasons. Until a LV has been demonstrated to work (launch is very high risk endeavor) you cannot 100% rely on it being available in the future. FH first launch 6 months out currently (although this has been sort of a moving target ), SLS is even further out into the future late 2018 (at least 2 more budget cycles). Government budgets can change and do from year to year congress to congress and administration to administration. Between now and SLS launch there is a administration change and a change of the makeup of congress. This represents a high risk politically for SLS program’s existence through to its first launch. This is the main program risk for SLS. For FH the main risk is a technical challenge not a funding issue. If SpaceX can work out the technical challenges they have a actual higher likelihood of having an existing operational SHLV (note a LEO payload capability >50mt is classed by NASA as a SHLV) by or before 2018.
For some programs that need HLV, having 2 candidates FH and SLS that may come to exist is a hedge on the payload planning such that it is highly likely at least one will exist for a HLV requiring payload to go forward from planning into preliminary and detailed designs.
LVs and payloads are a chicken and egg problem. Payloads are design mainly for LV capability that exists now and rarely for LV capability that has yet to exist on a new LV. That is why there is such a lack of planetary payloads of SLS size or even the smaller FH size. These high risk high $ exploration programs want more assurance that the capability is real before start of spending 100s of millions of $ designing to a LV that may not come to pass.
“FH first launch 6 months out currently (although this has been sort of a moving target ), …”
Sort of a moving target?
SpaceX originally claimed they would fly the FH in 2012. Since then it has been delayed year to year for 5 years. Now “scheduled” for November, but not even a structural test article has yet made an appearance.
I for one am extremely impressed with your flare for understatement.
Yes sadly the FH first launch date has been a moving target. But this is because the F9 performance has also been a moving target with now twice jumps of 50% and 40% performance increases. Hopefully such major increases of the basic F9 has slowed to the point that its design will remain steady for the time it will take to get FH off the ground. The F9 increases also made it easier for the FH performance targets as proposed in 2012 to be achieved.
The final item is that there is now increased pressure both internal and external to SpaceX to get FH off the ground. This has increased its priority to that equal to or maybe even ahead of the re-usability efforts for the F9. FH seems to now be at the top of the priority list after F9 launch operations.
It gets much better than that. SpaceX now claims to have discovered a 72% increase in F9 capacity with no changes to the hardware at all (note the quote from the article at the link).
At this rate they will soon not need the FH.
There is a joke that would seem appropriate – “I was born at night, but it wasn’t last night.”
http://www.engadget.com/2016/05/01/spacex-updates-falcon-rocket-specs/
“If you thought SpaceX was already making a fuss over the capabilities of both its existing Falcon 9 rocket and the upcoming Falcon Heavy, you haven’t seen anything yet. The company has posted updated specs showing that both vehicles are more powerful than previously thought. A Falcon 9 is now known to be capable of hauling 50,265lbs to low Earth orbit, up from just shy of 29,000 pounds. The Falcon Heavy, meanwhile, will carry 119,930lbs instead of the previously promised 116,845lbs. Elon Musk chalks up the improved figures to more thorough testing — SpaceX hasn’t upgraded the hardware….”
Those performance increases just highlight why the preassure/priority to fly a FH has been low. The F9 could do it up till now or would be able to do it in a short period, less than getting FH to fly.
But now they do need the FH.
Jeff,
Those “performance increases” (as described in the article backed up by a link to a Musk “tweet” ) indicate that they somehow managed to underestimate the F9 payload capacity by 72%.
Even if you find that believable (I do not), they also supposedly only discovered this windfall recently. That would not justify any delays in FH delivery.
It is anomalies like this that make some of us skeptical of SpaceX claims.
Paul –
(Just got a copy of your latest book, by the way; I was first on the list at the local public library for it).
1. The problem lies not with the rocket that we are building – it lies with the mission that we do not have.
Actually, the first part of that is not true. There is a problem (more than one) with this rocket ; and, additionally, with the way we’re going about making it. I touch on these below.
In the 21st century, to say we’re advancing by taking reusable/refurbishable hardware; turn it into expendable hardware; dump it in the ocean each flight; and only fly every two or so years, and call it progress, is almost laughable, if the subject weren’t so damn serious. At the end of the 1960s, we were putting 6-12 humans into space every year. Now, many decades and hundreds of billions of $$ later, we are putting – about 6-12 humans into space each year. And the SLS/Orion programs will actually decrease that, at the cost of tens of billions (and more; see below).
That’s progress? Really?
2. You leave out of the equation what, I think, is the most important thing; more important than even wasting $20-$30B is. And that’s what was robbed to pay for all of that.
