Congressman John Culberson (R-TX 7) testifies on his proposed bill to reorganize NASA.
The House Space Subcommittee held two hearings on the U.S. civil space program in February – one where the strategic direction of the human spaceflight effort was discussed, and a second one dealing with the configuration of NASA as an executing entity for such policy. The somewhat understated subtext of both of these hearings is that our space program currently lacks coherency and strategic direction. In partial response to this state of affairs, Rep. John Culberson of Texas has proposed legislation (the Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015) to try and resolve some of these operational difficulties – legislation designed to reconfigure the existing interface between NASA and the executive and legislative branches of government. Many have given considerable thought as to why this bill is necessary and why it could be a solution to our ongoing space policy chaos.
It is clear from much of the discussion at these two hearings that despite repeated claims by the agency, no one believes that we are truly on a “#JourneytoMars.” This situation is in part technical, in that NASA does not have a well-defined architecture, or even a roadmap, to develop the technology to conduct such a mission. For example, the Asteroid Retrieval Mission (ARM) is widely recognized as a pointless distraction. But equally significant is that by repeatedly over-promising with rhetoric and under-delivering on actual spaceflight capability, the current incarnation of the agency has little political or programmatic credibility.
The basic source of our dilemma comes from the decision made by the administration in 2010 to unilaterally terminate Project Constellation (yet retain the planned retirement of the Space Shuttle) and to remove the Moon from the path of deep space human spaceflight – for essentially trivial and specious reasons (“We’ve been there!”). Congress had twice endorsed the 2004 Vision for Space Exploration in two separate authorizations – one while under control of the Republicans (2006) and one while under Democratic control (2008). This made at least the general exploratory path of “Moon-then-Mars” a bipartisan consensus, something rare and remarkable in Washington. True enough, the Constellation architecture had run into some technical (and hence, fiscal) difficulties, but none that couldn’t be solved. In any event, it was still possible in 2009 (when Obama took office) to adjust the architecture (in terms of funding, schedule and implementation) without throwing out the hard fought for and won consensus on strategic direction that the previous two authorizations represented.
Instead, the VSE was discarded and replaced with (essentially) nothing. Sure, there was talk about “flexible paths” and “asteroid missions” but nothing came of either idea. Although the Flexible Path was deceptive (a recipe for widget-making and strategic confusion), the possibility of a human mission to an asteroid was seriously examined – and found to be wanting. In essence, the problem is that the Orion spacecraft (the only piece of the Constellation spacecraft left intact) is designed primarily for weeks-long duration cislunar missions, not for missions to an asteroid, which last for many months. When no near-Earth asteroid suitable for a human mission was found, the agency substituted a gimmicky plan to retrieve an asteroid and bring it back into cislunar space, there to be accessible by the spacecraft that we were still building (but not for its original intended purpose). But it could be said that we’d be flying beyond LEO, approaching an asteroid, examining it by humans who would then be able to bring a piece of it back to Earth.
In order to give the impression that a long-term direction was being pursued, NASA re-embraced (again) human Mars missions as their “ultimate goal.” This gambit retread has two advantages: 1) it simulates continuity, as Mars had always been assumed to be the eventual destination for human missions; and 2) it is so far into the future that no one need worry about how to do it or figure out how to pay for it – the perfect government program. A space goal that is more than two decades away might as well be non-existent. In such a situation, any space activity, no matter how idiotic or worthless, can be rationalized as a step within a “technology roadmap” that would eventually enable us to achieve that “ultimate goal.” A long-range plan with no specifics is infinitely malleable; no one can prove that the ARM is not relevant to future Mars missions. This ludicrous situation has been carefully re-packaged by NASA – along with a large helping of public relations glitz – into their current “#JourneytoMars” campaign, a hodge-podge of real hardware and fake missions, with a thick icing of Hollywood schmaltz (The Martian).
This very real and dismal state of affairs is the kind of situation targeted by Culberson’s bill. In his plan, both the President and Congress would appoint eleven members to a “Board of Directors.” This board would meet quarterly to review NASA’s progress and recommend changes or shifts in emphasis. The board would consist of space professionals – people who work, or who have worked, in the area of space science and engineering (with the idea that these members would be qualified to understand, judge and pronounce on technical merits of a given spaceflight proposal). The board would also conduct special studies and reviews on any topic about which the Congress or administration had particular concerns.
