History is a set of lies agreed upon. – Napoleon Bonaparte
Discovery in orbit
Now that the Space Shuttle’s been retired, we’ve witnessed nearly universal agreement within the space commentariat on its legacy: Failure. Take your pick of descriptors – a mistake, a bad design, “the end of an error,” the wrong path, a death-trap, and/or “Nixon’s destruction of Apollo.” It doesn’t matter whence this criticism comes; the same words and phrases are recited again and again. Are these denunciations independent convergence on the truth or simply echoes in a canyon?
In part, it’s the image of the Space Shuttle that suffers in comparison to its immediate predecessor, Apollo. The Saturn V was magnificent – a gleaming white monument pointing to the stars, a Teutonic beauty rising above Earth, carried aloft on a glorious blinding pillar of orange flame while thunderous super-bass, low frequency pounding of engines vibrated inside your chest up to five miles away. The Apollo spacecraft took people to the Moon, hundreds of thousands miles beyond low Earth orbit. From that lofty perch, we saw the full globe of the lovely blue-and-white planet Earth, hanging before us like a masterpiece in the Louvre. For space buffs, the Apollo program was a spectacle to remember and savor.
Contrast that vision with the Space Shuttle – squat and ugly, the vehicle defaced Pad 39A by its ignoble presence. It was a kludged-together conglomeration – an airplane standing on its tail, overwhelmed by the presence of the big, ugly orange hulk of the ET and two giant Roman candles strapped to its side. When it lit, you held your breath, waiting for the inevitable catastrophic fireball explosion. Then by some miracle it reached orbit, but no further. What a disappointment – a thrown-together launch vehicle that only reached low Earth orbit (barely). It even had to open its cargo bay doors to radiate internal heat so the crew could remain aloft. The Shuttle ugly duckling suffered greatly in comparison to the beautiful Saturn V swan.
Why should it matter that Shuttle is gone? What have we really lost? In fact, just about everything. Outside of leasing seats on regularly flying Russian Soyuz spacecraft, America has no way to get humans to and from space. We cannot launch large replacement parts for the International Space Station (good thing that it’s fully assembled; let’s hope it does not develop any serious difficulties that require replacement of any of the major pieces). We no longer have the ability to access and service the Hubble Space Telescope, or any other satellite for that matter. We will remain without this capability even after the new Orion spacecraft becomes operational. The Shuttle stack had a throw weight of more than 100 tons; nothing in the world’s stable of launch vehicles remotely approaches that capability.
The Shuttle program came about because NASA was looking for a path to make spaceflight affordable and routine. Although proven, Apollo was simply too expensive to continue. Parts of the Saturn V were (literally) hand-made. Recently I’ve been reading commentary about the Shuttle program that’s appeared in the last few years and certain tropes repeatedly appear. In this piece, I want to examine and address some of them. I reserve the right to revisit this topic later for more rumination on other issues.
One canard often mentioned in the Apollo-Shuttle comparison is that for what the Shuttle program cost, we could have launched dozens of Saturn Vs. Perhaps, but what would we have launched? The Shuttle payload was about 25 tons; Saturn V could carry 120 tons. If we’d flown the same manifest, Saturn would have wasted 4/5 of its capacity on each launch. Of course, we could have combined some payloads – if they were ready at the right time and they all needed to be delivered to the same orbit.
It’s often alleged that Nixon cancelled the Apollo program because it was a Kennedy initiative. In fact, it was Lyndon Johnson who shut down the Saturn V production line in 1968 to finance the war in Vietnam and expand entitlements. True enough, the last three Apollo missions to the Moon were cancelled, but it was NASA that wanted that. The Apollo program managers thought that having accomplished their primary goal (“man-Moon-decade”), they were simply tempting fate (and a possible catastrophic loss of crew) to continue the program. As a lunar scientist, I am more grateful that we got the six landings that we did than resentful that the last three were cancelled.
Nixon was actually a huge supporter of human spaceflight. At a time of great social upheaval and turmoil, Nixon thought that the space program was a positive, forward-looking activity that could help counter the negativity then prevalent in America. However, as both a plain-cloth Republican and a political realist, he realized that there was no support for the expenditures that a human Mars mission (as his Vice-President Spiro Agnew advocated) would require. Nixon wanted a space program that we could afford. He also recognized the geopolitical importance of not allowing the Soviet Union to become the only world power with a human spaceflight program. Nixon’s judgment was that a program that could hold the line at less than one percent of the federal budget would be sustainable on a long-term basis, a supposition that the subsequent thirty-year history of the civil space program has shown to be correct.
It was on these terms that NASA began to examine possible Shuttle configurations. It was not simply a matter of being given a number and designing a program to fit that number. Cost is always a concern in any big technical project. In this case, the issue was what kind of human space program could we have given such a level of support.
Early design sketches for a space shuttle included a two-stage, fully reusable vehicle. That led to the legend that it was this obviously superior design NASA wanted but was forced by the budget bean counters to build the lower cost, partly reusable alternative. In fact, there were serious issues with the fully reusable design; many engineers thought that in technical terms, it was just a bridge too far in 1970 (and still is in 2013). According to Bob Thompson, Shuttle Program Manager during this era, it probably could not have been made to work. The decision to adopt a partly reusable design probably saved the space program from inevitable failure and subsequent collapse.
Also held up for criticism is Shuttle’s delta wing. It is often claimed that the large delta wing configuration of the Shuttle was imposed by military requirements. If Shuttle had been launched into a polar orbit, after one revolution the launch (and landing) site would no longer be under the Shuttle groundtrack. Delta wings gave the Shuttle the large cross-range capability (more than 1000 km) it needed to return to base quickly in launch abort scenarios. The massive triangularly shaped Shuttle wings reduced the payload capacity of the vehicle, but delta wing vehicles are more aerodynamically stable in the various velocity regimes through which the Shuttle traveled during re-entry from orbit to landing. If the Shuttle wing design was an “imposition,” it was a beneficial one for the ultimate design that emerged.