The Obama Administration’s de facto space policy in February 2010 surprised a lot of reformers within the agency (I count myself among those), in that it recognized, and tried to act on, a couple of hard truths:
a. The Constellation program, slipping a year each year, would need $3b/year, every year, additional (just for that program!), to succeed. And since no one – not the Republicans or Democrats in the Congress, nor the President – was going to go along with that, he cancelled it. A correct decision, based on facts; not an ‘arbitrary’ cancellation, as I think you say in the first page of your book.
b. Under the previous Administration and Congress, the space tech R&D program at NASA had been “decimated” (to quote from Charlie Bolden in 2010; and he was right). We needed to re-establish a technology base that use to exist just to be able to make intelligent – and, cost effective – decisions; so the President proposed a very serious ramp-up in space tech funding over that next five years.By 2015 we would have a better, smarter idea of what we could, should do, based partly on that, and partly on expanding commercial industry to low earth orbit (next).
c. Building on the perceived progress (and later success) of the commercial cargo COTS/CRS program, they expanded on that Bush-era policy to commercial crew, targeting getting off Russian dependency by 2015.
If we had indeed followed that program, the US, and Earth, would be much better off now, and with more cost-effective tools to go forward with. As it is, though, the public-private partnership known as commercial crew had significant monies taken from it to feed SLS/Orion; and, worse, the decimation of the space tech efforts has gotten even worse – solely to feed SLS/Orion.
NASA is no longer a space technology generation engine it used to be for the American economy; and the effort to reverse that was totally undermined these last 5 years solely to force building a large government-controlled/owned/designed/operated rocket using 1970s technology in a couple of states. Our efforts in space have been severely hurt by that diversion of funds for pure pork. That’s the single biggest error in your piece, that omission.
A final ridiculous criticism of the SLS program is that it is simply a “jobs program” for NASA.
Not so ridiculous, actually. Which states legitimate programs get steered to are always arguments over jobs. To create and sustain multi-billion dollar programs whose ops costs are unsustainable, and at the direct price of very much needed government efforts like R&D and jump-starting new commercial industries, is an entirely worse thing altogether.
Finally, to imply that the Falcon Heavy- which may fly by the end of the year (unlike the SLS, it actually has paying customers) – is not real because: a) Hasn’t flown yet. (Geesh! SLS is almost certainly further away – with no attempt at reusability). and, b) Because, well, The Soviets in the 1960s!! (Really??).
I don’t think it is any more useful to have a knee-jerk reaction against SpaceX and Falcon Heavy than I do for there to be one against SLS. I don’t consider my non-support for SLS to be ‘knee-jerk’. It’s based upon many concrete things: My direct experience being a proud member of the space shuttle team (dozens of flights in flight ops, plus working in shuttle program management), with how much it costs for a government-led and controlled team to do things. Plus our own internal studies here in NASA that show that private outfits like SpaceX who put their own skin in the game, really can innovate faster, and produce new launch vehicles and spacecraft faster, and find a broader customer base to support them, than we at NASA can. (And not just by a little: our estimate was that we would have cost at least 400% more – and more likely 900% more – than SpaceX to do the same thing). Then there’s the ridiculously low flight rate – I would maintain, again based on direct experience assessing past shuttle flight rate safety for the Administrator, that it’s also an unsafe flight rate, as well. The continued decimation of our space technology R&D base to feed it.
And, finally, the fact that there are better, cheaper, and faster (no kidding) ways to get things done. Smart use of public-private partnerships leverage the best parts of the public and private sectors is one, and it’s not theoretical. And that includes using those partnerships to bring forward faster an era of true RLVs, the space ‘holy grail’, along with use of in situ resources.
Doing what we’re doing with SLS/Orion – and doing them in the slowest, most expensive, way, while deliberately decimating space technology funding needed for the future – can’t really be supported by any known facts or studies; actually, the facts and studies point in the opposite direction. It’s almost like NASA, having stumbled over the Truth (that tech development does matter; that smart public-private partnerships can do space development faster and cheaper, etc.) – the agency has just picked itself up, brushed itself off, and hurried on in the old direction, as if nothing had happened.
Dave Huntsman
Opinions expressed are my own
a. The Constellation program, slipping a year each year, would need $3b/year, every year, additional (just for that program!), to succeed. And since no one – not the Republicans or Democrats in the Congress, nor the President – was going to go along with that, he cancelled it. A correct decision, based on facts; not an ‘arbitrary’ cancellation, as I think you say in the first page of your book.
I said (in the book, but also here and many other places) that it was an arbitrary decision to cancel America’s return to the Moon — and it was. Terminating Constellation is a separate issue. Augustine was presented with architectural alternatives to Constellation that could preserve schedule and capability (like Shuttle side-mount); those ideas were ignored.
Augustine concluded that NASA is going nowhere in deep space in the next few decades without a budget boost of $3 billion (Sec. 6.6.2, p. 96). And that was with respect to the then-proposed FY 2010 budget and in FY 2010 dollars; the requisite plus-up now is even larger. Nobody, not even SLS’s most ardent supporters in Congress, was or is pushing for NASA budgets on that scale. Hence, I believe Dave Huntsman’s characterization is correct.