Along with having advisory oversight, the Board of Directors would have considerable influence over the program. Specifically, the board would be responsible for helping to select the agency Administrator (and Deputy), who would serve a ten-year term of office. This selection would come from a list of nominees provided by the Board to the President. Presumably, this arrangement would assure that the Administrator would be technically knowledgeable enough to steer the agency onto the right tactical path once a strategic direction had been articulated, with special attention given to seeing that they remain on the planned path. Interestingly, the proposed legislation also provides that the board can recommend the Administrator’s “removal for cause” – for being unresponsive and/or ineffective. This provision in no way eliminates the ability of a President to fire an existing administrator for reasons of their own. In addition, the Board would have one other significant power – it would devise a yearly recommended budget for the agency, independent of the one drawn up by the administration’s own Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Both budgets would be submitted to the Congress for consideration, with the executive required to explain any differences that exist between the two.
This last provision is quite interesting and no doubt could be the source of a lot of mischief, depending upon how Congress reacts to the possible submission of two wildly divergent budgets. A memorable moment came during Thursday’s hearing (1:19:30 of this video) when former NASA Administrator Mike Griffin stated: “Anything that can be done to ameliorate and control the influence of the OMB on the process would be welcome. The OMB is a haven for largely unelected, unappointed, not very well qualified staff who seek to exercise a level of power and control in their area that their accomplishments have not earned.” Griffin’s pointed statement is indicative of some unhealed wounds from past battles between parts of the administration and the agency.
The intent of the proposed law is to insulate the agency from some of the more devastating political winds of change – assuring that strategic decisions are made for good technical reasons. Since the new arrangement reduces the power that the executive holds over NASA, they will likely oppose it. In part, the desire and purpose of the bill is to make NASA a less political agency, similar to the FBI, whose Director is also appointed for a 10-year term and is not directly tied to a given administration. But it is also desired that good scientific and technical oversight be brought to the agency, a proposition I am sympathetic to, having recommended in the 2004 Aldridge report the re-establishment of the National Space Council, a White House group designed to watch over and make sure that NASA properly implements a chosen strategic direction.
Our current mess has deep roots and complex causes, but is largely the result of unilateral action taken by an administration that, without consultation, discarded a strategic direction that Congress had collectively agreed upon. At the hearing, Griffin commented that the 2006 and 2008 authorizations were “good strategic plans” and wondered why Congress did not act when the President casually eliminated them. In point of fact, the 2010 NASA authorization reiterated the goals of the VSE, specifically mentioning the critical role of cislunar space, including the lunar surface. This direction was ignored by the agency, wherein it became a thought-crime to even mention any possibility of human crews going to the lunar surface. In the subsequent rough-and-tumble of operational plans being submitted to Congress, that defiance of the “return to the lunar surface” mandate was papered over and lost in the subsequent noise of everyday government operations.
Culberson’s proposal is interesting in many ways. It would provide some needed technical oversight to the agency and spread the political responsibility for success (or failure) on a few more shoulders. I would be surprised if this proposal was accepted by the administration, seeing as how it would reduce their power and decision-making role. But the bill is a good point of departure for a debate on how to structure and conduct a realistic, cumulative, multi-decadal program in a government dominated by short-term, political battles. The NASA of the Apollo-era worked because there was an agreed national purpose to human spaceflight. The idea of national purpose no longer prevails, as battles and debates over Moon vs. Mars, human vs. robotic, and government vs. private are perforce ideological and thus, eventually political. I will be watching with interest as Rep. John Culberson’s Space Leadership Preservation Act of 2015 bill moves though the Congress.
There are 3 main policy problems with almost ALL of the current plans:
(1) they rely on giant expendable boosters, due to local politics creating chaos at the national level.
(2) as a result, no money is left to develop Lunar OR Mars space vehicles and equipment..
(3) the policy community is divided into Moon-only and Mars-only camps.
The solution is logically simple but politically almost impossible:
(1) let private companies develop giant, reusable boosters
(2) with the freed-up funds, develop and build Lunar and Mars vehicles and associated infrastructure.
(3) Get the Lunar and Mars camps to work together so that each goal supports the other. The moon provides fuel to reach Mars, the Mars mission provides the fuel demand to allow access to at least one lunar pole.