The sizing of the Shuttle payload bay is also held to be another military imposition. Supposedly, the 15 by 60 foot cargo bay was sized specifically to accommodate launching the then-planned reconnaissance satellites needed by the military. However, NASA also wanted a big cargo bay. They intended to eventually build a space station in low Earth orbit and Shuttle was sized in accordance with its anticipated needs. If the Shuttle stack had been much larger than it was, it might never have gotten off the ground; it certainly would not have fit through the doors of the VAB at the Cape, necessitating extensive reconstruction. If it were much smaller, a single vehicle would no longer serve all of the space program’s needs. Like Goldilocks, a “just right” Shuttle was built to satisfy all of the program requirements, as they were then understood.
Part of the great disappointment with Shuttle was that it cost more to operate than planned. Some pre-program economic studies showed that if you could fly the Shuttle 50 times a year, it might actually make money. No one seriously thought that we would ever achieve this number. Klaus Heiss, the man who did this analysis, once told me that the study was primarily an academic exercise, designed to compare the economics of a Shuttle with then-existing expendable launch vehicles. (Klaus also demonstrated that a partly reusable vehicle was better economically than a fully reusable one.) A reusable space vehicle had never been built and serious technical difficulties arose during its development. The complex thermal protection system (tiles) is one example. Upon each return to Earth, the Shuttle had to dissipate its enormous orbital kinetic energy as heat. Finding a material strong and light enough to provide this protection was extremely difficult and the system turned out to be more maintenance intensive than had been hoped.
Despite these difficulties and a lingering resentment about its origin and appearance, the Space Shuttle flew 133 successful missions, delivering over 3.5 million pounds of payload to space, including nearly the entire mass of the largest spacecraft made to date – the International Space Station. More than 350 people have traveled to space on the Shuttle. Over the course of its thirty-year history, the Shuttle program demonstrated the value of on-obit assembly, in-space repair, and maintenance of vehicles by people and machines working together. Such a step-by-step, extensible series of operations and experience must continue if we intend to pursue and successfully secure humanity’s long-term future in space.
The biggest myth of all is that solid rocket boosters are the great satan. Over 200 successful firings in a row make the 4 segment SRB the most dependable and powerful booster ever made. In the 5 segment version for the SLS it is the most evolved heavy lift system in history. It is the very best there is. We could possibly have built much larger and more powerful monolithic boosters in the 60’s but…..it did not happen.
There is no cheap; a cargo version would have made every penny worth it but going half way only got us half way. I always wonder what a space station made of a hundred external tanks would be like. I think a spaceship is always the best space station but if you consider how much internal space those 100 tanks have….it is pretty mind boggling and was entirely doable. What a waste.
I have read or at least took a close look at all the books written on the Shuttle program and it is obvious that underfunding made the shuttle a killer. Every single problem that kept the STS from succeeding had to do with not enough money being available to make the original design practical.
And of course the lack of a cargo version meant no earth departure stages of any ability would be sent up and this effectively trapped us in LEO for the next…how many years will it be before we once more leave the Earth’s gravitational field?
it is obvious that underfunding made the shuttle a killer. Every single problem that kept the STS from succeeding had to do with not enough money being available to make the original design practical.
The design of Shuttle was the best we could do at the time and was NOT compromised by a lack of money. The fully reusable “original” version of the Shuttle was too much development for the time horizon available. In any event, you cannot criticize a vehicle for being designed to cost when that aspect is one of the original motivators for its implementation.
“The fully reusable “original” version of the Shuttle was too much development for the time horizon available. In any event, you cannot criticize a vehicle for being designed to cost when that aspect is one of the original motivators for its implementation.”
I have to respectfully disagree with you Dr. Spudis. I am criticizing it being “designed to cost” since it did not fullfill it’s primary design goal of cheap lift.
http://history.msfc.nasa.gov/book/chpteight.pdf
“In September, Vice President Agnew’s Space Task Group presented its report, which in effect ratified Mueller’s goals for manned space. The report offered guidelines for space operations, and stressed the importance of “three critical factors” of commonality, reusability, and economy. The panel offered President Nixon three alternative courses. The first two were ambitious and expensive, incorporating a manned mission to Mars. The third was more modest, but still supported both a Space Station and a Shuttle. Nixon selected the third option six months later.”
I have read that Nixon made sure the thiokol segmented boosters were selected as political payback- and this is strangely similar to SpaceX and the Obama campaign.
I have also read the air force requirements were all about kidnapping a Russian spy satellite and landing it back in a single orbit and North American spent shuttle development money under the table on the B-1 bomber. None of these assertions can be proven but I happen to believe all three are are probably true.
I am criticizing it being “designed to cost” since it did not fullfill it’s primary design goal of cheap lift.
“Cheap lift” was NOT the only consideration — there was also routine operations (which it did achieve) and a maintenance of American spaceflight capability (which it also achieved). In the context of history, “cheap lift” should be read as “cheapER” than what we then had, the Saturn family. Shuttle was undertaken as a cheaper alternative to Saturn, which at the time it was approved, seemed doable.
“Cheap lift” was NOT the only consideration-”
You cite the article by Griffin where he writes about Alex Roland criticizing the Shuttle program:
“Briefly stated, NASA made two mistakes in shuttle development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, it traded development costs for operational costs. Second, it convinced itself that a recoverable launch vehicle would be inherently more economical than an expendable. NASA promised savings of 90%, even 95%, in launch costs. In practice, it costs more to put a pound of payload in orbit aboard the shuttle than it did aboard the Saturn launch vehicle that preceded it.”
While the SRB’s meet the definition of reusable they were really more expensive than throwing them away; I liked reusing them just because it allowed for constant and extremely close inspection- which led to over 200 flawless firings in a row.
In regards to the rest of the system I have to agree with Griffin and hold to reusability being a myth.
If reusability was the linchpin of the whole program, and the very first reason to require commonality and reusability was economy- then “cheap lift” was the only true consideration being entertained.
Routine operation did not happen since both times it killed a crew operations stopped for quite awhile and since it “maintained spaceflight capability” at the cost of human life and interrupting routine operations…….
But in the “context of history” you are being more accurate than my characterization; cheapER than Saturn was what drove most outcomes.
Routine operation did not happen since both times it killed a crew operations stopped for quite awhile and since it “maintained spaceflight capability” at the cost of human life and interrupting routine operations…….
STS did produce routine operations for most of its 30-year history. The hiatus periods after Challenger and Columbia are not unique; the Apollo 1 fire also shut down human spaceflight for almost 2 years.