The Augustine report was a pre-determined piece of program assassination. They were presented with alternatives which they ignored, no doubt on direction from their masters. Thus, I categorically reject your analysis.
I know Ed Crawley and Jeff Greason, two of the primary authors. Neither engaged in “a pre-determined piece of program assassination…no doubt on direction from their masters”. Just coming up with different conclusions from yours based on their intensive study of what was going on at the time does not qualify them to be disparaged in this way, at least not without evidence.
Dave Huntsman
I know them too and I specifically asked them why they had not considered use of Shuttle side-mount. I received no coherent or logical answer.
You can conclude from that what you will, as I have.
On reading Wayne Hale’s blog, he stated that by 2010 that the shuttle options had come and gone and it was dead with absolutely no way it would be resurrected.
No one is talking about continuing to fly the Shuttle — we are talking about a Shuttle-derived heavy lift vehicle, the side-mount.
Discussed here: http://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/heft-lies-and-videotape-157014594/?no-ist=
Perhaps Mr. Huntsman knows of a justification for the Augustine Commission ignoring (not refuting or rejecting but ignoring) the Side Mount Option.
Since he writes very long treatises on his opinions, I would assume he will explain his detailed reasoning for us.
“President proposed a very serious ramp-up in space tech funding over that next five years.”
I remember that when Obama said he wants to allocate $3B to study HLV for next five years and later decide how to build it. I can’t remember his exact words but just about everyone only remembers the “been there, done that” in regards to going to the Moon. This reminded me of a management class where many times people give presentations about state of the company/project but at times will say a particular quote that will cause the audience to completely remember that small quote and totally forget everything else that was said.
Although I was strongly against the Ares I/Ares V architecture, no increase in the NASA human spaceflight budget would have been required to complete the Constellation architecture and its return of humans to the Moon before the end of the decade.
When President Obama came into office, the Constellation program was already being funded at about $3.4 billion a year which is pretty close to the current funding for the SLS/Orion program.
Additional funding for the Constellation program was to come from the cancellation of the $3 billion a year Space Shuttle program and, by 2016, the termination of the $2 billion a year ISS program.
$8.4 billion a year would have been plenty of money to return humans to the Moon before the end of the decade– even with a launch architecture as bad as the Ares 1/Ares V.
But it was clear from the start that the Augustine Commission preferred continuing NASA’s perpetual mission to LEO over returning to the Moon.
By the way, the Augustine Commission only recommended a $3 billion increase in NASA’s 2010 budget with a further 2.4% increase in NASA’s annual budget.
Marcel
Excellent points. I agree with you that there is a smarter ways forward and better utilized the Nation’s treasure then the SLS – Orion programs.
And that smarter way forward to better utilize the Nations’ treasure is SpaceX of course. So transparent.
NewSpace has been doing one thing for years yet nobody ever talks about it: the Ayn-Rand-in-Space Musk groupies damn the space agency and cal for it to be done away with on one page and praise NASA for pouring several billion tax dollars into commercial cargo and commercial crew on another.
They have nothing bad to say about the over one hundred billion dollar space station to nowhere yet curse all government “porkonaut projects” not connected to SpaceX (like the SLS) as pure evil. If these two-faced deceivers were not so damaging to the future of space exploration their idiotic contradictions would be funny.
Sometimes I find it astonishing that people can’t see the obvious advantages of having super heavy capability. Even Elon Musk recognizes the clear advantages of having a super heavy lift vehicles with large fairing diameters. That’s why Space X is developing its own super heavy lift vehicle intended for future crewed missions to Mars.
The Boeing/ATK SLS vehicle will be capable of housing huge and heavy structures within a ten meter in diameter payload fairing.
The ISS required– 14 launches– for its current pressurized volume of less than 1000 m3. A single SLS launch could deploy a space station into orbit with more than twice the pressurized volume of the ISS. If you were a wealthy space tourist shelling out $25 to $35 million for a trip to a space station, would rather go to tiny and cramped sub-heavy lift space hotel or to an enormous and spacious space hotel deployed by a heavy lift vehicle?
A single SLS launch could deploy huge propellant manufacturing water depots to EML1 utilizing water exported from the lunar surface for enhanced lunar missions and future crewed missions to the orbits of Mars and Venus. And NASA is probably going to require the SLS to deploy the large reusable orbital transfer vehicles and habitats needed to travel to those planets from EML1.
Coupled with a lunar landing vehicle, a single SLS launch could deploy a spacious SLS propellant tank derived habitat on the Moon with an internal floor space as large or larger than an average two story home in Europe.
A single SLS launch should also be capable of deploying huge habitats capable of spinning and expanding in order to produce artificial gravity with floor space equivalent of two European homes.
Of course, the SLS could also be used to deploy enormous telescopes into cis-lunar space that would dwarf the Hubble and the future James Webb telescopes.