I hope the rumors (that this board would force abandonment of the commercial crew and cargo program and return to the stalled Constellation program after wasting 5 years on a nearly stalled SLS program) are false. If the Commercial crew and cargo program is allowed to proceed, it will result in a reduction of space transport costs, which will allow more funds to be used for exploration and development in all areas. This includes development of propellant depots and logistics bases near the Moon, which are required for both safe and reliable access to the lunar surface and to support Mars expeditions.
“let private companies develop giant, reusable boosters”
Sure they will.
There is an old joke:
Question – How do you put 4 elephants in a compact car?
Answer – It is easy, 2 in the front 2 in the back.
“If the Commercial crew and cargo program is allowed to proceed, it will result in a reduction of space transport costs, which will allow more funds to be used for exploration and development in all areas.”
Perhaps, but the drastic underperformance of SpaceX and Orbital Sciences on CRS-1 would indicate exactly the opposite.
“I hope the rumors (that this board would force abandonment of the commercial crew and cargo program and return to the stalled Constellation program after wasting 5 years on a nearly stalled SLS program) are false.”
That is certainly an interesting rumor. Got a source for it?
–
“(1) let private companies develop giant, reusable boosters
(2) with the freed-up funds, develop and build Lunar and Mars vehicles and associated infrastructure.”
We’ve heard this before.
After the shuttle was decommissioned it was supposed to free up funds for larger, more complex tasks.
So far, this hasn’t worked.
Private companies have so far shown enough problems in making medium lift boosters work. So far, just one successful landing, and even then that rocket won’t be used to lift off again.
–
” If the Commercial crew and cargo program is allowed to proceed, it will result in a reduction of space transport costs, which will allow more funds to be used for exploration and development in all areas.”
It has been proceeding for some time now, with not much to show.
Likely this is due to the companies trying to compete with established companies that provide reliable transport and that have years of experience. As a result, real progress is slowed down.
No, commercial reliance isn’t the answer, and I do believe Dr. Spudis has previously explained why.
The real answer is to have responsible leadership.
No, commercial reliance isn’t the answer, and I do believe Dr. Spudis has previously explained why.
Let me clarify my position regarding “commercial” space. I am not opposed to commercial efforts to develop lunar mission capability; indeed, I am actively engaged with one company that is attempting to do exactly that. The problem is that the development of flourishing long-term markets for commercial lunar efforts is dependent upon the development of some capabilities and technologies that we do not currently possess and (I believe) are unlikely to be solely developed by commercial entities alone. Moreover, some of these capabilities are needed by NASA for their future deep space efforts; thus, it is entirely appropriate to expect NASA to work on developing some of them. I also happen to think that unless there is a substantial federal government presence on the cislunar frontier, legal issues, such as property rights and international relations become much murkier and certainly less favorable to commercial companies. Just as the federal government had a legitimate interest in the various entities that settled the American west, so we all collectively (through our elected government) have an interest in space development, in cislunar and beyond.
When I wrote “commerical reliance”, I wasn’t outright against commercial space entities either.
Rather, I meant those that think that by commercial entities alone can we do what we set out to do.
I imagine you’ve seen the type; those that see commercial entities as beating NASA to Mars, doing things better than NASA, etc.
As you point out, using both is the logical answer.
Unfortunately, it is “commercial space” that has been using NASA
The promised cheap astronaut taxi has yet to fly a person but is certainly sending satellites up for profit (largely on the taxpayers dime).
While landing back lower stages is a nifty parlor trick and makes for a great infomercial, the numbers concerning these concepts have not changed since they were first studied a half a century ago. Every feature used to enable “reusability” cuts into the payload to such an extant it makes no economical sense at all compared to dropping spent stages in the ocean.
In other words, it’s a scam.
Space X and the ULA are both trying to develop partially reusable Earth to orbit sub heavy lift launch vehicles. But NASA operated a partially reusable heavy lift vehicle for more than 30 years. It was called the Space Shuttle.
Boeing’s SLS could also be a partially reusable spacecraft if the SRBs were reused. But they’re not going to do that because there really is no proof that partially reusable Earth to orbit spacecraft are significantly cheaper than expendable spacecraft.
High demand is the key to dramatically reducing Earth to orbit launch cost.