“Briefly stated, NASA made two mistakes in shuttle development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, it traded development costs for operational costs. Second, it convinced itself that a recoverable launch vehicle would be inherently more economical than an expendable. NASA promised savings of 90%, even 95%, in launch costs. In practice, it costs more to put a pound of payload in orbit aboard the shuttle than it did aboard the Saturn launch vehicle that preceded it.”
NASA did not make these mistakes, Caspar Weinburger, who was the head of OMB forced NASA to use the TAOS design because of its lower development costs even when he was told that the operational costs would be higher.
If reusability was the linchpin of the whole program, and the very first reason to require commonality and reusability was economy- then “cheap lift” was the only true consideration being entertained.
The Von Braun version with the S1-C class flyback booster would have met this criterion but by this time some in NASA was doing all it could to kick the Germans to the curb. Von Braun wanted to preserve the Saturn production line and to fly the NERVA nuclear stage to more than double the throw weight to the Moon and beyond.
The Saturn V was able to deploy a pressurized volume of 360 m3 into orbit with just a single launch. With just three Saturn V launches, it could have exceeded the pressurized volume of the ISS (837 m3) which has so far required over 30 launches to assemble. So I think it can be argued that the Saturn V and Saturn 1B was not only more versatile but also a more efficient architecture than the Space Shuttle– even at LEO. Plus the high development cost for the Saturn V and Saturn 1B had already been paid for back during the middle 1960s.
I also don’t think there is any evidence that the high NASA spending during the Kennedy and Johnson years hurt the US economy. In fact, the US had the largest economic growth in the last 60 years (from Eisenhower to Obama) during the Kennedy-Johnson era. And some have argued that NASA spending during that time was a considerable economic boost to the economy!
The decline of US economic growth seems to have coincided with the end of the Apollo program. But, to be honest, there are probably a number of additional reasons for the decline in US economic growth over the past 40 years:
1. the rapid increase in the importation of foreign oil,
2. the relentless growth of the welfare state,
3. rampant private health insurance inflation,
4. the halt in the production of new commercial nuclear power plants which stopped over 30 years ago,
5. the growing economic consequences of illegal drug use in America
and
6. the outsourcing of US jobs to foreign countries
plus differential reproduction: the poorest and least educated people in the US had a lot more kids than the more educated middle class over the past 40 years.
Marcel F. Williams
Plus the high development cost for the Saturn V and Saturn 1B had already been paid for back during the middle 1960s.
The development costs had been paid, but the recurring costs made Saturn a very uneconomical proposition. The relatively high recurring costs of Shuttle were not then known.
I also don’t think there is any evidence that the high NASA spending during the Kennedy and Johnson years hurt the US economy
Quite true, but not relevant. This is a case where appearances take precedence over facts. It was the impression that vast sums of money were being thrown away that helped to collapse political support for space. Both parties and both ideological stripes howled for a cheaper space program (if we were to have one at all).
Marcel F. Williams says: June 2, 2013 at 7:44 pm
Paul Spudis says: June 3, 2013 at 2:49 am
“The development costs had been paid, but the recurring costs made Saturn a very uneconomical proposition. The relatively high recurring costs of Shuttle were not then known.”
The high recurring cost for the Saturn were (at least in large part) due to the nonstandard construction of some of the rockets components. As you note in the article some were literally hand made. An alternative approach would have been to implement a series of incremental changes to standardize the Saturn component manufacture. This could have reduced the recurring costs and done so for less: (1) Risk, (2) Development Money, and (3) Time than Shuttle development.
The resulting program would have been very different from the one that evolved so it is hard to judge their relative efficiency. As Marcel notes a bigger station (composed of Skylab sized modules) could have been assembled in far fewer flights. Additionally lunar access could have been maintained. However many of the ISS requirements (primarily microgravity) would have been compromised and the development of the extensive on orbit EVA capability (needed for cis-lunar space development) would not have been developed as the use of bigger Space Station modules would have made it unnecessary (it should be noted that this capability – in America anyway – is in jeopardy of being lost).
Where this discussion should lead is not dwelling on what should have been done forty years ago (if I could cast a time traveling vote I would go with modifying the Saturn hardware), but what we should do now. The Shuttle hardware is now in the position that the Saturn hardware occupied forty years ago. Adapting it for use is now the most efficient path forward for anyone wishing to see a vigorous American future in space over the next decades.
The second stage of the Saturn V is to me the most interesting part of the Saturn V stack. It was certainly the most difficult stage to build and actually required explosive charges set off in water tanks to bend metal hemispheres to the right measurements.
The hydrogen oxygen second stage of a launch vehicle has the potential to be a crew compartment but this wet workshop concept has been completely neglected- even Skylab was a “dry” workshop. Sending a stage all the way to the Moon where it can be captured by a Lunar launched shuttle and converted into spaceship structure is the true “flexible path.”
Sending the core tank of the SLS to the Moon is not being considered. Even to crash upper stages into a lunar debri field for later recycling would be a worthwhile project but is not something anyone wants to spend money even studying.
The “wet workshop” concept was abandoned because it was much too risky from a programmatic viewpoint. At the time, we had virtually no experience with in-space construction.
“second stage of the Saturn V is to me the most interesting part”
I’m thinking about those responsible for those engines because after stage separation, pumps have to spool up, engines have to ignite, thrust needs to build up…. all without tedious monitoring by hundreds at the firing rooms at the Cape.
Great, well-written article Paul! I nearly spilled coffee on my keyboard from laughing while reading the contrast between the ugly duckling shuttle versus the swan Saturn V!! Funny how history repeats itself as we now seem to be swerving back to the Saturn V template; I wonder what the inevitable replacement of SLS will look like…
I wonder what the inevitable replacement of SLS will look like…
One shudders to think….
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Most people consider the space shuttle to be really cool looking because it actually does resemble buck rogers winged rockets. It takes some small knowledge of space and rocket science to appreciate the difference between what is functional and real and what is actually baggage from an earlier era.
Many looked at Sidemount and thought of it as a completely ugly lash-up. Knowing the complete evolution of the components and it’s capabilities made it absolutely beautiful to me.
After my grief over Sidemount being killed I am not so affected by the look of the SLS but that will change after I see it fly for the first time I am sure. I am a fan of the Delta IV heavy and am looking forward to a very pleasurable experience seeing Orion fly on it.