So its pretty obvious that SLS will probably be one of the most useful launch vehicles ever developed for both government and private commercial uses. In fact, they’re so useful that even Elon wants to have one:-)
Marcel
Paul,
Great piece; you no doubt expected to receive a bunch of comments based upon subject matter. There seems to be (my opinion) a lot of emotion in the airwaves tied up in launch vehicles for some reason.
I think that there is benefit in having a heavy lift vehicle for some payloads, including certain elements of a Lunar Architecture. The obvious thing is mass (get as big a lunar surface payload capability as possible with one launch), but just as important is volume; payload densities are such that the volumes are often the limiting factor. And a larger shroud on a smaller vehicle is involved enough to represent a new vehicle design, since aerodynamics plays a significant factor in vehicle loads. Yes, there is the potential tradeoff for on-orbit assembly, but the complication is that on-orbit assembly needs orbit crew to assemble (to this point in time anyway), and the crew needs support infrastructure at the assembly point. The ISS had that crew infrastructure with Shuttle and later habitable ISS, but other things that one would want assembled may not. There is also the tradeoff with depots, but depots are more of a risk due to unknowns in not having that capability in place presently and not knowing what the Unknowns are in the implementation of that technology. Good technology to go pursue, but hard to start designing systems and payloads now assuming they will be in place when your payload matures.
Regarding SpaceX, I think the philosophy is that for a big heavy lift vehicle like SLS, the market is really limited to government. Should one company advocate for that launch service, to fill government needs, there is no limitation on cost growth with a monopoly. Even in the case of competition, there doesn’t seem to be that limitation; look at the cost/kg of the Cargo contract to ISS for SpaceX, and compare that against their advertised cost to orbit. As well, developing SLS helps keep the NASA (and contractor) workforce engaged and experienced for the future.
I think we can take advantage of any launch vehicle, but SLS looks like it is here to stay, and has benefits that we can take advantage of for a Lunar Architecture.
Tony Lavoie
“Yes, there is the potential tradeoff for on-orbit assembly, but the complication is that on-orbit assembly needs orbit crew to assemble (to this point in time anyway), and the crew needs support infrastructure at the assembly point. The ISS had that crew infrastructure with Shuttle and later habitable ISS, but other things that one would want assembled may not.”
Good point. I worked assembly/maintenance on ISS. We tried to tell the “powers that be” that as the design got closer to reality the actual work would require a higher level of direct human participation. It of course eventually did (the Appendix B’s of the design specifications – that detailed EVA exceptions – were literally several times as thick as the rest of the specs). Fortunately between Shuttle and (eventual ISS) capabilities those resources were available. Too many are ready to stop their “analysis” with listing the cost of an HLV and assuming that the support infrastructure will be free.
“There is also the tradeoff with depots, but depots are more of a risk due to unknowns in not having that capability in place presently and not knowing what the Unknowns are in the implementation of that technology. Good technology to go pursue, but hard to start designing systems and payloads now assuming they will be in place when your payload matures.”
Another good point. As with orbital assembly, too many are ready to stop their “analysis” with listing the cost of an HLV and assuming that the development of orbital propellant depots will be free.
Please do not take this as me being anti orbital assembly/propellant depots. Just the opposite, as Lunar ISRU/Cis-Lunar Space development (hopefully) proceeds both will be absolutely indispensable. But to place them in the critical path to lunar return would be to take on extra cost/risk that is often over looked.
For What It Is Worth my own path (please feel free to ignore) would be:
(1) Establish initial Lunar ISRU facility (propellant with Lunar surface propellant depot).
(2) Use (1) to support infrastructure development in key locations.
(3) Use (1) and (2) to support establishment of propellant depots.
(4) Begin use of established system to begin building/support of application platforms/planetary missions etc.
At that point need for an HLV might very well go away, but it would hardly be the first successful transportation system to “put itself out of existence”.
Three very easy to digest sources giving some understanding to the situation concerning space exploration. Also very indicative of the complete inadequacy of NewSpace efforts.
1. https://engineering.dartmouth.edu/~d76205x/research/Shielding/docs/Parker_06.pdf
2. Infographic (on page 23 http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucfbiac/Lunar_resources_review_preprint_accepted_manuscript.pdf) depicting the depths of the Earth and Lunar gravity wells.
3. http://www.astronautix.com/engines/325solid.htm
Anybody with basic critical thinking skills can figure out how these examples apply to Human Space Flight Beyond Low Earth Orbit (HSF-BLEO). Unfortunately there are those so completely brainwashed by NewSpace infomercials they cannot process this basic data, so I will supply some hints:
1. Radiation? LEO is not really space; it has about as much in common with the space environment above LEO as a catfish pond does with the North Atlantic.
2. Water? The only place to get the shielding required for HSF-BLEO is the lunar poles.
3. Spaceships? Super Heavy Lift Vehicle iterations far more powerful than the evolved SLS are necessary for constructing a cislunar infrastructure. Saying anything otherwise is completely false and misleading.