However, it should be relatively cheap and easy to develop reusable single stage extraterrestrial landing vehicles and reusable interplanetary vehicles using propellant depots technology– especially if it utilizes lunar water resources. The biggest economic advantage of reusable single stage extraterrestrial vehicles is that they don’t require reassembly and only require refueling.
The reason that NASA currently doesn’t have enough money to develop propellant depot based extraterrestrial landing vehicles and interplanetary vehicles is because an enormous amount of its human spaceflight related budget is still dedicated to its perpetual– Big LEO programs.
So Congress needs to either end NASA’s big LEO programs in order to appropriately fund its beyond LEO program or simply raise NASA’s meager annual human spaceflight related budget by at least three to four billion dollars. Its that simple!
Marcel
A compromise would be to send astronauts to the moons of Mars. They are asteroid like moons at Mars. Asteroid, moons, Mars, everyone’s happy. Much cheaper and safer than landing on any gravitational surface or chasing some random NEA. The same habitat can be used for both transfer and surface operations. I think it is the most realistic option politically, technically and scientifically. It would be a stepping stone to a landed Moon mission.
Yes, travel all the way to Mars to rendezvous with one of the Martian Moons and then come home.
That will somehow be “stepping stone” to returning to the Moon.
If you want a mission to the Martian moons advocate for it on its own merits. As a “stepping stone” to the Moon such a mission makes as much sense as the Asteroid Retrieval Mission.
Which is to say none at all.
“-let private companies develop giant, reusable boosters-”
Gosh, I wonder what company that would be? So transparent.
“-after wasting 5 years on a nearly stalled SLS program-”
The obligatory NewSpace death-to-SLS statement.
“If the Commercial crew and cargo program is allowed to proceed, it will result in a reduction of space transport costs, which will allow more funds to be used for exploration and development in all areas. This includes development of propellant depots-”
Abandoning the space station to nowhere and associated taxi’s and indefinitely shelving the boots on Mars fantasy would probably be the first recommendation of such a board.
NewSpace advocates are absolutely terrified of that happening.
The propellant depot concept has been marketed for years as a way to make the evil Super Heavy Lift Vehicle unnecessary. Except it has never been done and is in fact far less efficient than super heavy lift.
There are 3 main policy problems with almost ALL of the current plans:
(1) they rely on giant expendable boosters, due to local politics creating chaos at the national level.
(2) as a result, no money is left to develop Lunar OR Mars space vehicles and equipment..
(3) the policy community is divided into Moon-only and Mars-only camps.
Actually, not quite.
(1) It is not “local politics” that dictate the development of a heavy lift vehicle — it is the Apollo experience on the design mindset of the people who develop deep space architectures. Apollo is the only example of a trans-LEO human spaceflight program that worked. Apollo used a heavy-lift vehicle, therefore, we need a heavy-lift vehicle for trans-LEO human spaceflight. Q.E.D.
The “chaos” at the national level was entirely induced by the current administration’s cancellation of the VSE, an agreed-to strategic direction by both political parties at the national level.
(2) Even if I accept this analysis (which I don’t), there were (and are) other policy solutions to the alleged funding shortfall that were never even explored by either the 2009 Augustine committee nor the administration they reported to. For example, no one looked at the possibility of cost-sharing by ESA or even of ESA (or some other entity) developing and paying for the Altair lander.
(3) More precisely stated, the policy “community” (such as it is) is divided into (1) incremental tacticians, who think that a gradual expansion of human reach into deep space (one that includes learning to use the resources of the Moon to create new spacefaring capability) will lead to greater long-term human space access; and (2) Mars-at-all-costs zealots, who want a human Mars mission “in their lifetimes” no matter what and don’t care what happens after the first flags-and-footprints Mars mission is accomplished (as if it ever would be).
Your mileage may vary.
The giant reusable boosters are required by the time a Mars program starts sending missions, but they are NOT required for an initial Lunar program since the moon has no atmosphere and wide landers are not needed. They would be helpful in launching large depots to facilitate storage of lunar derived fuel at L1 or an equivalent high orbit location. They would also allow launch of larger in-space reusable vehicles which would further reduce the cost of lunar and cis-lunar operations.