I am very critical of combining cargo and crew vehicles. It seemed to me to be one of the most critical errors made in the shuttle design. But…….considering the need to transport nuclear materials to the Moon as directly and safely as possible, the human-rating of the SLS is a blessing in disguise. That escape tower and capsule are the way to send fissionable material to the Moon for use in reactors and propulsion systems.
It’s often alleged that Nixon cancelled the Apollo program because it was a Kennedy initiative. In fact, it was Lyndon Johnson who shut down the Saturn V production line in 1968 to finance the war in Vietnam and expand entitlements.
Absolutely right. I cannot believe how many times this myth that Nixon killed Apollo is trotted out.
Johnson was the leader of the Senate in 1958 and led the effort in the Senate for the founding of NASA. His views at the time were clear when he gave a speech in January of 1958:
“In essence, the Soviet Union has appraised control of space as a goal of such consequence that achievement of such control has been made a first aim of national policy. [In contrast], our decisions, more often than not, have been made within the framework of the Government’s annual budget. Against this view, we now have on record the appraisal of leaders in the field of science, respected men of unquestioned competence, whose valuation of what control of outer space means renders irrelevant the bookkeeping concerns of fiscal officers.”
When Johnson was president, he funded the building of 15 Saturn V rockets. Only the third (Apollo 8) would finally be used for a manned mission during the end of his administration. The other 12 were to be utilized by future Presidents. I’m not sure if you could fault Johnson for not building more at that time.
But Johnson had gotten the US heavily involved in a war in Vietnam the would eventually cost the US more than $738 billion in today’s dollars. Plus he was also trying to greatly increase spending on the welfare state. Johnson new that the political situation had changed a lot since 1957. Plus Johnson no longer feared that Russia would try to claim ownership of the Moon if they placed humans there first after the US and the USSR signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 prohibiting any nation from claiming ownership of the Moon.
Nixon had every opportunity to manufacture more Saturn V rockets since the high development cost had already been paid for during the middle 1960s. And there were proposals by NASA for lunar outpost. I think Nixon viewed the Apollo program as a stunt and wanted to get NASA out of the manned spaceflight business by developing a reusable space vehicle that he thought would eventually be attractive to private industry. Plus Nixon knew that there were many Democrats in Congress who never understood the rational for so much spending on the manned space program.
Johnson’s highest expenditures on NASA at one point were over $33 billion a year in today’s dollars. Even though he dramatically reduced the NASA budget, he still handed Nixon a $21 billion a year NASA budget in 1969 in today’s dollars. But when Nixon left office, he left Ford with an annual NASA budget of less than $12 billion in today’s dollars.
References
LBJ’s Space Race: what we didn’t know then (part 1)
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/396/1
LBJ’s Space Race: what we didn’t know then (part 1)
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/401/1
Creating NASA
http://www.vectorsite.net/tamrc_07.html
Marcel,
I know that all this is the conventional wisdom. But the Saturn V production line was shut down in 1968. LBJ was President then. The old NASA budget at peak Apollo paid for all the current agency infrastructure, especially at the Cape and the field centers and was a non-recurring expense. That level of expenditure should not be used to evaluate the level of space program support after all the infrastructure had been established.
A common myth. If you read the history of the program, the high water mark of funding for NASA was FY 1966. From a peak of $5.933 billion ($32.166 billion in FY 13 money), the budget dropped to $4.251 billion ($21.376 billion in FY 13 money).
Employment dropped from 396,000 to 78,000 in 1969.
Most of those cuts came out of the Apollo Saturn V production budget and employment.
You are basically saying the equivalent that we could start flying Space Shuttles again anytime we want.
It was not possible to sustain the Saturn production capability with that level of cuts.
http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/10presidents.html
These excerpts from a NASA history article portray a more ambiguous story.
Feeling shackled by the growing costs and unpopularity of the U.S. commitment to the war, Johnson once visited the Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, where the Saturn boosters were assembled; while there, he told astronaut Wally Schirra, “It’s too bad. We have this great capability, but instead of taking advantage of it, we’ll probably just piss it away.”
Johnson did, however, remain committed to meeting the goal of landing on the moon before 1970, and provided the budgetary and political support needed. When the Apollo 1 accident occurred in January 1967, his support for NASA never wavered. He allowed the space agency to lead the accident investigation and to take the steps needed to get Apollo back on track.
However, Johnson was unwilling to approve significant funding of any major programs to follow Apollo. As a result, the NASA budget during the final years of his presidency began a precipitous downward slide, and decisions were made not to order additional Apollo hardware, such as the Saturn V moon rocket.
Nixon rejected NASA’s ambitious post-Apollo plans, which included developing a series of large space stations, continued missions to the moon, and an initial mission to Mars in the 1980s.
By the time Nixon left the White House, the NASA budget had fallen from its peak of almost 4 percent of the total federal budget to less than 1 percent. It has remained at that lower level for the last 30 plus years. At that level, NASA decided it could not continue to operate the systems it had developed for Apollo and closed down the production lines for the Apollo spacecraft and Saturn V rocket while also cancelling three lunar missions – Apollo 18, 19 and 20.
Nixon rejected, however, ending the U.S. human spaceflight program, and against the advice of many of his technical and budgetary advisers in January 1972, approved the development of a new crew-carrying vehicle, the space shuttle.
By deciding the priority of space efforts had to be considered along other demands on the federal budget, and by approving of space shuttle development, Nixon laid the foundation for NASA’s efforts for the next three decades, a period characterized by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board as “straining to do too much with too little.”
I know that this is the official NASA story. I reject some of it.
These excerpts from a NASA history article portray a more ambiguous story.
A really good exercise is to read the papers regarding the FY-67, 68, and 69 budget and see where the money was taken, and where it went. For example job training initiatives increased by almost twice what came out of the NASA budget, which makes no sense considering that the jobs being trained for were the ones being lost.
More than anything it was a reprioritization of what the democrat party stood for at the time, what they wanted to fund, and it has remained that way all the way until today.
“According to Bob Thompson, Shuttle Program Manager during this era, it probably could not have been made to work. The decision to adopt a partly reusable design probably saved the space program from inevitable failure and subsequent collapse.”
I think that explanation is a gross oversimplification.
It should be made clear the underlying qualifier is that reusability is a myth. If the public was unwiling to watch anymore multi-million dollar stages being buried at sea after burning for a few minutes then was the solution to “simply” portray something as being the opposite?