The Apollo 1 fire made the aerospace industry take a step back from Human Space Flight and look to defense for profits. The 1972 Solar Flare would have killed or profoundly dosed an Apollo crew if they had been in transit to or from the Moon. Skylab’s main instrument was a solar telescope to try and predict solar events so as to allow missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) without having crews in constant danger. Space weather is still not predictable and probably never will be. All this points to hobby rockets and entrepreneurs as simply incapable of “opening the solar system up.”
It’s a scam.
NewSpace is essentially an Orwellian construct that will deliver exactly the opposite of what it promises. There is no cheap.
Hi Bill.
As always, you make a solid and evident case, but in my humble experience it’s best not to limit yourself to words like “never” as it only requires one clever cookie with one unconventional thought to move from the limitations posed by one equation to a more enabling one. I’m not saying you’re outright wrong, I just think you have to allow for that off-chance Big-bang disruptive outlier. I think that the more we look, the more we see this to be the case, and the universe is littered with exceptional outliers. Just because we can’t imagine it, doesn’t mean we should project that as the final authoritative version … stranger things have happened.
… just saying, based on merely looking around
Philosophizing and waxing romantic on off-chance Big-bang disruptive outliers does not necessarily make one a clever cookie. “Looking around” keeps some of us from “just saying” and gambling the next big thing or entrepreneur will solve our problem- we take care of it with what will work.
A close and focused appreciation of NewSpace reveals it to be a joke. Take a look.
“Apollo 1 fire made the aerospace industry take a step back from Human Space Flight and look to defense for profits. ”
Not really, Apollo program funding peaked in 1966 mainly for designing and building the infrastructure (much still used today). But then that program was only meant to beat the Soviets to the Moon. Though many engineers were thinking of using this infrastructure to sustain and go beyond, it simply wasn’t the plan for politicians.
“1972 Solar Flare would have killed or profoundly dosed an Apollo crew if they had been in transit to or from the Moon.”
If there is one thing that is not talked about, it’s this. One big solar flare will put an end to any HSF mission outside the Van Allen belts. I’m sure there’s discussion but all I see presented are Dragons and FH, Orions and SLS. No habitat/transit modules with lots of shielding (maybe you have mentioned this in one of your several comments or rants).
Thanks for posting the links, more study material to better understand what it takes to go somewhere.
North American took a severe beating over Apollo 1. Their profit margin took a nosedive. If you think that did not really matter and the aerospace industry as a whole did not sit up and take note that humans in space were going to be hard money then you really do need to study up.
“Congress was concerned that an important national resource – the industrial and technical infrastructure (including its human resources) to build and fly HLV rockets – was being lost through neglect and attrition.”
The US has not had a heavy-lift capability since the mid-1970s; how does Congress’s decision to build SLS preserve a capability that did not exist in the first place? But why does it matter, anyway, when both ULA and SpaceX have offered heavy lifters in recent years. They don’t seem to feel that preserving Shuttle hardware is a prerequisite for building a heavy lifter, and they know more about it than Congress does.
“They [Congress] asked the agency to come up with a specific design for an HLV system but received no cooperation. So, they consulted external technical experts to derive the specifications of a general purpose HLV and mandated this design in the authorization.”
So Congress chooses anonymous experts who just happen to recommend a rocket that keeps money flowing to the districts and states represented by key space-committee members (recall Sen. Orrin Hatch saying “According to our experts in Utah” the only way to launch big payloads is with SRBs). This very much looks like a case of the fox guarding the hen house, and it stinks to high heaven. SLS’s congressional creators have themselves to blame for the “it’s just a jobs program” meme.
Let Congress name the experts it consulted and produce the advice they supplied. If it’s all sound and above the board, they should be happy to do so, possibly with a few redactions for commercial reasons. This would be the most powerful argument against “it’s just a jobs program.”
At a more fundamental level, who is Congress to decide that a heavy lifter the size of SLS is needed? Augustine says a vehicle in the 40-60 metric-ton class could do the job. Each approach has its pluses and minuses, but they should be weighed up by qualified engineers rather than by politicians.
Even if a heavy lifter is needed, why SLS rather than, say, the Phase 2 or 3 EELVs proposed by ULA circa 2010. ULA indicated a price tag in the single-digit-billion range, which is a bargain compared to the more than $20 billion that will have been lavished on SLS by the time even the Block 1 version flies.
Again, the SLS advantages are not just in its ability to lift heavy masses into orbit but also in its ability to launch large structures with large diameters into orbit.
Boeing lobbied hard for a Space Shuttle derived supper heavy lift vehicle that utilizes successful technologies developed for the Space Shuttle program. And Congress clearly saw the logic in that!