I will ignore the scoffers who think private companies will never built huge rockets, since they also scoffed at steamboats, airplanes, and even going to the Moon. Private companies generally cannot support pure exploration efforts, as there is no profit in it. For now, NASA is still vital to providing the funding for such exploration efforts.
I admit that I would like to still be alive when mankind lands on Mars, but not at the expense of an Apollo Mission Model based, flags and footprints type mission plan, since it cannot and will not last.
(All of the current NASA Mars plans fall into this category! ). Find just one that specifies reusable Lunar and Mars vehicles and I could be proved wrong.
I strongly support and endorse international Lunar and Mars mission planning and shared funding.
John Strickland
“I will ignore the scoffers who think private companies will never built huge rockets-”
Fusion reactors and space elevators are also scoffed at. But not by the same people who scoffed at steamboats.
“For now, NASA is still vital to providing the funding for such exploration efforts.”
The NewSpace crowd may be completely oblivious to their own hubris but others are not.
“Find just one that specifies reusable Lunar and Mars vehicles and I could be proved wrong-”
You have to be proven right before actually being proven wrong. That so many assume the flexible path was ever “right” in the first place is a red flag all by itself.
The U.S. space program has drifted far off the path it started on looking for some cheap workaround to expanding the human presence into the solar system. There is no cheap. An indication of this is the call for fictional “reusable huge rockets” to land on Mars built by a “entrepreneur” while damning the factual most powerful launch vehicle ever created that is only just capable of returning to the Moon.
“I will ignore the scoffers who think private companies will never built huge rockets, since they also scoffed at steamboats, airplanes, and even going to the Moon.”
Then I trust it will be alright with you if the skeptics ignore you. Since people with your lack of skepticism have also believed (among many other things) in:
(1) Perpetual Motion.
(2) The car from the 1950’s that ran on water (which the oil companies of course covered up).
(3) The Roswell UFO crash.
(4) Etc.
Trying to discredit other peoples opinions by use of “historical analogy” can be played by anyone.
An interesting proposal.
Particularly the part about checking the power of the OMB.
Made me think of something that happened in the early 1980’s. I was a newly graduated engineer working in Shuttle EVA (my first job out of college).
The Shuttle had been flying for several years by then and one of the guys I worked around (Ted, last name withheld to protect the innocent) was a trainer for the shuttle flight deck simulator.
One day Ted was tasked with giving a tour of the facility to a group of “OMB space experts”. When the tour was over Ted returned, to where we were working around another simulator. When the tour group had left he burst out in uncontrollable laughter. When we asked what was going on, he recounted the story.
He was showing them the flight controls and when he showed them the break pedals, one of the “OMB space experts” asked (in an accusatory tone, as if he had found graft and corruption): “Breaks, what do you need breaks for; you land in the water?”
Congress needs to focus NASA’s near term efforts on establishing a permanent outpost on the Moon, primarily for the exploitation of lunar polar ice resources.
Of course, it wouldn’t make make much sense to produce water on the Moon for propellant unless we also design reusable vehicles and depots that can utilize LOX/LH2 propellant.
Using the SLS to deploy water depots to the Earth-Moon Lagrange points and to the lunar surface for manufacturing LOX and LH2 — needs to be a priority. NASA needs to resist advocating or supporting any architecture that cannot utilize propellant derived from lunar ice resources.
The exploitation of lunar ice is also the key to private commercial expansion to the lunar surface and to the rest of cis-lunar space. The exploitation of lunar ice is also the most sustainable way to quickly and cheaply get humans to Mars.
Marcel
-“The exploitation of lunar ice is also the most sustainable way to quickly and cheaply get humans to Mars.”
“Quickly” as in soon or “quickly” as in a rapid transit?
Regardless, we’ll never be able to focus on a sustainable plan for lunar ice if all we think about is going to Mars. That’s part of what caused problems for the VSE.
We must put Mars on the back burner for the time being and focus on the more economical task at hand. Only then, after we have established a cislunar network, could we realistically think about manned voyages to Mars.
“Regardless, we’ll never be able to focus on a sustainable plan for lunar ice if all we think about is going to Mars. That’s part of what caused problems for the VSE.”
Actually that did not cause problems for the VSE, though it did when it became emphasized for Constellations Systems (which was the attempted implementation of the VSE).
Other than that clarification I completely agree with your point.