This portrayal of the shuttle as an airliner to space was perhaps the greatest mistake NASA ever made. It is not so hard to explain space travel to the public but lying to them by claiming it is cheap is where the genesis of the catastrophe are to be found.
There is no cheap.
It occurs to me the manned geostationary telecom platform- somewhat like Dr. Spudis is proposing with a cis-lunar network- would have been the path to salvation instead of a partially reusable shuttle.
The problem then was the same as now; radiation shielding to allow humans to live and work above LEO is a huge mass to bring up out of Earth’s gravity well. The ice on the Moon now offers a solution to the shielding problem and the opportunity to take that most promising path to saving the space program from “inevitable failure and subsequent collapse.”
I think that explanation is a gross oversimplification.
You are free to believe what you choose to. Bob Thompson was there; you and I were not.
I attended a presentation by Mr. Thompson where he said the same thing.
I think that explanation is a gross oversimplification.
It should be made clear the underlying qualifier is that reusability is a myth.
I am reminded of a scene in the movie Iron man where the the character played by Jeff Bridges (Obediah Stane) confronts an engineer at Stark industries regarding his inability to replicate the ARC reactor that Tony built in a cave. The response by the chief engineer was that “I am not Tony Stark”.
Werhner Von Braun was completely confident in his ability to build a fully reusable two stage to orbit system based on the existing Saturn vehicle. After working with some of his lieutenants and talking to many of the others over the years I am quite confident that they thought that it could be done. I also think about what Kelly Johnson achieved over the years at the Skunk works.
I find it less than compelling when someone says that reusability is a myth as an axiomatic statement when Von Braun had been working on it for 30 years and thought that it was doable.
I think the Shuttle was a remarkable machine but far more complex than it should have been.
Since NASA knew that they wouldn’t have the funds to develop a– completely reusable– shuttle, they should have simply developed a reusable winged glider to go on top of the Saturn 1B. So there would have been no need to spend precious funds developing SRBs, an external tank, and new hydrogen engines.
A 21 tonne winged orbiter for the Saturn 1B would have been nearly twice as large as the winged Dream Chaser that’s being currently developed for the Atlas V. Such a large space plane might have been able to carry more passengers to orbit than the passenger constrained (because of its large cargo bay) Space Shuttle. Unmanned Saturn 1B launches could have also been used for 20 tonne cargo launches for NASA and the US military.
We can wonder all day what could have been and what should have been when questioning what was…but what is- is what matters.
We have these 5 segment SRB’s, and we have RS-68’s and SSME’s, and J2x and various hypergolic engines; along with friction stir welding technology to build stages there is the launch infrastructure. We can build HLV’s in the coming decades and they will get us to the Moon where we can build a new infrastructure to support deep space flight.
That is what we can do in terms of taking the next steps. Anything LEO including the ISS is a waste of time and resources. The rocket equation is merciless and the only way to improve the situation so far is with beam propulsion. The beam is the dream.
Gigantism may be the only answer to opening the solar system to colonization. Very large launch vehicles using massive beamed energy resources to improve ISP and allow for SSTO may be the only future that is possible. We may be able to build such a system in 20 or 30 years and start the real space age.
These little rockets- even the Saturn V was “small” as in being just big enough to accomplish the specific mission- are not going to get us out there.
We would have to spend the same 4 percent as when we were racing to the Moon to make any progress toward a new space age. There is nothing written in the stars that says it will or will not happen.
But if we do not go back to what we had and quadruple the human space flight budget we are not going anywhere.
The SLS should be an extremely useful machine– if its fully and frequently utilized– in a pioneering space program that first focuses on establishing a permanently manned outpost on the lunar surface.
A lunar outpost would be used for testing long term human physical and psychological effects in a hypogravity environment for several months to several years. It is extremely important to find out if there are any deleterious effects living under a low gravity environment for several months or several years.
The lunar outpost would also be used for producing large amounts of water (at least 1000 tonnes per year, IMO) from the lunar poles. The exploration and quantification of other precious volatiles at the poles should also be extremely important. Finding out what kind of materials and how much of them are contained at the lunar poles is going to be one of the most fascinating and important scientific and economic adventures in the history of humanity!
Phase two should focus on exporting some of the lunar water to the Earth-Moon Lagrange points for supplying drinking water, air, and mass shielding from radiation for SLS deployed space habitats.
Phase three should focus on the SLS deployment of large manned interplanetary vehicles at a Lagrange point gateway that are fueled and mass shielded from lunar water resources. Then we can finally begin a phased deployment or orbital outpost and fuel depots around Mars leading eventually to permanent outpost on the Martian surface.
But the Moon is the key to everything!
Marcel F. Williams
“-leading eventually to a permanent outpost on the Martian surface.”
Why Mars? Better to concentrate on building habitats or go farther out to the subsurface oceans of the outer moons. You can land on those with Lunar landers.
I have yet to hear a good reason to go to Mars. The gravity well makes it difficult to get to and from and there is little solar energy.
There are hints that the low gravity of Mars may not be deleterious to human health. But its not so clear if that will also be true under the 1/6 gravity of the Moon. Of course, putting people on the Moon for a year or two should enable us to quickly find out if low lunar gravity is deleterious to human health:-)
Politically, I think back to the Moon advocates need to get Mars First advocates– on their side– if we’re going to move forward. And establishing a lunar outpost first is the best way to later establish similar outpost on the Martian surface, IMO.
Marcel
Gigantism may be the only answer to opening the solar system to colonization. Very large launch vehicles using massive beamed energy resources to improve ISP and allow for SSTO may be the only future that is possible. We may be able to build such a system in 20 or 30 years and start the real space age.
This is one opinion, it certainly was not considered to be the only way by Von Braun. The Horizon report from 1958 showed how we could have a lunar base on the Moon by 1966 using only Saturn IB class vehicles to do orbital assembly of the spaceships that would then fly to the Moon.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Horizon
Gigantism only makes sense if you completely ignore all other considerations, specifically including In-Situ Resource Utilization. Mike Duke had a great chart showing how launch vehicle size scales downward with increasing ISRU implementation. We should never build large spaceships at the bottom of an 11 km/sec gravity well covered in an atmospheric shell. Makes no sense whatsoever.