Marcel
“The US has not had a heavy-lift capability since the mid-1970s…”
The Space Shuttle was a Heavy Lift Vehicle, it just put the reusable orbiter into orbit on every mission. As was clearly and accurately stated in the article the Side Mount Configuration HLV was a direct path to adapt the shuttle configuration for launching large payloads. The Augustine Commission had access to this information and ignored it.
When someone (you or the Augustine Commission) insists on starting out with a faulty assumption you get an equally faulty analysis.
The mass media really needs this article Dr Spudis. You really hit the target here.
Indeed, the opinion of NASA paying SpaceX to build an HLV and other hardware as opposed to SLS and Orion has been given by the Bad Astronomer, Phil Plait, amongst other popular space science forums and blogs.
Most tend to not only focus on the Falcon Heavy, but also the MCT.
I find the latter focus amusing, as the MCT is truly a paper rocket, whereas SLS has now starting the process of bending metal (as far as I know).
We can only hope that if a cislunar architecture is selected, SLS will be integrated into it (as opposed to starting over again).
By the way, loving “The Value of the Moon” so far!
By the way, loving “The Value of the Moon” so far!
Glad to hear that — thanks for your comments!
“Most tend to not only focus on the Falcon Heavy, but also the MCT. I find the latter focus amusing, as the MCT is truly a paper rocket, whereas SLS has now starting the process of bending metal (as far as I know)….”
Yes, the Core Stage flight and structural test article tanks are in fabrication now. Booster segments are already available from Shuttle, as are the engines, so the only “new” design piece other than the ICPS (store-bought upper stage from ULA with tweaks due to SLS configuration) housing/neck-down vehicle structure under Orion is the Core Stage. The Core Stage passed its CDR in 2014 and is in major structure fabrication and component qualification now.
As long as we are pondering the wonders of the Mars Colonial Transport (MCT)/Big Frigging Rocket (BFR) (and yes that is what Musk calls it), here are a few interesting points:
(1) Musk has asserted it will have the capability (using only chemical upper stages) to place a 100 tonne payload on the Martian surface in a single launch.
That would require the launcher to place the mass equivalent of a fully fueled Saturn 5 moon rocket into LEO on a single launch. BFR indeed.
(2) Musk says the MCT (at 100 tonnes) will carry 100 colonists.
1 tonne/passenger, going to be pretty crowded for a months long trip.
(3) In order to build up his enormous Martian Colony Musk asserts that it will fly 1,000 times/year.
But Martian launch windows open only once every 26 months. The duration of the windows is dependent on the capabilities of the launch vehicle. With only chemical rockets used it is generous to give a 30 day duration. That means to average 1,000 flights/year during those thirty days a BFR would have to launch every 20 minutes around the clock for the entire 30 days. A truly aggressive launch schedule.
A bit off the topic but SpaceX has selected the company to build its launch/entry pressure suit for the Falcon 9.
http://www.engadget.com/2016/05/03/spacex-taps-superhero-costume-maker/
A company that makes super hero costumes for movies. Musk’s fans like to claim that he is the role model for the Tony Stark character from Iron Man (even though Musk was born 8 years after the character first appeared in the comics). Maybe Musk believes he really is Tony Stark.
I fear for the writers at the satirical website The Onion. With “real life” like this, how do you satirize it?
It’s not a matter of schedule slips being okay or not okay.
The issue is how SpaceX likes to flaunt how supposedly superior they are to “Old Space”.
Fans of SpaceX spout how they will build an HLV first, get to Mars first, build better products, etc.
Yet SpaceX has shown they are no better at spaceflight than NASA is.
So the issue is, what is the real benefit of having them?
It’s as if basic economic principles that we should all know, and on which modern civilization has been built, have just been thrown out. I could forgive people brought up in North Korea who’ve never experienced the advantages of the free market, advantages that everyone in every other country benefit, from not understanding why state monopolies don’t give as good a return or as good a service as the multiple providers in a competitive market, but It’s incomprehensible to me why people here advocate a single state provider for American (American!) launch services.
Who wants the state to own the car manufacturing industry?
Who wants the state to provide all hotel services?
Who wants the state to own the road freight industry?
It’s like reason has been lost and history forgotten.
State ownership in Eastern Europe failed, Cuba is a failure, China succeeds – by allowing competitive markets to operate there.
I can understand why, where there’s the situation of a service required that’s a natural monopoly, people not wanting a private provider to be that monopoly.
Space launch is not a natural monopoly, so why this hostility to a competitive market and private service providers?
To me it’s just nonsensical.
Space launch is not a natural monopoly, so why this hostility to a competitive market and private service providers?
Many (not all) New Space companies are not “private” in the sense of classical capitalism (i.e., they create and market goods and services developed with their own capital) but rather, a species of “crony capitalism,” in which a company corrals federal government funds to subsidize or pay in full their development costs, after which they collect all the profits. Moreover, there is a sense among some of us that much of the sales rhetoric of these same companies is exaggerated (to say the least) and that while much has been (and continues to be) promised, much less has been delivered in terms of capabilities and delivery timescales.