But that is a vision for a future with very intensive space exploration. There’s no demand for much fuel in space today. Even with a crewed mission to Mars at every conjunction, it would be cheaper and simpler to launch the fuel from Earth (at $4,000/kg and decreasing), than to build and remote operate some fuel factory on a Lunar pole. It will come, but it’s not for us, it’s for the next generation.
“- it would be cheaper and simpler to launch the fuel from Earth (at $4,000/kg and decreasing), than to build and remote operate some fuel factory on a Lunar pole.”
Where did you get that 4000 dollar figure? Let me guess…..SpaceX. Except their advertising does not seem based in any reality except that of their fans.
True.
When SpaceX actually signed a contract to deliver cargo to a fixed point in space (the CRS contract) the cost turned out to be $80,000/kg. Cryogenic Propellants will be more difficult/expensive then the kind of cargo delivered under CRS.
Depositing 1200 tonnes of water to EML1 for a Mars mission from Earth would require 40 SLS launches (30 tonnes per launch) or about 80 Falcon Heavy launches.
But deploying a lunar water and propellant factory would probably require only three or four SLS launches:
one to deploy 1.4 MWe of solar electric power,
a second to deploy propellant producing lunar water depot (electrolysis plant plus cryocoolers and water tank)
and a third launch to deploy mobile microwave water extraction vehicles, mobile water tankers, and mobile cryotankers
and maybe one additional SLS launch to deploy a one MWe nuclear power plant.
A single SLS launch would be required to deploy a couple of empty reusable water tanker shuttles to the lunar surface.
Each water shuttle would be capable of delivering at least 50 tonnes to EML1 from the lunar surface with enough propellant left to return to the lunar surface per launch. Assuming that these water shuttles utilize CECE engines (capable of at least 50 starts), two water shuttles should be capable of delivering up to 1200 tonnes to EML1 from the lunar surface if we assume four engine starts per mission.
However, if Blue Origin’s BE-3 engines are used for the water shuttles then they would be capable of more than 160 starts (perhaps 40 round trip missions): 4000 tonnes of water deployed to EML1 from just two reusable shuttles and a single SLS launch.
Marcel
I was dismayed to hear about the corrections published in the Sept. 23, 2011 issue of science. “Basically all the LCROSS numbers except hydrogen have to be revised downward, mostly by a factor of 5.5” Christopher Carson reports on the Moon Society Facebook page.
https://www.facebook.com/groups/6457556893/search/?query=lcross%20science
And the original LCROSS numbers didn’t show anything like the 2 meter thick sheets of pure ice Spudis imagines. The LEND data doesn’t support Spudis’ optimistic hopes.
If it turns out the richest lunar water deposits are 1% water by mass, I would call the moon a pointless distraction.
Good to know that the font of all knowledge, Facebook, has weighed in.
The LCROSS data need to be confirmed, but its (unrefuted) estimate of ~7 wt.% in the floor of Cabeus is more than adequate to mine water.
The LEND collimated data are worthless; the uncollimated data corroborate the previously obtained LP neutron data, but in any event neutron spectroscopy only senses the upper half-meter or so of the lunar surface. Radar penetrates several meters deep.
I have always advocated additional surface missions to ground truth the remote sensing and such missions are in the critical path for our architecture. A study for DARPA by the Colorado School of Mines in 2003 found that any concentration of water ice greater than 1 wt.% was “economic” in the mining sense of that word.
Thanks for contributing your pointless distraction.
Not my area of specialty, but I seem to remember this whole issue being discussed on this website over a year ago.
As I recall you put it away very effectively.
Is this just the same already refuted claim being put out again?
Yes, it has come up before and will no doubt come up again. I discussed the LEND data controversy HERE.
That’s what I thought, thanks for the confirmation.
Even if there was– absolutely no water ice– on the moon, lunar regolith is still composed of about 43% oxygen. Oxygen is about 89% of the mass of water and 86% of the mass of rocket fuel (LOX/LH2).
So more than 86% of the mass needed for an interplanetary journey could still be provided from the Moon’s low gravity well!