Since Project Horizon seems to keep coming up, perhaps a more detailed review of the history of the project than is available on Wikipedia might be helpful.
http://www.astronautix.com/craft/hortpost.htm
Note the following points:
(1) The Base build-up program required 61 Saturn I and 88 Saturn II launchings through November 1966, the average launching rate being 5.3 per month. During this period some 220 metric tons of useful cargo would be transported to the moon (that is a flight rate of one every six days over a period of over two years – and for the project to be successful every one of the launches would have had to be on time and successful).
(2) LEO Assembly would take place at an austere spent-tank space station. In other words a wet workshop which, as has already been pointed out was beyond the capabilities of the day (Paul Spudis says: June 3, 2013 at 10:29 am “The “wet workshop” concept was abandoned because it was much too risky from a programmatic viewpoint. At the time, we had virtually no experience with in-space construction”). Even if the rendezvous/docking and EVA/EVR capabilities had been available at the time this would have required more launches to supply assembly crews and supplies to the austere station.
(3) The cost estimate was only a fifth of the actual cost of the Apollo program (and its cancelled follow-ons) which could have resulted in an equivalent base being created on the moon but some ten years later.
None of this should be taken as disparaging to Von Braun and his team. They were the predominate booster developers of the twentieth century (and have yet to be surpassed in the twenty first). But the Project Horizon Report was (to put it mildly) optimistic.
Joe, if you go to the references part of the Wiki page the original report itself is available. Again, the person who wrote the report is the same guy that designed a vehicle that had thousands built and several per day launched.
We look at space today from this viewpoint that each vehicle is finely crafted piece of artwork. Von Braun looked at them as tools to accomplish tasks.
Rockets were not the only finely crafted pieces of artwork that Von Braun looked at as tools to accomplish tasks… Probably he forgot to include labor costs in his Project Horizon cost estimate!!
I knew it!!! “The total program cost as outlined in this report was estimated to be $6,052,300,000 … These figures are estimates based on past experience … ” (page 5) lol!
Dennis,
I first read the Project Horizon Report when I was in College (around 1980) and have re-read it several times since over the years.
The cryptic reference to the person who wrote the report is somewhat puzzling since there were several authors, but I assume you mean Von Braun. I have already (in a previous post) paid sincere homage to Von Braun (and his team) but invoking his name is not a talisman that ends all decent.
I also have to assume when you talk about “a vehicle that had thousands built and several per day launched” that you are referring to the V-2 Rocket in it version used as a warhead launcher during the blitz in World War II. Sorry but I suspect that is an “honor” to his work Von Braun would prefer be left out of his biography. That is as much politics as I am going to get into. The technical part is that the V-2 (a suborbital warhead launcher in that iteration) is in no way comparable to a multistage vehicle with hydrogen/oxygen upper stage intended to put substantial payloads into LEO.
What I am now going to now say is in no way intended as an insult to anyone. These “alternate history” discussions (What would have happened if someone had made a different decision 50 years ago?) are fascinating up to a point and that point quite reasonably varies among individuals, but mine has been reached. I am much more concerned with what is going to happen from this point forward.
Just as an example, you are a big supporter of BEO missions supported by extensive LEO assembly. The EVA/EVR capabilities to support such activities currently exist. But as the current situation is going by the end of 2015 this country will lose that capability. It will not even be able to perform EVA maintenance on the ISS (another “service” we can buy from the Russians). Yet here we are debating whether or not Von Braun could have made Project Horizon work in the 1960’s.
“-alternate history” discussions (What would have happened if someone had made a different decision 50 years ago?) are fascinating-”
They are the best tool there is for moving forward; Santayana and all that.
The point where the past cannot teach us anything about the future is a subtle one. Most of what we are discussing is in no way unknown territory. I am taking some big leaps with beam propulsion but other than that the evidence for travel to the Moon using chemical propulsion is all in.
The mistakes are glaringly apparent and I am always puzzled by the success of those who continue to promote so many failed concepts from the past. And even more curious how anyone can fall for such deceptive promotion.
The SLS is the only project that has any hope of taking human beings outside the gravitational field of Earth again. Yet the only HLV in development on Earth is underfunded and under constant attack from the space clown wannabe mob.
Planetary defense and survival colonies have become real issues after so many near misses and the growing bio-terror threat. Yet our leaders are content to ignore these threats while pandering to defense contractors.
Then there is the matter of solar energy beamed down from space- the ONLY way we can possibly provide a western standard of living for a world population projected to climb to over 10 billion in the coming decades. The ONLY way that energy will ever become available is by way of the Moon.
I agree with Joe; we are at a critical decision making point in history concerning space. The situation may deteriorate and the window of opportunity will close. IMO we are an endangered species and what is most dangerous is our collective lack of vision concerning space exploration and colonization.
It was never going to happen. US military leaders aren’t as credulous as Hitler and his cronies were. Von Braun, through the force of personality, was able to cause the most massive misallocation of resources in Nazi Germany since the invasion of the CCCP itself. They should have given him the Congressional Medal of Honor just for that! But Project Horizon was a good college try. Too bad ole Wernher isn’t still alive: he’d have a nice 300 pager prepared for the CNSA by now!!
Joe will find this mildly optimistic also.
http://www.space.com/14291-photos-future-interstellar-starship-visions-spaceflight.html
I understand how difficult it is to get people to think outside the box after several years in military intelligence- sometimes a picture will make the lightbulb go on. I am sure Von Braun had the same problem concerning the F-1 powered Saturn whose engines were over the top unbelievable at the time.
Image 11 by Adrian Mann shows the scale of a hypothetical fusion starship. Consider this as a beam propelled launch vehicle and you might understand what I am getting at with “gigantism.”
What is hard to wrap one’s head around concerning beam propulsion is that the ISP of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen is much lower because instead of the steam being accelerated it is just the lighter (and much faster) hydrogen and instead of molecular energy derived from combustion the energy comes from transmitting stations; far more energy than simple combustion allows.
The result will be (I hope) those large spaceships “We should never build – at the bottom of an 11 km/sec gravity well covered in an atmospheric shell.”
The beam is the dream.
Actually my criteria for mildly optimistic in matters like this is usually driven by cost/time to accomplish.