Those private service providers are competing (that’s the important word) to provide a service to customers (NASA being the largest customer) several bids have gone in for COTS, and quite rightly some were declined – and that is the commercial part of the procedure, competing bidders. It’s for the providers and the customer to work out the terms by which that service is to be financed and provided – that is part of the market process. Agreements of the type we’re seeing between NASA and the various providers are not unheard of in the commercial world, they do occur in similar situations of high cost and risk to the supplier.
The important question is “Has NASA gotten deals that are acceptable to them and to the service providers in a competitive market place?”
It seems they have, so unless there’s some sort of under the table corrupt dealing going on it counts as legitimate business, there’s nothing “crony capitalism” about it unless you’re claiming that other potential service providers were either unfairly excluded from the bidding process, or unfairly treated when it came to the selection of the successful bidders.
Those private service providers are competing (that’s the important word) to provide a service to customers (NASA being the largest customer) several bids have gone in for COTS, and quite rightly some were declined – and that is the commercial part of the procedure, competing bidders.
By that definition, we’ve always had “commercial” spaceflight, as every space flight project since Mercury has been bid on by a wide variety of aerospace companies (in fact, by many more that existed then, under the “socialist” model, than exist now under the allegedly free market “New Space”). New technology was jointly developed by NASA and those contractors. So now that’s it’s “established” and proven by 50 years of useage, why should the feds pay for a new rocket and spacecraft development?
I know that you New Space guys love to redefine terms, but I’m not buying it.
By that definition, we’ve always had “commercial spaceflight, as every space flight project since Mercury has been bid on by a wide variety of aerospace companies (in fact, by many more that existed then, under the “socialist” model, than exist now under the allegedly free market “New Space”).
I’d argue that what we have now is closer to commercial practices involving the provision of services in that the customer specifies the service he’s buying, not the process by which it is to be created. If I employ a service provider, I’ll use landscaping as the example, I’m not going to demand on specifying the make of the machinery he uses, who he employs, where he bases his operations, where he buys his gas from, who his accountant is to be etc, if I were to meddle in his business in that way, guess what, he’s going to end up charging me more and I have no doubt he would end up providing me with a more expensive but inferior service. I don’t know his business as well as he does, the government doesn’t know rockets as well as SpaceX or ULA does.
I’d argue that by meddling in the way it has in the past the Government has created a culture within aerospace companies that has cost the American tax payer billions – for nothing other than to give politicians opportunities to play politics. Politicians love power, love exercising power, love to be seen as important. It’s why they chose that occupation.
I know where you’re coming from and just don’t buy it. But enough. Thanks for your comments.
I don’t agree with using the N-1 as a “good reason(s) to doubt the technical viability of the Falcon Heavy”. I’m not trying to downplay the potential issues for FH, Musk has openly aired his anxieties on this especially around separation events, and as you point out 27 engines must run reliably together. But the reasons for the N-1 failures were different on each flight and could be traced back to a combination of poor QA during construction and a lack of static testing that would have allowed potential risks to be identified prior to flight.
Whatever your opinion of SpaceX, they do have a good base of operational and test-stand experience with the F9 core and will have an opportunity to test all 3 cores together. The FH doesn’t feature a primitive, over zealous engine control system (like KORD), nor does it’s engine arrangement (3 groups of 9) lend itself to pressure effects between two concentric rings of engines – as I’m sure you’re aware the N-1 was not initially designed for 30 NK-15s, the later addition of the central ring of 6 engines caused many problems which led directly to at least one flight failure and indirectly contributed to others. FH, by its modular nature doesn’t feature a single engine compartment with the fuel lines for all engines running through it and as far as I’m aware based on flight history to this point the propellant feed system in the F9 core hasn’t encountered any catastrophic water-hammer incidents.
While it’s perfectly fair to express concerns about an unflown configuration, a more relevant point of comparison would have been useful here.
“-a more relevant point of comparison would have been useful here.”
The relevant point is clear- 27 engines violates the KISS principle and was never a good idea. You can technobabble all you want but all those little hot rods are 27 times more prone to a catastrophic failure than one.
SpaceX will be cheaper per Metric Ton to LEO and will probably fly more mass to orbit. But SLS will be able to put larger assemblies in orbit which has the possibility of making it situationally more efficient.
There is a way to use solar sails to harness momentum without fuel and use that momentum to conduct fast transit to mars without the use of any rocket fuel. Relative to 310 ISP rocket fuel the new method provides a mass savings of 80% one way to Mars or 96.7% roundtrip to Mars. It relies on a physically very large cargo craft relative to a minimalistic mission.
SpaceX isn’t likely to be 4 or 25 times cheaper than SLS unless SLS is starved for missions.
Here is my talk on how LEO->Mars->LEO can be conducted without fuel in the middle term future which is probably still within the SLS life cycle.