Marcel
It is a fantasy to think that the problems we have in our space program can be “fixed” bureaucratically. It does not matter how long the Administrator’s term is, or how he or she is chosen.. The only thing that will create a space exploration program worthy of the people in the space community to work on, is leadership from the top. Ultimately, neither the Congress, nor an “independent board” will make policy, or ensure that the existing one is followed. There will be a new President 11 months from now. Whether or not that specific person is at all interested in the space program, around him or her will be the “presidency,” as in institution, with advisors, policymakers, etc.. We had a space exploration program until Obama cancelled it. It is not such a big leap, and I think would get visible public support, to propose that we have one, again.
I am (sadly) inclined to agree.
Sadly because there does not appear to be any sign of that sort of leadership developing.
Still it never hurts to try.
On a happier note, if you are the Marsha Freeman who wrote the book The Extraterrestrial Imperative; I greatly enjoyed it.
“We had a space exploration program until Obama cancelled it.”
I voted for him in the slim hope he would end our military adventures overseas and bring the troops home. I now have another forlorn hope to pray about: th prospect of climate change being addressed with space solar power (Gerard K. O’Neill was proposing this 40 years ago).
This issue is vaguely similar to the F-22 being canceled; Both McCain and Obama promised to cancel this quarter billion dollar each fighter plane as too expensive. It did not matter who won- it was a dead duck.
If both candidates were to campaign on Moon return and space solar power (one as a cure for climate change and the other as the path to global energy dominance) then it would not matter who won- we would be going back to the Moon either way.
While this may be a good direction, my worry is that it also may turn out to be a case of rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Let’s hope that doesn’t happen.
If a new plan is chosen, hopefully it can be one that doesn’t have to scrap the SLS in favor of yet another launch vehicle.
In my view a single event best describes the no-win situation the U.S. is in:
“On October 9, the CBS program 60 Minutes ran a segment about space colonies. Later they aired responses from the viewers, which included one from Senator William Proxmire, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee responsible for NASA’s budget. His response was, “it’s the best argument yet for chopping NASA’s funding to the bone …. I say not a penny for this nutty fantasy”.[53]”
The prophet of space colonization was Gerard K. O’Neill and though he is now largely forgotten, nobody has come close to the perfection of the concepts he advanced. A “national purpose” is absolutely needed to prevail over the chaos that now reigns and the only likely candidate is O’Neill’s vision. Colonizing Mars is a very bad idea and was ruled out early on. It persists today as a way to garner the interest of emoting sci-fi fans.
Lunar resources are the key and a government sponsored program of Super Heavy Lift missions the path. It is not flexible and does not embrace LEO tourist ‘entrepreneurs” or Mars or “the search for life.”
Going back to the Moon for resources is clear and unambiguous.
It would seem that NASA (sliwly morphing into NADA) could take several pages out of the DARPA, ‘get it done already’, play-book, some of which could include short admin tenures and top level cover.
“In addition, the Board would have one other significant power – it would devise a yearly recommended budget for the agency, independent of the one drawn up by the administration’s own Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Both budgets would be submitted to the Congress for consideration, with the executive required to explain any differences that exist between the two.”
There is no clear objective.
Boots on Mars does not serve the public in any way. Continuing to go around in circles pouring 4 billion a year into some cans in LEO is accomplishing nothing. Thus when a Human Space Flight budget of billions goes up for approval there is not much to recommend it to the public- and it shows.
The public is generally disinterested in space for good reasons.
In my view the GEO satellite infrastructure is the first target of opportunity for NASA human spaceflight. Why isn’t the space station to nowhere hovering over North America providing a human-crewed laboratory for improved telecommunications? Radiation.
The thousands of tons of water to protect GEO telecommunications space stations can come from only one place- the lunar poles.
The second target of opportunity for NASA human spaceflight is the nuclear deterrent. We presently have an arsenal of missiles in land-based silos and submarines that is vulnerable and on hair trigger alert- and in need of about a trillion dollars of funds over the next ten years. Moving those warheads into deep space on human crewed “space boomers” would divert that trillion dollars into a cislunar infrastructure. Russia and China would follow our example.
And the last target of opportunity for NASA human spaceflight has already been mentioned: Gerard Kitchen O’Neill’s plan to beam down the energy to power civilization on Earth from space (using lunar resources). Let the next administration prove their commitment to solving climate change, or depending on which party triumphs, providing energy independence.
This kind of goal setting would be the equivalent of Apollo-with-a-purpose in the 21st century. And the public would be very interested.
Great Post! Thank you