Project Horizon is a good example. I do not doubt that given enough time and money, they might have achieved the kind of booster performance (about 60 flights per year, with a very high success rate) and have developed the rendezvous/docking and EVA/EVR capabilities to support the LEO assembly approach. In fact – even though the EVA/EVR capabilities are in danger of being lost – the second and third sets of capabilities exist today (some 50 years later). The real question is could it have been done for $6 Billion (in 1960 dollars) and in only 8 years. It has been said that the Project Horizon approach was abandoned because it could not be done within the arbitrary Apollo deadline, but according to the Project Horizon study it obviously could. I would submit therefore that when things got real even the Project Horizon authors had their doubts.
The same criteria (to me at least) applies to beamed propulsion. Such launches from the Earth’s surface would be very difficult to manage (the “Laser Light Craft” studies ended up saying a prerequisite was a Solar Power Satellite). Use of beamed propulsion for orbit to orbit (and perhaps even lunar surface to orbit) transport is a different matter. But that would require an extensive cis-lunar space capability (including lunar resource availability). So if the time frame is 20 to 40 years then such a transportation system might be practical, but there is a lot of work to be done first.
“Such launches from the Earth’s surface would be very difficult to manage-”
Yes, of course.
If you want easy, space is not the place to look. If you want cheap, you will get very little for your money. The question of what to spend tax dollars on has gone unasked since Ike’s defense industrial complex speech on January 17, 1961.
The game of pigs in space with congressmen fighting over dollars for their district to create jobs to create votes to keep them in office has been going on for a very long time. Unfortunately spaceships are hard money. Unlike many cold war toys spaceships actually have to work (Apollo 1 is proof of this). This makes them a non-starter for any for-profit enterprise. The easy money certain companies expect to make from space tourism scamming using tax dollars for “exploration” is not going to happen IMO. We are due for some fatalities and when that happens the flim flam will come to a grinding halt.
The two drivers are Fear and Greed. Our society works under the steal-what-you can-get-away-with principle until a threat to that kleptocracy arises. Then fear trumps the greed and we do things like defeat the axis and land on the Moon.
We did not launch once every 6 days for two years and project horizon did not happen because there was no threat to easy money- and more important no easy money to be made.
Colonizing the solar system is a project on the same scale as fighting a world war or cold war; anything less is just an exercise in trying to do the impossible. I really dislike space analogies but you could think of it as the Native Americans invading Europe with tree bark canoes. They might have had it all worked out but the essential fact is the North Atlantic made it impossible.
We have no Axis or Communist threat to the status quo to inspire a new space program. We actually have threats to humankind far more dangerous and insidious to answer and going into space is the only real solution.
The only person presenting a plan on this planet that seems to be pointed in the right direction is Paul Spudis. The geostationary manned telecom platform supported by Lunar Resources is the only plan that has any chance of working. Mars is a joke. So is launching solar power stations from Earth. But launching them from the Moon makes solar energy resources- and beam propulsion practical.
We live in this gravity well and when it is matched to the exhaust velocity of chemical propellants the rocket equation makes the situation clear. Materials science tells us there is only so much that can be done in terms of making hardware light AND reusable. In regards to engines and stages reusability is, at this time, a myth. Not “compelling” perhaps but there is no proof to the contrary.
We have to start with rockets but can only accomplish so much. Using Heavy Lift Vehicles to set up a beam propulsion infrastructure using lunar resources is IMO the only practical plan to actually explore and colonize the solar system in this century. We might not make it to the next century.
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And I forgot to give thanks to Ike (and all his soldiers) for his good work on that June 6 many decades ago.
Thanks Ike.
“We did not launch once every 6 days for two years and project horizon did not happen because there was no threat to easy money- and more important no easy money to be made.”
Sorry to disagree, but more likely reason is that Project Horizon could not have been accomplished within the 1970 time frame (even though the study said it could).
If the powers that be had been willing to spend at Apollo levels until maybe the 1980’s (and obviously they were not), then you might have gotten to a lunar landing using that method. Maybe that would have been a superior way to go, but it was not a politically practical one. The budget cuts would have probably hit about the time the hardware/operations development program was preparing to build an initial (and small) wet workshop.
We could very well be sitting here now looking at a history in which there was not only no lunar landing at all, but no American achievements in space beyond a two to four crew wet workshop for a couple of years. Imagine trying to have these debates if many of the same people who now argue that a human lunar program is “unsustainable” were still able to argue that it would be impossible.
“Sorry to disagree-“
No, you are right. I was not saying Horizon would have worked. I do not think the inferior lift vehicle/orbital depot/LEO assembly concept is viable at all. There is no substitute for an HLV with hydrogen upper stages. Of course you have read that talking point from me many times Joe.
The wet workshop to me is the way to build spaceship crew compartments. With no engine it is a space station but add some nuclear propulsion (in Lunar orbit) and Moonwater for cosmic ray shielding and you have a spaceship- which is always the best space station.
IMO the 260 inch monolithic solid rocket booster was what would have built a Moon base in the 80’s if we had just kept going instead of failing at the political level.
A pair of those on an uprated Saturn V with F-1A’s and some other mods would have put a much larger payload on the Moon in a cargo version. A very cool proposed design was to stretch a pair of AJ-260’s to accommodate aux LOX tanks at the top of the first stage so as to simplify the plumbing arrangement was really beautiful.
It was a tremendous mistake not keeping the Saturn V flying as the statements concerning the shuttle being more expensive per pound to orbit show.
Still the shuttle would be worth every penny if we just learn from the mistakes. Unfortunately a certain company is very successfully dumbing down the public in regards to those mistakes. All the old false promises are back and no one is throwing the B.S. flag (except a few private space haters)
It seems ironic that it really wasn’t until after the loss of Columbia that we really learned how to fly the shuttle right.
I.E, being able to leave the SSMEs in place rather than removing them after each flight for inspection, reduction of launch debris, ect.
Many “what ifs” come to mind too.
What if we went with the concept of using the Saturn V to launch the shuttle (from what I’ve seen, the shuttle would’ve been side-mounted to the third stage)?
What if we used an all-liquid shuttle (like Buran), with F-1A powered LRBs and J-2S powering the ET (which would have removed the need for the shuttle itself to have the RS-25s, leaving it only with the OMS)?
Speaking of Buran, what if we used LOX/RP-1 for the OMS? Would that have given us better performance in LEO?