Talk starts 33 min in
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/86070557
This method combined with building a railgun type launch on the moon/mars capable of achieving stable orbit will enable a system of trade where space colonies can send manufactured goods to Earth and compete on price with Earth goods in the next century or so. This trade will provide the money to send mass from Earth to the colonies enabling their rapid growth.
Once its clear that this is possible the real estate of space colonies can be monetized against future revenue and the space investment bubble can commence.
There will be enough pie for everyone.
“-the real estate of space colonies can be monetized against future revenue and the space investment bubble can commence.”
The rail gun launching material from the Moon to build Bernal Sphere space colonies is all Gerard K. O’Neill from 1976.
Why didn’t you accredit him?
As for making money off of a space colony before a state sponsored infrastructure has been created…..unequivocally throwing the B.S. flag on that.
“There is a way to use solar sails to harness momentum without fuel-”
Unfortunately solar sails won’t be doing any heavy hauling in a space program. You want to move stuff around try using an alloy fabric parachute a couple thousand feet in diameter and some atomic bombs. That would actually work.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_pulse_propulsion#/media/File:MedusaNuclearPropulsionOperatingSequenceDrawing.png
I see a few comments about what was ignored/not implemented/not chosen options of Augustine Committee options, Wayne Hale posted in his blog (sorry too lazy to go find it), Wayne basically said that he provided lots of assistance to the Committee but he did not want his name on list of contributors because options to be put forward should not cost more than $3 billion. Hale felt there were notable options that are worthy of this nation but may cost more, and he didn’t like that price cap.
Since congress has been so good at designing rockets, maybe we could get them to design airliners as well.
Since NewSpace groupies have been contaminating the blogosphere with trash talk and propaganda for years maybe we could refute all their lies and misrepresentations and expose them to the public as well.
Congress did not design the SLS. They directed a Super Heavy Lift Vehicle be constructed. Since the SLS going direct to the Moon is a direct threat to the NewSpace LEO business plan, this has generated literally thousands of misleading “death-to-SLS” comments.
[“The rail gun launching material from the Moon to build Bernal Sphere space colonies is all Gerard K. O’Neill from 1976. Why didn’t you give him a mention? “]
[“I am sure there is a way to genetically engineer flying unicorns also. But unfortunately solar sails won’t be doing any heavy hauling in a space program. You want to move stuff around try using an alloy fabric parachute a couple thousand feet in diameter and some atomic bombs. That would actually work. “]
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Thank you for the correct reference I knew this was a common knowledge approach but did not know the history of the first to come up with it. Gerard K. O’Neill is the owner of the idea to use a rail gun or similar technology to launch mass to orbit from the moon or mars. Likewise aero-braking and parachutes to slow spacecraft re-entering Earth are good ideas discovered by others.
Regarding unicorns I explained in detail how it works in the video. I appreciate I am making a large claim and its very easy to say that it is impossible to rapidly transit to Mars without consuming fuel.
But it can be broken down to very simple steps with yes or no answers.
1) do you believe solar sail powered spacecraft provide delta V without consuming Earth sourced fuel? I am assuming ~200 m/s per month in my calculations which is roughly correct.
2) do you believe the law of conservation of momentum applies if one space ship kinetically ejects another space ship? How about if it ejects many small space ships one after the other at a velocity of 250 m/s which is about 900 km/hr? This is an ISP of ~25.5 s
3) Do you believe its possible to rapidly accelerate in a energy efficient manner using a 25.5 seconds ISP fuel given enough mass?
4) do you believe the laws of physics allow a solar sail spacecraft that can navigate to a docking station and then re-package its solar sail into a compact form factor?
5) Do you believe physics permits a spaceship from Earth after reaching a docking station to re-load the smaller spacecraft from a docking station thus reusing the fuel?
6) Do you believe its possible to have a solar sail spacecraft that is durable enough to last decades?
7) Do you believe the large space ship could dock a large number of times say 52 times on the way to Mars?
If you answered yes to these questions we are already in agreement. New ideas always sound strange and unworkable, I invite you to invest 15 minutes of your time to understand how my idea works.
Talk starts 33 min in
http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/86070557
Docking 52 times each way allows 2 missions worth of infrastructure to eliminate the need for fuel and reduce the kg to LEO per kg to Martian orbit by 80% for the lifetime of the smaller spacecraft which could be decades.
Sure the small spacecraft are expensive relative to rocket fuel, Sure there are technology hurdles that need to be solved. But 100 years from now this is how it will be done unless em drive or some other fantastic advance renders it obsolete.
“simple steps with yes or no answers.”
Not that simple.
1. “I am assuming ~200 m/s per month in my calculations which is roughly correct.”
You are leaving out the sail would be miles in diameter to transport only a few tons at most (roughly correct). It is completely impractical.
“a solar sail spacecraft that is durable enough to last decades -could dock a large number of times say 52 times on the way to Mars?”
Mars is a dead end.