Something else that people forget is that the goal of a spaceplane was, more or less, the focus of the human spaceflight program. And we would’ve had it quite early with the X-20 Dynasoar.
The shuttle simply was the result.
We also don’t see that the shuttle suceeded in one main respect: it made spaceflight routine, a goal that the commercial space companies want to achieve.
And the shuttle also opened up the doors for MORE people to fly into space. Again, a goal that commercial companies want to do.
So, while so much hype came about from these commercial companies regarding spaceflight, those that really appreciate what the shuttle did know that it already met those goals.
“-after the loss of Columbia that we really learned how to fly the shuttle right.”
No….it had no escape system- there was no way to fly it “right.” It was a deathtrap.
The airliner-to-space was never a reality. An airliner works within large tolerances- very large- and so rarely fails catastrophically. A rocket works necessarily at the very edge of failure.
Yes, I hate space analogy but sometimes I just have to take a shot at one;
Comparing an airliner with the space shuttle is like comparing a Honda civic with a top fuel dragster.
“-people forget is that the goal of a spaceplane was, more or less, the focus of the human spaceflight program.”
I am sorry but that is……just wrong. The goal was humankind in space- not wings and landing gear in a vacuum. Some things just do not make any sense at all.
The capsule with escape tower on top of the stack is like the 4 wheel configuration for wheeled land vehicles. It works the best. Half the planet is covered in water and even with a parachute failure it is still a survivable landing. Every shuttle landing was high drama IMO. Not even a system for a single missed approach and go around (everything was sacrificed to allow at least a mediocre payload. It was thread the needle or die.
When I mention the concept of a spaceplane being a goal, I refer to the path that we started on with the X-1 and the later series (X-15, X-20, the lifting bodies) that lead to the shuttle.
And when I refer to flying the shuttle “right”, I meant within it’s boundries, not with what it ought to have had.
That’s why I also think that something like Dreamchaser (or the HL-20, which IIRC is what it’s based on) would’ve been a better path to take for wings into space.
” Not even a system for a single missed approach and go around ”
Wasn’t this an upgrade planned for Buran to get?
“-when I refer to flying the shuttle “right”, I meant within it’s boundries, not with what it ought to have had.”
I understand- doing it as close to the original airliner-liner-to-space fantasy as possible. IMO bringing the SSME’s back was the devil in the details- and this mistake is where the the ultimate rocket engine, the RS-68, came from. The only part of the whole system that made any sense was the most damned- the SRB’s. And because they were segmented they were not powerful enough (rail limited diameter) and turned out more expensive than anyone expected. Building monolithic solids using submarine hull technology and barging them in was the better course but was killed for political payback to thiokol (or so it has been alledged).
Aerojet was so sure their giant solids were going to dominate launch vehicle technology that they built a huge facility in Florida and tested the most powerful booster ever fired there. It is abandoned now.
The point I am trying to make is that hauling 75 tons of wings, landing gear, cargo bay, and airframe into orbit- expending a huge amount of energy making it “go fast”- just to bring it all back down again was……stupid. It is opposite of what rocket science and the laws of physics call for if you want to put alot of mass into orbit. It was really sending three rockets up to do the work of one and doubling the cost of those three rockets by making them “reusable.” How did we make such a stupid mistake? We were conned in the same way we are being scammed right now by private space.
It is the oldest game there is; appeal to human greed and you can steal them blind. Tell people you can give them something for nothing and they will believe despite all evidence that it is too good to be true. The shuttle shell game was all about going cheap and we should know by now-
THERE IS NO CHEAP
The most informative I found on Shuttle history is the MIT opencourseware videos from 2005, http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/aeronautics-and-astronautics/16-885j-aircraft-systems-engineering-fall-2005/ particularly first video of Dale Myers mentioned in early planning of what almost happened was no human spaceflight by United States after the Skylab program (Apollo Soyuz was not yet scheduled). It could have been end of the line if Shuttle as it is was not approved. It had problems with design and high operating costs, but it could have easily not came to pass like MOL. Each lecture after has lots of fascinating stuff (i.e. tons of lead weight was placed in aft of orbiter to help pitch control on re-entry, yikes all that mass that goes up and down). There are also links to various documents including letters by Cap Weinberger, James Fletcher, George Low and others in 1970/1971 timeframe when key decisions were made.
Listening to those that were there gives reason at least what and why Shuttle is what it is. I wonder of what we are currently working (SLS, VSE, CCdev, etc) and Spudis pointed to his series on “VSE, a brief history” which I am currently digesting.
This is an old article; I know I am grave digging and yes this is a drive-by post. With that said do you know how many damn people die every day driving to work? That’s life. I am so sick of hearing how space travel is dangerous and the shuttle program was a death trap. People died; s*it happens. People die every day. In fact our nonsense useless wars kill thousands of times more people and waste hundreds of times more money than the shuttle program. I worked as a medic firefighter for years; if someone came to me tomorrow and wanted me to fly in a shuttle I would be there in a heartbeat. Look at the new Orion craft; it’s total garbage. This is what we get from a new generation that has to be politically correct; can’t hurt anyone’s “feelings” and have to be “sensitive” to people’s “needs”. Bunch of no balls Nancys’. People die every day from far worse stuff than exploring space. NASA has been far too cautious and has taken on a zero loss policy which is completely unrealistic compared to every day life on Earth.
If my company ever gets going I will spend every last dime rebuilding the shuttle program to its former greatness. Ugly? It’s one of the most beautiful spacecraft ever built. How can you call a tiny coffen on an oversized ICBM pretty? Go back to your old folks home and a time that should be forgotten. The Space Shuttle could have been the future but we are now left with a castrated space program.
Ugly? It was worse than ugly. It had no escape systems. They did at least give the crew parachutes though after Challenger.
The space shuttle could never have been the future. Not enough lift. What was required after Apollo was to roughly double or triple the thrust of the Saturn V.
Mike Leinbach (KSC launch director) said in a interview when looking at the smoke trail of STS-135 into the horizon, “I put my arm around my friend and said, ‘We will never see this again.'”
Watching 747/Endeavour fly over Ames I thought, “Never again will there ever be something like that.” Now everyone argues about whether Shuttle was economic or not, or it kept us in LEO for decades… these days we ***cannot*** design and build such a thing as much of the infrastructure is gone.